The capture of the frigate Esmeralda was a naval operation conducted on the night of 5 November 1820 during the Peruvian War of Independence. A division of boats with sailors and marines of the First Chilean Navy Squadron, commanded by Thomas Cochrane, stealthily advanced towards Callao and captured the 40-gun Spanish frigate in a cutting-out operation. The frigate was the most powerful Spanish warship in the region and the main objective of the operation.Fernández Duro 1903, p. 295. She was protected by a strong military defense that the Royalists had organized in the port.
Both ChileanVázquez de Acuña 2003, p. 164. and SpanishFernández Duro 1903, p. 297. historiography considers that as a result of this naval action the importance or maritime influence of the Spanish Navy in the Pacific disappeared completely. British historians Brian ValeVale 2008, pp. 115–116. and David J. CubittCubitt 1974, p. 309. follow the same line of opinion when affirming that Spain had unquestionably lost control of the sea against the Chilean Navy.
Background On 20 August 1820, the Liberating Expedition commanded by General José de San Martín sailed from Valparaíso to Peru. This force was escorted by the Chilean fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Cochrane.
From the beginning of the campaign, San Martín and Cochrane had differences regarding the military strategy that they should carry out in Peru.Vázquez de Acuña 2003, p. 159. The first wanted to avoid direct fighting, win over the population and press with indirect actions towards Lima. The second wanted to give a decisive blow to the Royalists with both army and navy. San Martín's line of thought prevailed.
The expeditionary force arrived on 7 September in Paracas, near Pisco.López Urrutia 2008, p. 144. San Martin established his headquarters to put pressure on the Royalists. The Viceroy Juaquin de la Pezuela entered into negotiations with San Martin, based on the new political situation in the Iberian Peninsula with the proclamation of the Spanish Constitution of 1812. However, the negotiations that took place between the end of September and the beginning of October, failed.Vázquez de Acuña 2003, p. 160.
At the beginning of October, San Martin sent a division of the army to the Peruvian highlands to win the territory over for the Patriots, giving the command of this force to General Juan Antonio Álvarez de Arenales.
On 9 October 1820, the garrison of Guayaquil mutinied and proclaimed the independence of the city. This event had material and moral consequences in favor of the revolutionary cause in Peru.Barros Arana 1894, p. 98.
On 26 October, the expeditionary force left Pisco towards the north, arriving on the 29th in front of Callao.Barros Arana 1894, pp. 87–88. The next day, San Martin went to Ancón with the purpose of executing military operations on land.Barros Arana 1894, p. 89. For his part, Cochrane occupied the island of San LorenzoFernández Duro 1903, p. 296. and stayed at the port's approaches to establish a rigorous blockade with several ships.
Blockade of Callao
Inactivity of the Spanish Navy
Since the arrival in September of the liberating expedition to the Peruvian coast, the Spanish Navy had not accomplished any effective actions to repel or at least harass the revolutionaries, granting them control of the sea.López Urrutia 2008, p. 145.Vázquez de Acuña 2003, p. 161. This was due to the inflexible defensive policy of the Viceroy Pezuela, and the incompetence of the Commanding General of Navy Antonio Vacaro.Fernández Duro 1903, pp. 294–295.
The Spanish fleet, based in Callao, was mainly formed by the frigates Prueba, Venganza and Esmeralda, together with several other armed ships. The first two frigates, commanded by Captain José Villegas, left the port on 10 October towards the Peruvian south coast with the purpose of embarking troops,Ortiz Sotelo 2015, p. 372. leaving the third frigate and the other ships under the impressive defense of the port, constituting a floating palisade that was protected with gunboats and batteries.Fernández Duro 1903, pp. 297–298. Vacaro made this third naval unit the flagship of the squadron under his command.
This was the situation of the Spanish fleet at the time when Cochrane had established the blockade of Callao on 30 October, having at his disposal the frigates and , and the corvette .López Urrutia 2008, p. 147.
The Cochrane plan The blockade was maintained without difficulty by the Chilean fleet, since the Spanish fleet remained entirely on the defensive. However, this inactivity, made Cochrane impatient, and led him to undertake naval action.
To break the monotony of the blockade, he planned to inflict a great blow on the Royalists in their strong defenses, similar to the capture of the defensive system of Valdivia earlier that year. On the basis of his own information and that of a subordinate,Cubitt 1974, p. 300. he decided to undertake a surprise assault, entering the port at night with several boats and seizing the Esmeralda by means of a boarding attack.Vale 2008, p. 111.Barros Arana 1894, p. 100. As a complement to this plan, he intended to capture or burn the other ships.López Urrutia 2008, pp. 149–150.Cubitt 1974, p. 301.
Cochrane began preparations for the attack that he had personally decided to direct, with his usual attention to detail.Barros Arana 1894, p. 99.Vale 2008, p. 112. For three days, the crew was trained to row silently and climb the sides of the ships, without informing them of their target.López Urrutia 2008, p. 148. On 1 November he had given instructions for the attack to his immediate subordinates.López Urrutia 2008, p. 149. On the night of 4 November, he practiced a reconnaissance in the bay, which was a test run for the operation executed the next night.
