The Capture of Beaumont-Hamel was a tactical incident that took place during the Battle of the Somme (1 July – 18 November 1916) in the Battle of the Ancre during the second British attempt to take the village. Beaumont-Hamel is a commune in the Somme department of Picardy in northern France. The village had been attacked on 1 July, the First Day of the Somme. The German 2nd Army (General Fritz von Below) defeated the attack, inflicting many British and Newfoundland Regiment casualties.
On 1 July 1916, the 29th Division attacked at ten minutes after a mine under the Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt had been blown. The explosion alerted the Germans nearby, who occupied the far lip of the crater and pinned down British troops in no man's land on either side, where they were caught by German artillery-fire. White German signal rockets were mistaken for success flares and the 88th Brigade, including the Newfoundland Regiment, advanced from behind the British front line. The few parties that crossed no man's land found uncut wire. Reserve Infantry Regiment 119 had been in deep dugouts () and emerged to defeat the attack. The Newfoundlanders suffered of the 29th Division total of
By early November, the British in the south were ready to attack northwards towards the Ancre river, simultaneous with an attack eastwards on the north side of the river to capture Beaumont-Hamel and Serre-lès-Puisieux. On 13 November, in thick fog, the 51st (Highland) Division outflanked Beaumont-Hamel on both sides and forced the garrison to surrender. Infantry and artillery co-operation was conspicuously superior to 1 July; barrages were better aimed and more destructive, cut off the German front line from the rear and neutralised German guns; mopping up parties had been given detailed objectives in the German defences. The German garrison was able to repulse an initial frontal attack but were surrounded in the fog and surrendered later in the day.
Background
Beaumont-Hamel
The Ancre river flows west to Hamel then turns south through a valley past Miraumont, Grandcourt, Beaucourt-sur-l'Ancre and St Pierre Divion. On the north side of the river, the Auchonville Spur (with a lower feature called Hawthorn Ridge) and Beaucourt Spur, which descends from Colincamps and Grandcourt Spur, with the village of Serre-lès-Puisieux (Serre) on its summit to the north, point south-west down to the river. The Colincamps–Beaucourt Spur has a slight east–west rise, north of Beaumont-Hamel, which became known as Redan Ridge to the British. In the shallow valley between the Auchonvillers and Beaucourt spurs lies the village of Beaumont-Hamel and the road to Auchonvillers, with a branch known to the British from 1915 as Y Ravine, cutting into the south side of Hawthorn Ridge. Beaucourt Valley contains the road from Beaucourt to Puisieux, which lies to the south of Serre.
1914
The 26th (Württemberg) Reserve Division Franz von Soden) of the XIV Reserve Corps ( Hermann von Stein to 29 October then Georg Fuchs), arrived on the Somme in late September 1914, attempting to advance westwards towards Amiens. By 7 October the advance had ended and the troops occupied temporary scrapes. Fighting in the area from the Somme northwards to the Ancre subsided into minor line-straightening attacks. Underground warfare began and continued when the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) took over from the French Second Army at the end of July 1915. Miners brought from Germany late in 1914 tunnelled under Beaumont-Hamel and the vicinity to excavate shelters for the infantry, against which even heavy artillery could cause little damage.
Prelude
British plan
The German front line ran northwards along the east side of Auchonvillers spur, round Y ravine to Hawthorn Ridge, across the Beaumont-Hamel valley to the Beaucourt spur and the Grandcourt spur, west of Serre. No man's land tapered from south to north from and was devoid of cover, except for a sunken lane north of the Auchonvillers–Beaumont-Hamel road. The German front line ran along small salients and re-entrants, with plenty of cover in the valleys behind and well-camouflaged dugouts and house cellars. Beaumont-Hamel had been fortified and from it, German machine-gunners commanded the valley in front; artillery-observers on Beaucourt ridge had a good view over the British lines; even the British field guns could be seen. From the British front line, only the German front and support trenches were visible down the slope; its convex nature obstructed British heavy artillery and much of it remained undamaged on 1 July. The 29th Division held the east side of the Auchonvillers spur, its right flank north-east of the Auhonvillers–Beaumont-Hamel road and the left flank close to the top of Beaumont-Hamel valley, next to the 4th Division.
The 29th Division was to advance eastwards across the Beaumont-Hamel valley to the German intermediate line on the Beaucourt spur, thence to the second position. The infantry had hours for the advance and then Lewis gun teams were to form an outpost line. Because of the taper of no man's land, the leading waves were to stagger their departure to be from the German front trench by Zero-hour. The 18-pounder field guns were to make six lifts, starting from the German front trench at zero and lengthening their range by per minute. German machine-gun nests and shelters were to be destroyed by the divisional 4.5-inch howitzers. Two 18-pounder batteries were to be ready to move at short notice and the Royal Engineers were to wait behind the infantry to repair roads, build water points and consolidate strong points during the night. Three tunnels were dug forward on the 29th Division front and a mine with was placed under Hawthorn Ridge redoubt opposite Beaumont-Hamel. After some argument, the timing of the mine detonation was set for ten minutes before zero-hour, to allow the British infantry to occupy the crater before the main attack began at The barrage had to lift early all along the VIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston) front, to avoid hitting the advanced parties at the crater.
