Nuclear safeguards are a set of technical, legal and institutional measures, used to verify that nuclear materials, facilities and technologies are adopted only for peaceful purposes and not directed towards developing nuclear weapons in accordance to the legal obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).acc
Safeguards measures are designed for the early detection of diversion of nuclear material from declared facilities, undeclared processing or production of nuclear material, and undeclared nuclear material or activities in member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards operate at overlapping levels which include national systems of accounting and control by individual states, regional verification organizations, and the international safeguards system implemented by the IAEA.
Safeguards form one of the central pillars of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The NPT is the foundational tool of this regime and is built around three pillars: achieving non-proliferation, moving towards nuclear disarmament, and allowing for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article III of the NPT requires all non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty to accept verification, in the form of safeguards, from the IAEA on all peaceful nuclear materials, to ensure they are not diverted to non-peaceful applications. In addition to comprehensive safeguards agreements concluded under the NPT, safeguards are also implemented in states that are not party to the NPT, such as India, Pakistan, and Israel, on the basis of item-specific agreements concluded with the IAEA.
While the IAEA is the principal international verification authority, safeguards are not implemented by the organization alone. At the international level, nuclear safeguards are implemented by the IAEA, but regional organizations also play a major verification role. Such regional organizations include the Euratom in the European Union and the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in South America and treaty-based nuclear-weapon-free zones that impose their own regional safeguards obligations. These regional and bilateral arrangements operate alongside, and in coordination with the IAEA, providing an additional layer of assurance between neighbouring or allied states. In practice, safeguards rely on a combination of verification techniques rather than a single method. These include nuclear material accounting, advanced non-destructive assay technologies such as neutron counting and gamma-ray spectroscopy, containment and surveillance measures and environmental sampling.
International safeguards: The IAEA system
Internationally, nuclear safeguards are primarily implemented by the IAEA, under the authority granted to it by the NPT and the IAEA's own Statute. States that have joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states are required to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA, under which the IAEA verifies that all nuclear material in the state's nuclear activities are free from diversion to weapons purposes. Many states have also adopted an additional protocol (AP), which extends the IAEA's access to information and areas beyond the scope of the CSA, and a smaller number of states outside the NPT have adopted facility-specific safeguards agreements. As of 2024, the IAEA have applied safeguards in 190 states with agreements in force, carrying out thousands of inspections annually across nuclear facilities worldwide.
Regional safeguards systems
Euratom safeguards
The Euratom treaty which established the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), is the foundation for the peaceful use of nuclear materials and technologies in the European Union and establishes a system, known as "Euratom safeguards”. The legal basis for Euratom safeguards is found in Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty, and Article 77 requires the Commission to ensure that there is no diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses. All users of nuclear materials within the EU are expected to provide information on their installations and report on the flows and inventories to the Commission, as outlined in Commission Regulation. The Commission verifies the correctness, completeness, and coherence of these declarations through documents review and physical on-site inspections at nuclear installations, after which it draws annual safeguards conclusions. Nuclear material accountancy and physical verification are the two main pillars of the Euratom safeguards system, with non-destructive assay techniques as a main verification method applied.
Euratom safeguards and IAEA safeguards are agreed within the scope of trilateral agreements involving member states, the Commission, and the IAEA. Because all EU member states are IAEA members and NPT parties, two multilateral safeguards agreements have been concluded: one between EU non-nuclear-weapon member states, Euratom, and the IAEA; and a separate agreement between France, Euratom, and the IAEA, reflecting France's status as a nuclear-weapon state. In implementing these agreements, the Commission and the IAEA collaborate closely by performing joint inspections and using common instruments and tools, while maintaining the ability to draw independent conclusions.
The European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) provides research and development activities to provide assurance that nuclear safeguards is implemented and nuclear materials are used for civilian purposes as declared. The scientific activities of the JRC focuses on developing new concepts, tools and approaches for safeguards verification and to deliver education and training to safeguards inspectors and students.
Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
The Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) established by Argentina and Brazil in 1991, is a binational safeguards body, created to verify that both countries use nuclear materials for only peaceful purposes. ABACC adopts the Common System of Accounting and Control (SCCC), a full-scope safeguards regime covering all nuclear material and activities in both countries, applied through bilateral inspections carried out by mutual technical experts drawn equally from each side. ABACC's role is reinforced by the Quadripartite Agreement, signed in December 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the IAEA, which placed all nuclear facilities in both countries under IAEA safeguards in addition to ABACC's own bilateral verification. This layered structure means that nuclear material in Argentina and Brazil is subject to inspection by both a regional body and the IAEA. ABACC is widely cited as a confidence-building model for resolving regional proliferation concerns through bilateral cooperation rather than reliance on international oversight alone, and its establishment contributed to the ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and accession to the NPT during the 1990s.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones A nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) is a region in which countries pledge not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons. It creates a legal basis for strengthened regional safeguards obligations. There are five treaties on regional NWFZ covering Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia. The safeguards provisions set out in NWFZ treaties are similar to those in the NPT, as they require state parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The Treaty of Semipalatinsk also requires state parties to conclude an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, which grants wider access to information and locations in a country. +Treaties of the NWFZTreatyRegionYearSafeguards requirementTreaty of TlatelolcoLatin America & Caribbean1967CSA with IAEATreaty of RarotongaSouth Pacific1985CSA with IAEATreaty of BangkokSoutheast Asia1995CSA with IAEATreaty of PelindabaAfrica1996CSA with IAEATreaty of SemipalatinskCentral Asia2006CSA + AP required
National systems of accounting and control (SSACs) Under the NPT, each state party accepts safeguards in line with a bilateral agreement with the IAEA, and this requires the state to establish a state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) to support the verification process. The performance of national safeguards authorities and their SSACs has a significant impact on the effectiveness of implementing IAEA safeguards. The SSAC forms the basis of a state's reporting to the IAEA about the presence of nuclear materials in the state. While the IAEA is responsible for independently verifying that nuclear material is not diverted, control of nuclear material itself is treated under INFCIRC/153 as the responsibility of the state. A safeguards agreement detailed in INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) is required to provide that the state shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the agreement. The agreement mandates the Agency to examine the efficiency of the SSAC in carrying out its mission and to appropriately assess the success of SSACs.
Types of safeguards measures The effective implementation of nuclear safeguards depends on a combination of verification techniques rather than an individual method. Nuclear material accountancy is an essential safeguards measure applied with containment and surveillance measures which helps to verify that the flow of nuclear materials and inventories are as declared by the state under CSA and AP. These tools form a strategic verification system designed to detect both the diversion of declared material and the presence of undeclared activities.
Nuclear material accountancy Nuclear material accounting is the process of determining the quantities of nuclear material within defined areas and tracking changes in those quantities over specified periods. Nuclear material accountancy is the practical implementation of this process by the facility operator, the state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC), and the IAEA to fulfill the requirements of the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and the State (or group of States). It ensures that nuclear material is accurately accounted for, that the required reports are timely submitted to the IAEA, and that the IAEA can independently verify the accuracy and completeness of the accounting records.
Containment and surveillance Containment and surveillance (C/S) measures are used to maintain continuity of knowledge of nuclear material and facilities between IAEA inspections. These measures include the use of seals, cameras, and other monitoring devices to prevent undetected access to or movement of nuclear material. When used alongside nuclear material accounting, C/S measures help the IAEA verify the correctness of accounting records while reducing the need for frequent physical verification activities. The IAEA also relies on remote and unattended monitoring systems to continuously observe nuclear material in the absence of inspectors. Currently, nearly 300 unattended systems, some of which transmit data directly to IAEA, support the effective and efficient maintenance of continuity of knowledge.
Environmental sampling