Ramrod 16 was an attempt by the Royal Air Force (RAF) to bomb the Koninklijke Hoogovens (Royal Blast Furnaces) steelworks at IJmuiden in the Netherlands during the Second World War. After several recent abortive attacks a more elaborate plan was made for six Douglas Boston IIIA light bombers of 107 Squadron to attack again, with a Ramrod as a diversion. (Ramrod was the RAF term for bomber operations intended to induce fighters into action for British fighter escorts to attack.) Ramrod 16 was to be flown by twelve Lockheed Ventura Mk II bombers of No. 487 Squadron RNZAF against the Hemweg power station in Amsterdam, not far upriver from IJmuiden.
Thirteen Spitfire squadrons from 11 Group, Fighter Command, were to fly Rodeo 212 to Vlissingen (Flushing), to the south-west of Amsterdam, as another diversion. The Venturas were to be escorted by three squadrons of Spitfires from 12 Group, Fighter Command. Two squadrons of high-flying Spitfire Mk IXs were to wait off the Dutch coast, available for contingencies and eight Mustang fighters were to protect the Bostons on their return from IJmuiden, three more Spitfire squadrons covering the return of the Venturas.
The raid began in the late afternoon of 3 May 1943 but Rodeo 212 arrived early and at height, alerting the Germans. The first three 107 Squadron Bostons missed the IJmuiden steelworks but the second formation obtained direct hits. The Venturas of 487 Squadron got ahead of most of their escort and met an unexpectedly large number of German fighters, the local contingent having, by coincidence, been temporarily reinforced. All but one of the Venturas were shot down before bombing and a German Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter was shot down by the last Ventura, flown by Squadron Leader Leonard Trent, whose bombs overshot the power station; Trent was shot down moments later.
Morale of the three Ventura squadrons in 2 Group was severely shaken by the losses but 487 Squadron was rebuilt, returned to operations at the end of the month and was re-equipped with de Havilland Mosquitos later in the year. The full story of the raid became known when Trent was repatriated from a German prison camp in 1945. Trent was awarded a Victoria Cross and his navigator, Flight Lieutenant Vivian Phillips, received a Distinguished Service Order.
Background
Bomber Command, 1939
On 4 September 1939, five out of ten Bristol Blenheim bombers were shot down making low-level attacks on German warships in daylight, along with two out of fourteen Vickers Wellington bombers. On 29 September, five Handley-Page Hampden bombers flew another raid against German warships and all were shot down. Few operations were possible in October and November due to weather but on 3 December, 24 Wellingtons were sent to attack German ships. The Wellingtons were intercepted by German Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Messerschmitt Bf 110 fighters and engaged by German anti-aircraft guns (); no bombers were lost and one Bf 109 was claimed shot down, later confirmed by German records. On 14 December, Wellingtons made another attack and five were shot down, another crashing in England. On 18 December, 22 Wellingtons attacked again, flying at to evade , thought to be the main cause of recent losses. Flying at higher altitude and taking a longer route to avoid neutral territory, the Wellingtons were easier to detect by German radar. Around 100 German fighters were scrambled to intercept the bombers and the Wellingtons were intercepted by cannon-armed Bf 110s and machine-gun armed Bf 109Ds. In what became known as the Battle of the Heligoland Bight, eleven Wellingtons were shot down, one ditched in the North Sea and six crashed in England. Only one group of Wellingtons had bombed, the other had refrained to avoid civilian casualties; the Germans lost three fighters to return fire.
The extent of the loss "stunned" RAF leaders, exploding their belief that tight formations of bombers, equipped with machine-gun turrets, could defeat attack by day fighters. From January 1940, the Wellington and Hampden day bombers joined the specialist Armstrong-Whitworth Whitley night bombers in flying leaflet-dropping missions over Germany. The Fairey Battle and Blenheim light day bombers of the Advanced Air Striking Force in France and 2 Group in England also devoted considerable time to night-flying training. During the Battle of France the AASF and 2 Group flew day and night sorties, the Battles of the AASF suffering losses of 75 per cent by day from 10 to 14 May and 0.5 per cent by night. During the battle, the AASF lost 137 Battles and 37 Blenheims; 2 Group lost 98 Blenheims.
Leaning forward into France
Following its victory in the Battle of Britain, 1940, Fighter Command began sending fighter squadrons over northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands to engage the . The policy was known as "Leaning forward into France" and begun by Air Chief Marshal Sholto Douglas, who had replaced Hugh Dowding as Air Officer Commanding in chief Fighter Command on 25 November 1940. From December 1940, 11 Group flew Rhubarbs, raids by two or three fighters attacking targets of opportunity; Rodeos, fighter sweeps over enemy territory without bombers, which the usually ignored and Circuses, small numbers of bombers from 2 Group, escorted by large numbers of fighters. The objective of the operations was to attack ground targets, destroy any fighters which opposed the raids and keep them in Western Europe. Ramrods were bomber sorties escorted by fighters, primarily intended to destroy a ground target and inflict losses by the escorts on German fighters trying to intervene.
