The Soskovets campaign strategy refers to the strategy devised by Oleg Soskovets for Boris Yeltsin's 1996 reelection campaign for the Presidency of Russia. This strategy served as the initial template for Yeltsin's campaign before being discarded by March 1996.
The strategy was created under the premise that, in order to defeat nationalists and protofacist candidates in the 1996 election, Yeltsin would need to co-opt their policies. The strategy, however, failed to produce a rise in Yeltsin's poll numbers. The strategy was also a partial motive for Yeltsin's aggressive response to Chechen discord. His aggressive response in Chechnya initiated a highly unpopular war and consequentially had a significantly negative impact on his approval rating.
A plethora of coinciding factors persuaded Yeltsin to officially abandon the strategy by mid-March 1996.
History Conception The campaign strategy had been devised by Oleg Soskovets in response to the defeat of pro-Yeltsin parties in the 1993 and 1995 legislative elections. To craft the strategy, Soskovets worked alongside others such as Alexander Korzhakov. Soskovets had come to the conclusion that for Yeltsin to win in 1996, he would need to adopt some of Zhirinovsky's style of rhetoric. Per Soskovet's assessment, Yelstin would need to position himself as an intermediate between the reformers and the Zhirinovsky-style proto-fascists by coopting the platforms of both. Yeltsin had grown distrusting of leading politicians and organizations of the reformist political movement. This contributed to Yeltsin's willingness to abandon many elements of reformist politics that he had previously championed. Soskovets earned influence as Yeltsin began ousting a number of reformists from his inner-circle.
Rise of the strategy With Soskovets having become one of the most influential members of his inner circle, Yeltsin began to take steps to acquire a more nationalist image. To illustrate his new partial embrace of nationalism, Yeltsin spoke in his 1995 State of the Federation Speech of plans to strengthen the state by cracking down on crime. Yelstin issued harsh rhetoric against foes to the nation.
The cluster bombing of Chechnya bolstered the image of a more nationalist Yeltsin presidency. However, the bombings failed to produce any immediate improvement of Yeltsin's popularity. While the military action may have boosted Yeltsin's nationalist credentials, the war was opposed by the majority of Russians. Yeltsin's failure's to cleanly end the Chechen revolt had cost him support amongst the ranks of Russia's more liberal politicians. However it had earned him support in some consequential fractions of the armed forces. Nezavisimaya Gazeta editor Vitaly Tretyakov reported that, in the midst of this military action, perception of Yeltsin's grip on power was so weak that Russia's political elite was anticipating an eventual coup. Tretyakov even said that Russia's political elite would have been surprised if one did not occur.
Despite the aforementioned turmoil that the Soskovets strategy had ignited, it was not abandoned. Contrarily, it was soon adopted even further. This is due to the fact that the failure of reformist parties in the 1995 legislative elections bolstered Soskovet's argument. In the aftermath of the 1995 parliamentary elections, hard-liners championing the Soskovets strategy momentarily acquired a stronger role in Yeltsin's administration, as they were able to convince Yeltsin that the results of the legislative elections were proof that campaigning as a reformist would be disastrous for him. Many Yeltsin's inner-circle had also come to momentarily interpret the communist showing in 1995 as a protest vote against Yeltsin's economic reform program. They viewed the strong showing of Zhirinovsky's party as evidence that Russians desired a strong, decisive leader that would fight crime, terrorism and disorder, thus leading them agree to comply with Soskovets' strategy.
Yeltsin saw little use for reform-minded democrats. He was now convinced that in order to defeat Zyuganov, he would have to play the game similarly to the communists. Soskovets was appointed by Yeltsin as the coordinator of his still-unannounced reelection campaign.
There was some legitimacy to the premise of Soskovets' strategy. In early 1996, polling showed the concept of law and order to have strong appeal with Russians. Polls showed that rural dwellers were most concerned with having a strong country and that individuals in small towns were most concerned with the prosperity of the nation. The majority of individuals in other large cities were primarily concerned about social security. Freedom only polled as a leading concern for Muscovites. In fact, amongst the nation as a whole, freedom as well as equality and justice ranked relatively low as a primary concern of voters.
In January 1996 Yeltsin signaled his plunge further into the Soskovets strategy. In what was seen as a final break between Yeltsin and reformist democrats, he fired three key reformers from his government (Andrei Kozyrev, Sergei Filatov and Anatoly Chubais). His replacement for Kozyrov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov, earned him praise from nationalist figures, including both Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky. His replacement for Filatov as Chief of Presidential Administration, Nikolai Yegorov, was considered a hard-lined nationalist. These appointments were angled in accordance with the Soskovets strategy, allowing Yeltsin's administration to achieve a more nationalist image. Yeltsin also officially appointed Soskovets the head of his campaign effort. Yegorov, Korzhakov and Mikhail Barsukov also assumed leadership roles in the campaign effort. As part of the team, Yegorov found himself tasked with the responsibility of coordinating the campaign's collaboration with regional leaders.
