The Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction is a set of arguments about two different positions of emptiness philosophy which are debated within the Mahayana school of Buddhism. It is most prominently discussed in Tibetan Buddhism, where Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika are viewed to be different forms of Madhyamaka philosophy.Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo V3 Pp 224-267
For Tsongkhapa, the founder of the Gelugpa school and the most outspoken proponent of the distinction, as well as for the Karma Kagyu school, these differences are of major importance. Tsongkhapa not only negates an inherent identity or self-characterizing essence which resides in persons, things, and abstract phenomena; but he also negates the identity of phenomena as they appear to our instinctive, everyday perception.Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo V3 Pp 224-267 In contrast, according to Tsongkhapa, the Svātantrika negate a "truly existing self," but maintain that things exist conventionally "according to characteristics."Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo V3 Pp 224-267
The heart of the distinction according to Tsongkhapa
Prāsaṅgika For Tsongkhapa, the Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction centers around the role of prasaṅga (consequence) in a formal debate, and the interpretation of the meaning of both "ultimate truth" and "conventional truth."
The Prāsaṅgika view holds reductio ad absurdum of essentialist viewpoints to be the most valid method of demonstrating emptiness of inherent existence, and that conventional things do not have a naturally occurring conventional identity.Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo V3 Pp 224-267 Further, the Prāsaṅgika argue that when initially attempting to find the correct object of understanding - which is a mere absence or mere negation of impossible modes of existence - one should not use positivist statements about the nature of reality. Positing an essencelessness rather than merely negating inherent identity creates a subtle linguistic and analytic barrier to finding the correct understanding.H.H. The Dalai Lama & Alexander Berzin, The Gelug/Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra, pg. 235.Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara with Commentary by Ju Mipham, pg. 208-210. This is exemplified in the debate over the use of the terms "devoid of nature itself" in Gelug Mahamudra (non-affirming negation) and "that which has voidness as its nature" in non-Gelug Mahamudra and Dzogchen (an affirming negation).
Tsongkhapa argued that because the Svatantrika conventionally establish things by their own characteristics, they do not arrive at a complete understanding of emptiness. According to Tsongkhapa, not only were their methods different, but also that students using Svatantrika do not achieve the same realization as those using the Prasangika approach. Lama Tsongkhapa states that when he uses the term "advocates of intrinsic existence" he is referring to both "essentialists and the Svatantrikas." Modern scholars like the 14th Dalai Lama disagree, echoing sentiments from classical authorities like Lobsang Chökyi Gyaltsen (4th Panchen Lama) stating that the credible teachers of the various systems of Buddhist philosophy all "arrive at the same intended point" of realization. However, they openly admit that this non-denominational position is very difficult to establish through reason.
Prāsaṅgika Logic
Consequential syllogistic reasoning According to Tsongkhapa, if both people in a debate or discussion have a valid understanding of emptiness already, then autonomous syllogistic arguments could be quite effective. However, in a circumstance where one or both parties in a debate or discussion do not hold a valid understanding, "the debate [should be] founded on what the parties accept as valid. Hence, it is proper to refute opponents in terms of what they accept." In other words, it is more appropriate to establish a position of emptiness through showing the logical consequences of the incorrect position that the opponent already accepts, than it is to establish emptiness through syllogistic reasoning using premises that the opponent (and perhaps even the proponent) do not fully or deeply understand. Tsongkhapa quoting Chandrakirti, in the Lamrim Chenmo, Volume Three, on the problem of relying on autonomous syllogistic reasoning: Tsongkhapa argues further that the Prāsaṅgika's use of reductio ad absurdum is syllogistic, because one "refutes the opponent using a subject, a reason, and so forth that are accepted by that opponent." For example, if cause-effect relationships occur because the sprout itself produces the effect of being a sprout (self-arising), then this "would mean that something that already exists is being produced, [and] production would be purposeless and endless [... if] contradictions are assembled in this way, the only result is that the opponents understand them and abandon" wrong tenets.
Non-affirming negation A prominent and important feature of the approach is their use of the non-affirming negation. A non-affirming negation is a negation which does not leave something in the place of what has been negated. For instance, when one says that a Buddhist should not drink alcohol, they are not affirming that a Buddhist should, in fact, drink something else. One is merely negating the consumption of alcohol under a particular circumstance.