At dawn on 5 November, final preparations were made for the attack, and a speech by Cochrane was read to motivate the crew.
Opposing forces
Chilean Navy Cochrane gathered his 240 men chosen for the attack, of which 160 were sailors and 80 were marines. The team was composed of 92 men of O'Higgins, 99 of Lautaro and 49 of Independencia.
Regarding the nationality of the crew belonging to the navy that was chosen for the attack, Chilean historian Lopez Urrutia, and also Cubitt, give some figures:
Name of the ship Number of men Chileans ForeignersO'Higgins92??Lautaro9943 relative 56 relativeIndependecia4915 34 Total crew240??Total of officers32527
They embarked on 14 oared boats, divided into two groups:
The first group, formed by seven boats of O'Higgins, commanded by Captain Thomas Crosbie. The second group, formed by seven boats from Lautaro and Independencia, commanded by Captain Martin Guise.
Cochrane joined the first group to direct the attack, leaving Captain Robert Foster in charge of all the ships in his absence.
For the attack, they were armed with pistols, boarding axes, daggers or machetes, and short pikes. The attackers wore white jackets with a blue armband for recognition. If the clothes were not visible in the dark, the words "Gloria" and "Victoria" would be used as a signal.Ureta Muñoz 1993, p. 3.
The oars of the boats were wrapped in canvas to muffle noise when moving in the water.
Spanish Navy and defense of the port The Spanish Navy stationed in Callao, under the command of Vacaro, consisted of:Ortiz Sotelo 2015, p. 373.
Flagship Esmeralda (40Cubitt 1974, p. 293. guns), commanded by Captain Luis Coig. On the frigate, in addition to the sailors, were on board some troops of the Real Carlos battalion and army gunners.Ortiz Sotelo 2015, p. 374. There was a crew of 313 between officers and men.
Brig Maipú (16Ortiz Sotelo 2015, p. 419. guns), under the command of Lieutenant Antonio Madroño.Fernández Duro 1903, p. 299. Brig Pezuela (20Ortiz Sotelo 2015, p. 421. guns), under the command of Lieutenant Ramón Bañuelos. Pailebot Aránzazu (11Ortiz Sotelo 2015, p. 434. guns), commanded by his private pilot Juan Agustín de Ibarra.
There were also 14Fernández Duro 1903, p. 298. to 24 gunboats and an undetermined number of armed merchant ships.
In addition to the naval squadron, there was the artillery of the fortresses and batteries of the port in charge of Brigadier Juan Francisco Sánchez, which consisted:
Fortresses of Real Felipe, San Rafael and San Miguel. Batteries of the Arsenal and San Juaquín.
The defensive formation of the royalists consisted of a floating barrier formed by trunks attached to chains, which protected the approaches to the ships and left only a small opening for entry or exit. This floating chain was guarded by the gunboats, and behind this chain were anchored Esmeralda, Maipú (these two at the northern end of the roadstead) Pezuela and Aránzazu, forming the head of the line of ships. In the rear were the armed merchant ships. All this defensive disposition of the squadron was also protected by the batteries of the port. It was an imposing defensive disposition.
Battle
On the afternoon of 5 November, Cochrane ordered Lautaro and Independencia to sea, leaving O'Higgins near the island of San Lorenzo, and on its hidden side, the boats with their crew destined to attack. With this movement he succeeded in deceiving the Royalists. At 10 o'clock at night, the boats separated from O'Higgins, approaching the entrance of the floating chain that protected the Spanish ships.López Urrutia 2008, p. 150. The boats advanced in two parallel columns under Crosbie and Guise.
The Chilean force sailed to reach the coast near the battery of San Juaquín, which defended the northern end of the port, and then went between the San Miguel fortress and the anchorage of neutral ships, hiding them from view. The neutrals were very close to the opening of the floating chain. When passing through that place, they found the frigates USS Macedonian and HMS Hyperion, which were the closest to the entrance of the Royalist defense. The American ship, upon seeing them, wished them good luck in the attack, while the British hailed the boats to establish their identities. The hail was not heard by the Royalists in the port. All this silent movement carried out until now to approach the roadstead, had lasted two hours.Barros Arana 1894, p. 101.
At midnight, the boats arrived at the entrance to the floating chain barrier and saw a gunboat guarding the place, with a lieutenant and 14 men on board, so they approached and surprised her, managing to capture her with the crew and preventing an alert. They then passed the chain, and at approximately 12:30 a.m. on 6 November, they approached Esmeralda and boarded from opposite sides simultaneously. Crosbie's column, at whose head was Cochrane, attacked to starboard, while Guise's column to port. At that time, Coig was in the cabin talking to some officers, and the crew was sleeping, many of them on the deck. Only the guards were on watch.
The sleepy crew, newly aware of the attack, took up arms to counter-attack, but as Cochrane later stated: "the Chilean machetes did not give them much time to organize and recover their spirit".Barros Arana 1894, p. 102. But in spite of the surprise, they gave some resistance in the places that were attacked, giving rise to a bloody fight with sharp weapons and firearms. However, the impetus of the Chilean attack was irresistible and soon occupied the quarterdeck, the frigate's quarters and the stern.Vale 2008, pp. 112–113.