Shortly after the aforementioned changes to his administration, Yeltsin ordered the payment of more than $700 million in back-wages to government employees. Additionally, in late January Yeltsin amped up his military efforts in Chechnya. This attempt to use military might to boost a more nationalist image for his presidency had disastrous results. Massive force was used against Chechen fighters and their hostages in Pervomaiskoe, Dagestan. Many civilians were killed, while Chechen leaders were able to escape. As a result of this humiliation, Yeltsin vowed he would end the war through a military victory rather than negotiation.
In February 1996, Yeltsin delivered his State of the Federation Speech. While his speech defended reforms, it criticized his government for making them too painful and promised to soften their blow. In the speech, he also issued harsh condemnation of his government for failing to increase social spending and compensate people's savings from the 1992 price liberalization. He also criticized his government for failing to address agriculture and military reform. He called for greater protection of Russian enterprises, and announced a new series of measures that would raise import tariffs. While he did vow to continue market reforms, the overall tone of his speech seemed to strike a tone that read more like an opposition address rather than a speech coming from a sitting president. In response to the speech, Zyuganov alleged, "At least a third of the speech has been copied from Communist Party documents."
While Yeltsin's State of the Federation speech had been greatly shaped the Soskovets strategy, by the time he delivered the speech, Yeltsin's inner-circle was already on its way towards abandoning the strategy.
Collapse of the strategy While Yeltsin had not yet completely abandoned the strategy, by January and February 1996 he had already begun to make a course-correction, in many ways moving towards the political center instead of continuing to appease the fringes.The 1996 Russian presidential election / Jerry F. Hough, Evelyn Davidheiser, Susan Goodrich Lehmann. Brookings occasional papers. Meanwhile, much of what would ultimately kill the Skoskovets strategy was being set in motion.
Soskovets' floundering efforts Soskovets' operations were proving disastrous. Soskovets' attempts to utilize media as a tool failed. His standing with Yeltsin was severely harmed after he failed to complete the campaign's signature drive by the deadline Yeltsin had assigned him.https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0967067X9700007X/1-s2.0-S0967067X9700007X-main.pdf?_tid=c956b4d2-c374-11e7-947d-00000aacb360&acdnat=1510029382_69a331ae0723c1dae4e58ab1a1d78288 This nearly doomed Yeltsin's campaign altogether.
Saratov "brainstorming group" On January 11, Georgy Satarov had convened a team of twenty top political strategists of Yeltsin's for a "brainstorming group" for the stated goal of helping to write Yeltsin's State of the Federation speech and plan his campaign strategy. Satarov anticipated that Yeltsin was indeed going to run for reelection, and therefore desired to devise a winning strategy for him. Yeltsin's electoral prospects looked extraordinarily poor at that moment. The nation was in fear over a hostage crisis in the southern region of Chechnya, where armed conflict was raging on. Merely three weeks before the meeting, the Communist Party had won big in the 1995 parliamentary elections. Yeltsin's approval rating had plummeted to between 4% and 8%. A defensive Yeltsin had been preoccupying himself with firing the remaining free-market reformers in his cabinet, as per the Soskovets strategy.
Igor Mintusov, one of the strategists at the meeting, said of the meeting,
The group that Saratov had convened concluded that the only way for Yeltsin to win would be if he campaigned as a candidate of reform and stability, and that he would lose if he tried competing for the nationalist and communist vote as Soskovets intended him to. This stance would soon win the support of several key figures in Russia's business community.
Dyachenko joins the campaign Sometime before the start of February, Yeltsin asked his daughter Tatyana Dyachenko to sit in on meetings of Soskovets' campaign management team.Yeltsin: A Life by Timothy J. Colton Soon after, Dyachenko began expressing concerns about the Soskovets' campaign team.Irina Savvateyeva, “Boris Yel’tsin predlozhil rossiiskim bankam sotrudnichestvo” (Boris Yeltsin suggests cooperation with Russia’s banks), Izvestiya, September 1, 1995.
The only figure from the business community who was serving on Soskovets' campaign management board was Berezovsky. He had only just joined shortly before Dyachenko began attending meanings. He also had felt that things were not looking good for the campaign.
Formation of Semibankirschina
A key development in the campaign took place at the 1996 World Economic Forum, held February 2–5. Yeltsin's chances were so poorly regarded at the time of the forum, that Zyuganov was greeted by Western leaders and the international media as the presumptive victor of the impending election.
Upset by the polite reception they witnessed Zyuganov receive, Berezovsky and several key Russian business figures met with each other and agreed that a drastic shift was needed in Yeltsin's campaign strategy. The businessmen regarded themselves as having the most to lose from a Communist Party victory in the 1996 election. Amongst them were Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Vladimir Vinogradov; the four of whom teamed up to form a united front against Zyuganov, which they dubbed the "Davos Pact".