Kamenets–Podolsky pocket

The Kamenets-Podolsky pocket (German: Kessel von Kamenez-Podolsk)Wagener, Carl. Heeresgruppe Süd. Der Kampf im Süden der Ostfront 1941-1945. Bad Nauheim, Podzun Verlag, 1967, p. 277. was a key part of a major Soviet Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation (Russian: Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция),Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 14. known on the German side by several names.On this, see this section. It was conducted by the Soviet 1st Ukrainian Front against the German 1st and 4th Panzer Armies, and Hungarian forces of Army Group South in March-April 1944. The plan was to launch the main strike south, at the junction of the two German armies, thus cutting off the Lvov-Odessa railway line, vital for supplying Army Group South.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, pp. 16-17.Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 416. The subsequent southerly advance to the Dniester aimed to cut off westward retreat routes for Army Group South, forcing it to use the long roundabout route through Romania for supply.

The offensive began on 4 March and the German front soon collapsed.Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 417.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 135. By 10 March, the Lvov-Odessa railway was cut and the Soviets advanced 60–100 kilometers.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, pp. 169-170. At that point, the drive halted due to the arrival of German reserves and the logistical difficulties of advancing in rasputitsa. After regrouping and introducing the 1st Tank Army, the offensive resumed on 21 March, completely shattering the German front on the same day.Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 430.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 338. On 23 March, the 1st Panzer Army lost contact with the 4th Panzer Army,Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, pp. 190-191. and the 1st Tank Army reached the Dniester on 24 March.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, pp. 194-195. Major communication centers, notably Proskurov, Kamenets-Podolsky, and Chernovtsy, fell in rapid succession, encircling the 1st Panzer Army, which held a ration strength of 200,000 personnel.Panzerarmee-Oberkommando 1, Abt. O.Qu., Nr. 101/44 geh. A.H.Qu., den 2.4.1944. Anlage 3 zu Pz.AΟΚ.1. O.Qu. Nr. 101/44 geh. vom 2.4.1944. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA) RH 21-1/374, fol. 21. This encirclement, however, was incomplete, as understrength Soviet units operating on overextended lines over muddy terrain could not establish a tight ring, especially in the west.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, pp. 338-339.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, pp. 149-150. Moreover, anticipating a German breakout south across the Dniester, the Soviet command ordered the 1st Tank Army to the southern bank, which excluded it from active combat against the encircled forces.

The commander of the 1st Panzer Army, Generaloberst Hans Hube, intended to breakout south, as the Soviets had anticipated. However, Hube was overruled by Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein, who insisted that the army must breakout to the west, relying on the element of surprise and because the Soviet forces there were weak.Wagener, Carl. Heeresgruppe Süd. Der Kampf im Süden der Ostfront 1941-1945. Bad Nauheim, Podzun Verlag, 1967, pp. 286-287.Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 435-436. As a relief force attacking from the west, Manstein received the II SS Panzer Corps from France.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, pp. 267-268.Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 435. The westward breakout, supported by a major Luftwaffe airlift,Morzik, Fritz. German Air Force Airlift Operations. USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1961, pp. 256-257. began in late March. Only at the start of April did the Soviet command realize German forces were breaking out westward.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 251. Parts of the 1st Tank Army were redeployed from southern bank of the Dniester, but this was hampered by the destruction of the river crossings by the Germans.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 296. On 4 April, the II SS Panzer Corps, whose arrival was undetected by the Soviets, struck from the west.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 276-277. By 10 April, contact between the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies was reestablished.Wagener, Carl. Heeresgruppe Süd. Der Kampf im Süden der Ostfront 1941-1945. Bad Nauheim, Podzun Verlag, 1967, p. 307.