German preparations
Many of the German units on the Somme had been there since 1914 and had made great efforts to fortify the defensive line, particularly with barbed-wire entanglements so that the front trench could be held with fewer troops. Railways, roads and waterways connected the battlefront to the Ruhr from where material for (dugouts) underground for each had been excavated every and the front had been divided into (barrage sectors). Each officer was expected to know the batteries covering his section of the front line and the batteries had to be ready to engage fleeting targets. In 1915, a second position another back from the strongpoint line () was begun in February and was nearly complete on the Somme when the battle began. A telephone system was built with lines buried deep for to connect the front line to the artillery.
The trenches of the front position were on a forward slope, lined by white chalk from the subsoil and easily seen by ground observers. The defences were crowded towards the front trench, with a regiment having two battalions near the front-trench system and the reserve battalion divided between the and the second position, all within of the front line, most of the troops being no more than from the front line, accommodated in the new deep dugouts. The concentration of troops so far forward and on the slope guaranteed that they would face the bulk of an artillery bombardment, directed by ground observers, on clearly marked lines. Digging and wiring of a new third position began in May; civilians were moved away and stocks of ammunition and hand-grenades were increased in the front-line.
By mid-June, Below and Rupprecht expected an attack on the 2nd Army, which held the front from north of Gommecourt south to Noyon, although Falkenhayn was more concerned about an offensive in Alsace-Lorraine and then an attack on the 6th Army, which held the front north of the 2nd Army from Gommecourt northwards to St Eloi near Ypres. In April, Falkenhayn had suggested a spoiling attack by the 6th Army but lack of troops and artillery, which were engaged in the offensive at Verdun, made it impractical. Some labour battalions and captured Russian heavy artillery were sent to the 2nd Army. Below proposed a preventive attack in May and then a reduced operation from Ovillers to St. Pierre Divion in June but only received another artillery regiment. On 6 June, Below reported that an offensive at Fricourt and Gommecourt had been indicated by air reconnaissance and that the south bank had been reinforced by the French, against whom the XVII Corps (s to 7 September then ) was overstretched, with twelve regiments holding and no reserves.
In mid-June, Falkenhayn deprecated an offensive on the Somme, since a great success would lead to operations in Belgium, rather than Germany. More railway activity, fresh digging and camp extensions around Albert, opposite the 2nd Army, was seen by German air observers on and spies reported an imminent offensive. On 24 June, a British prisoner spoke of a five-day bombardment to begin on 26 June and local units expected an attack within days. On 27 June, were visible, one for each British division but no reinforcements were sent to the area until 1 July and only then to the 6th Army, which was given control of the three divisions in reserve behind it. At Verdun on 24 June, Crown Prince Wilhelm was ordered to conserve troops, ammunition and equipment and further restrictions were imposed on 1 July, when two divisions were taken over by Falkenhayn. By 30 June, the 2nd Army had in six (reconnaissance flights: four (artillery flights: (Bomber-Fighter Squadron 1: (Bomber-Fighter Flight 32: and a (single-seat fighter detachment:
1 July
29th Division
87th Brigade
The 87th Brigade (Brigadier-General C. H. T. Lucas) of the regular 29th Division attacked on the right, where the edge of Y Ravine was visible but the German wire and front line was mostly out of sight on the far side of a convex (outward curving) slope. The terrain followed the line of Beaumont-Hamel valley and the edge of the ravine, a re-entrant, from which the Germans could engage an attacker with cross-fire. The 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers attacked to the right of Y Ravine, lost many men in the advance then found uncut wire; a few parties got through and were trapped. The 2nd South Wales Borderers attacked to the left of the ravine and were mostly stopped in no man's land; by the battalion had been annihilated, apart from a few men lying in no man's land.
German artillery east of Beaucourt Ridge and heavy batteries beyond had commenced barrage fire () on the British trenches soon after the advance began. The two battalions in support were devastated by the German guns as they moved forward to the front line. The battalions were to advance into no man's land at but the fire of German machine-guns led both commanders asking for a pause to re-bombard the German lines; white flares fired by the Germans were mistaken for the British signal that the first objective had been taken and the attack went ahead. The infantry bunched at the lanes through the British wire and were cut down by machine-guns ranged on the gaps. The survivors trickled forward from shell-hole to shell-hole until forced to stop well short of the German line. The rigidity of the corps artillery plan meant that the barrage moved on, giving no assistance.
86th Brigade