From December 1940 to June 1941, Fighter Command flew 104 Rhubarbs and eleven Circuses. In Bomber Command only 2 Group still flew day bombers and Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, beginning on 22 June, gave the group added significance. The withdrew its squadrons from coastal airfields to bases further inland, from where they could decline combat or engage RAF fighters in places where the British fighters were at a tactical disadvantage for lack of fuel. To force the to transfer fighter units from the Eastern Front and to inflict damage on communications in the west, the offensive over France was increased, Fighter Command devoting about a third of its aircraft to the operations until the end of the year. The effort was a failure, no German fighters being transferred from the USSR to reinforce the two (fighter groups) in the west. The Fighter Command loss was 51 pilots by June 1941 but another 411 were lost by years' end, a greater loss than July to October 1940.
Fighter Command made "enormously exaggerated estimates of German losses", from June to the end of December 1941 claiming 731 aircraft against a real loss of 154 aircraft, 51 of which were not lost to RAF action. By late January 1942, transfers of day fighters and anti-aircraft units had been identified by the British and Ultra decryption of German signals coded with the Enigma machine uncovered the transfer of 30 of the newest German fighter type to the Russian front and 40 from the Pas de Calais to northern Norway for anti-convoy operations. The day offensive resumed on 24 March 1942 and received a vigorous reply from the ; by 19 April, Ultra decrypts had revealed a reinforcement of the western air front, of the 180 single-engined fighters in the Pas de Calais, 120 were the new Focke-Wulf Fw 190, which outclassed the Spitfire Mk V.
By mid-June, Fighter Command had suffered 259 losses for the loss of 58 German fighters, against Fighter Command claims to have destroyed 197. On 6 July, Ultra revealed that the was struggling to supply aircraft to north Africa, had imposed limits on operations in Russia and ordered a vast increase in fighter output from the , which was taken to mean that the Fighter Command offensive had greatly contributed to the German difficulties. The offensive continued at a lesser rate, to tie down Fw 190 units and to maintain a measure of air superiority along the Channel coast, until the maximum effort during the Dieppe Raid (19 August 1942). In 2 Group, obsolete Blenheim bombers began to be replaced by faster and more versatile Douglas Boston, Lockheed Ventura and de Havilland Mosquito day bombers.
Prelude
2 Group raids
The three squadrons of 2 Group equipped with Douglas Bostons, began replacing their aircraft with new Boston Mk IIIAs in March 1943, flying training sorties and sea search operations. The first squadron to resume offensive operations was 107 Squadron on 1 May; Caen was attacked but the raid was thwarted by cloud cover. On 2 May, 107 Squadron attacked the Koninklijke Hoogovens (Royal Blast Furnaces) steelworks at IJmuiden on the coast, missed the works but hit barges and dock installations nearby. Spitfire Mk IXe fighters of 331 (Norwegian) Squadron claimed three Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighters. The Venturas of 464 Squadron (Royal Australian Air Force, RAAF) also attacked the steel works, escorted by the Spitfire Vbs of 118 Squadron. The bombers flew the usual wave top height approach over the North Sea then made a battle climb (a fast climb to bombing height). The Venturas received moderate as they attacked, also missed the steelworks but hit the coking works, sulphate plant and other ancillary works, along with three ships, two of which sank. The Venturas were caught out on the return journey by FW 190s, which damaged two of the bombers for two FW 190s claimed shot down by the escorts.
Plan
Ramrod 16 was another attempt on the IJmuiden steelworks by six Boston IIIAs with a diversion provided by twelve Ventura Mk II bombers of 487 Squadron (Royal New Zealand Air Force, RNZAF) on 3 May. In bright blue skies, sunshine and a warm day, the fourteen crews of 487 Squadron were briefed for the raid at RAF Methwold their base in Norfolk. The crews were told that they were to attack the Hemweg power station (the Papaverweg Powerplant; 52.39786815883844, 4.900222647021094) at the north end of Amsterdam, about from IJmuiden, to "encourage the Dutch resistance to resist German pressure in Holland and to aid Dutch workmen in organising disobedience". Twelve aircraft were to fly on the operation with three Spitfire squadrons as close escort. The Ventura crews were told to expect determined opposition but to press on at all costs. B Flight, 487 Squadron, led by its commander, Squadron Leader Leonard Trent and the deputy flight commander, Flight Lieutenant A. V. Duffill, was to be followed by A Flight, the result of a coin toss with the A Flight commander, Squadron Leader Jack Meakin. The plan was to bomb at dusk for the Venturas to benefit from the gathering darkness and return under cover night.
The Venturas were to rendezvous over RAF Coltishall at at an altitude lower than with the Spitfire Mk Vs of the close escort comprising 118 Squadron, 167 Squadron and 504 Squadron. The Spitfire Mark IX had a performance similar to that of the Messersmitt Bf 109G and Focke Wulf 190A fighters but only ten Fighter Command squadrons had been equipped with it by mid-1943, due to shortage of engines and despatches to overseas squadrons. Most domestic Spitfire squadrons were left flying obsolete Mk Vs, restricted to close escort of bombers. The bombers were to fly at Indicated airspeed (IAS) for 33 minutes across the North Sea, keeping below German radar until they were ten minutes from the Dutch coast, then perform a battle climb (fast and steep) at to and head straight for the target, to retain a degree of surprise. Fighter Command operations to protect bombers consisted of target support (or forward support) a sweep by fighter squadrons kept available for contingencies, close escort with the bombers, high cover for the close escort and rear support to escort the bombers home and engage any German fighters when the other escorts were low on fuel and ammunition.