After the breakout, the 1st Panzer Army was greatly weakened.Kriegstagebuch 13 des Panzer-Armeeoberkommando 1, Ia, 1.3.-30.4.44. NARA T313, R69, F7305947. All of its divisions were rendered combat-ineffective or suitable only for limited defense. Losses in heavy weapons, armored and motor vehicles were enormous, leaving units with a small number of them.Generalstab des Heeres, Generalquartiermeister Abt. III/Gruppe V (J) Az.2000/Nr. I/011477/44 II. Ang. g.Kdos. Betr.: Totalausfälle an Kfz., Pz. Kpfw. und Instandsetzungsmitteln an der Kesselschlacht von Kamenez-Podolsk beteiligter Verbände des Pz. A.O.K. 1. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA) RH 10/52, fol. 45.Panzerarmee-Oberkommando 1, Abt. O.Qu./Qu.1, Nr. 164/44 g.Kdos. A.H.Qu., den 12.4.1944. Bericht über die Versorgungslage. Stand: 1.4.1944. NARA T313, R75, F7313158. The army reported that most personnel broke out,Kriegstagebuch 13 des Panzer-Armeeoberkommando 1, Ia, 1.3.-30.4.44. NARA T313, R69, F7305972. but noted that only a small part of the 200,000 ration strength were combat troops.Panzerarmee-Oberkommando 1, Ia. Sonderanlagen zum Kriegstagebuch Nr. 13. Funksprüche 4. März-17. Apr. 1944. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA) RH 21-1/142, fol. 33. The infantry strength was reduced to a fraction of authorized levels, forcing the assignment of specialists and personnel from rear services to the frontline.Generalkommando LIX. Armeekorps. Anlagen zum Kriegstagebuch Nr. 7a, Band 7, 3-7 April 1944. Betr.: Zustandsmeldungen, 6-7 April 1944. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA) RH 24-59/116, fol. 272-287.Generalkommando XXIV. Panzerkorps Abt. Ia Nr. 1137/44 g.Kdos. K.Gef.Stand, 8.4.1944. Beurteilung der Lage des XXIV. Panzerkorps. NARA T314, R730, F001178-81. The troops emerged from the pocket debilitated, suffering from malnutrition and severe lice infestations,Panzer - Armeearzt 1, Az. 11 (Ia), A.H.Qu., den 4. Mai 1944. Tätigkeitsbericht für Monat April 1944. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA) RH 21-1/378, fol. 92. with the logistical breakdown triggering a decrease in discipline.XXIV. Pz. K., KTB Anlagen 7.-12.4.44. Anlagenband 14. Korpsgruppe Chevallerie. Der Kommandierende General. Q.U., den 8.4.1944. NARA T314, R730, F001230-1. According to the army’s field post inspection office, the hardships of this campaign had a devastating impact on morale, with four-year veterans describing it as the most difficult experience of the war.Oberkommando der 1. Panzerarmee F.P.P. E.O., den 2. Mai 1944. Tätigkeitsbericht der Feldpostprüfstelle beim Oberkommando der 1. Panzerarmee für April 1944. NARA T313, R74, F7312432.

Forces involved and names of this campaign The offensive operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which began on 4 March and ended on 17 April 1944, was conducted against the German 1st and 4th Panzer Armies on the northern (or left) wing of Army Group South, as well as the Hungarian forces in the area of the Dniester and foothills of the Carpathians. It was the biggest and most important operation of the Dnieper-Carpathian offensive, encompassing a vast area.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 265.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 15. According to Manstein, in March 1944 the time had come "to foot the bill" for the German High Command's fundamental mistake of never wanting to give anything up - this northern wing of Army Group South was the "decisive spot", from which the Soviets could push the entire southern wing of the German armies southward toward the Black Sea or Romania.Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General. Zenith Press, 1982, pp. 522-523. In the midst of this campaign, Manstein will be sacked by Hitler.

The right-wing forces and large parts of the main central grouping of the front were engaged against the German 4th Panzer Army (from north to south) in the area south of Kovel, Brody and Tarnopol regions.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, pp. 130-131. In the area south of Kovel, the forces of the front came into contact with the 2nd Belorussian Front, which was conducting the Polesskoe offensive (Battle of Kovel). Both Brody and Tarnopol were declared fortified places by Hitler and became areas of fierce fighting, with Tarnopol garrison being encircled and eventually destroyed- out of the original garrison of 4,600 troops, only 55 were able to escape by 18 April.Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 425. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the offensive, the mass of the central grouping of the front was deployed at the boundary of the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies, between the areas of Tarnopol and Proskurov, through which the strategic Lvov-Odessa railway line was running.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, pp. 130-131.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, pp. 17-20. The left-wing forces of the front were deployed against the 1st Panzer Army and came into contact with the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which was conducting the Uman–Botoșani offensive against the German 8th Army. From late March onwards, in the area south of the Dniester and foothills of the Carpathians, the Hungarian forces became actively engaged in combat- at first it was only the VII Army Corps, then from April the mobilized 1st Army, which in the middle of the month went on a local counteroffensive.