According to Tsongkhapa, for the the philosophical position of emptiness is itself a non-affirming negation, since emptiness is a "lack of inherent existence." One is not affirming anything in the place of that absence of inherence.Lama Tsongkhapa, Ocean of Reasoning, pg. 59 It is not the presence of some other quality. If one were to describe emptiness as the presence of some quality -for example, a "voidness" or a "thusness" - it would linguistically and philosophically contradict the nature of the object which it is attempting to characterize.The Gelug/Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra, p.235
Ignorance - Prasaṅgika Object of Negation Pabongka Rinpoche states in Liberation in Our Hands that if we cannot correctly "recognize the nature of the false mode of existence that is being denied, we will not be able to realize the simple negation [Skr. prasajyapratisedhah or non-affirming negation] that is established through its refutation."Pabongka Rinpoche "Liberation in Our Hands" Pg 274-275 For the Prāsaṅgika, when analyzing a table, the object being negated is not an abstract intellectual concept apart from the table which can be called 'inherent existing', but the conventionally appearing table itself, which appears to naive perception as being inherent. The table is not just empty of inherent existence in some abstract philosophical way; the identity of the table as it appears to normal, everyday perception - which misattributes inherence to the object - is being negated.Introduction to the Middle Way (2002), p. 210 Lama Tsongkhapa explains:We can say "therefore, [that] what exists objectively in terms of its own essence without being posited through the power of a subjective mind is called [...] 'intrinsic nature'" or ignorance Therefore, the object to be negated by reason is a conception that phenomena have an "ontological status—a way of existing—in and of themselves, without being posited through the force of an awareness. Pabongka Rinpoche adds that "while simply knowing and using verbal explanations such as these may be enough to silence an opponent in debate we have not truly recognized the object to be refuted until we have recognized it within our own experience."Pabongka Rinpoche "Liberation in Our Hands" Pg 276 In furtherance of this:This is the meaning of both ignorance and the object to be negated by valid cognition, according to the Madhyamaka-Prāsaṅgika in the view of Lama Tsongkhapa.
Indo-Tibetan rope & snake analogy Under low light, the thought might arise that a striped rope on the ground is a snake, "but there is nothing on top of or inside this rope [...] to which we could" validly apply the term and therefore establish a conventionally existing snake.Dalai Lama, Alexander Berzin The Gelug-Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra P 323 The Dalai Lama expands: In reality, the self of persons, objects, and abstracts is like the term-concept "snake" being designated upon a rope, "the snake is merely what can be designated by a mental label."Dalai Lama, Alexander Berzin The Gelug-Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra P 323 Like this, the object of negation or ignorance is viewed to be the thought and perception which grasps the self of persons and objects to be established within their respective bases of designation. To put this in somewhat simpler terms, the thought and perception which grasps persons, things, and abstract phenomena as existing in-and-of themselves - with characteristics or an identity of their own - is seen to be ignorance in this system.
Incorrect Object of Negation (Permanence) In the Gelugpa four tenets system, the object of negation is different for the Madhyamika-Prāsaṅgika than it is for Hinayana schools of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. Indeed, from the Prāsaṅgika viewpoint, Buddhist and non-Buddhist essentialist schools are not negating the correct object.Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo Pg 211 According to Geshe Tenzin Zopa in Buddhist Tenets, the various Hinayana schools are negating a number of different objects, but none of them are inherent existence. Geshe Tenzin Zopa states: "From Vaibhāṣika school, they [the Vasiputriyans] assert selflessness/emptiness of the person/self is that which is impermanent (can momentarily change), has parts (physical parts, moments of time, various cardinal directions) and is dependent."Geshe Tenzin Zopa, Commentary on Chokyi Gyaltsen’s A Presentation of Tenets Pg 33 Chandrakirti explains why the Prasangika do not see this as the final correct position: Lama Tsongkhapa supports the analysis of Chandrakirti when he says:
Refuting that rational analysis is not required From the point of view of the opponents of Prasangika, it is absurd "to conduct the extensive rational analysis required for refutations and proofs [which] is to meander among mere conventional words." They propose that "all phenomena are devoid of refutation and proof, in that, if something exists, it cannot be refuted, and, if it does not exist, it need not be refuted." An idea which Lama Tsongkhapa refers to as "a nonsensical collection of contradictions, showing neither general awareness of how reason establishes and negates things nor general awareness of how the path establishes and negates things."Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo V3 P 205
Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections he deals with this idea in a similar way:
What use is it to establish the negation Of what does not exist anyway, even without words? To answer that, the words "does not exist" Cause understanding; they do not eliminate.Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo V3 P 204-5
In his Commentary on Refutation of Objections Nagarjuna expands as follows:
The words, "All things lack intrinsic nature," do not cause things to lack intrinsic nature, but, in the absence of intrinsic nature, they do make it understood that things lack intrinsic nature."Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo V3 P 205
This can be illustrated with the following paraphrased example found in the same text. If a person named Devadatta is not in the house, but someone says, "Devadatta is in the house." Then in order to show that Devadatta is not there, someone else will say, "Devadatta is not there." Those words do not cause Devadatta not to be there but allow the first person to understand that Devadatta is not in the house. Similarly, the words, "Things lack intrinsic nature," do not cause things to lack intrinsic nature, but help those confused by ignorance to gain a valid cognition of reality.Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo V3 P 205
Dependent Origination - Conventional Truth