International relations from 1648 to 1814 covers the major interactions of the nations of Europe, as well as the other continents, with emphasis on diplomacy, warfare, migration, and cultural interactions, from the Peace of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna.William L. Langer, ed. An encyclopedia of world history (1968) pp. 459–651 online
Historical developments
Balance of power: The concept of the balance of power emerged as a fundamental principle in international relations during this period. Major powers sought to maintain a delicate equilibrium to prevent the domination of any single state or coalition, often leading to alliances, territorial adjustments, and military interventions.
Diplomatic history: The establishment of formal diplomatic practices and treaty systems became more widespread. Major international agreements, such as the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of Utrecht (1713), redefined territorial boundaries, recognized states' sovereignty, and shaped the norms and practices of diplomacy.
Colonialism and imperialism: European powers engaged in extensive colonial expansion during this period, leading to occasional imperial rivalries. Competition over resources, trade routes, and territories fueled conflicts between the powers, most notably the Seven Years' War (1756–1763).
Wars over succession and territory: Numerous conflicts erupted due to succession disputes and territorial claims. Wars like the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) and the Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815) reshaped European borders and power dynamics, with consequences extending beyond the continent.
Rise of British and French naval power: The period saw the rise of naval power as a crucial determinant of international influence. Naval dominance, particularly by the British Royal Navy and its great archrival France. The navies enabled projection of power, control over trade routes, and territorial expansion into overseas colonies.
Economic and commercial interests: Economic considerations played a vital role in international relations during this period. Expansion of trade, mercantilist policies, and the development of global markets influenced diplomatic relations, wars, and alliances as states sought to protect and expand their economic interests.
Revolution: The Age of Enlightenment and subsequent revolutions, such as the American Revolution (1775–1783) and the French Revolution (1789–1799), challenged traditional monarchical systems and aristocratic privileges. These movements had profound implications for international relations, inspiring other revolutionary movements and challenging the existing order.
Diplomacy and warfare
The 17th century, 1601–1700, saw very little peace in Europe – major wars were fought every year except 1610, 1669 to 1671, and 1680 to 1682.John A. Mears, "The Emergence Of The Standing Professional Army in Seventeenth-Century Europe," Social Science Quarterly (1969) 50#1 pp. 106–115 in JSTOR The wars were unusually ugly. Europe in the late 17th century, 1648 to 1700, was an age of great intellectual, scientific, artistic and cultural achievement. Historian Frederick Nussbaum says it was: prolific in genius, in common sense, and in organizing ability. It could properly have been expected that intelligence, comprehension and high purpose would be applied to the control of human relations in general and to the relations between states and peoples in particular. The fact was almost completely opposite. It was a period of marked unintelligence, immorality and frivolity in the conduct of international relations, marked by wars undertaken for dimly conceived purposes, waged with the utmost brutality and conducted by reckless betrayals of allies.Frederick L. Nussbaum, The Triumph of Science and Reason, 1660–1685 (1953) pp 147–48.
The worst came during the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) which had an extremely negative impact on the civilian population of Germany and surrounding areas, with massive loss of life and disruption of the economy and society. Scholars taking a "realist" perspective on wars and diplomacy have emphasized the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as a dividing line. It ended the Thirty Years' War, where religion and ideology had been powerful motivating forces for warfare. Westphalia, in the realist view, ushered in a new international system of sovereign states of roughly equal strength, dedicated not to ideology or religion but to enhance status, and territorial gains. The Catholic Church, for example, no longer devoted its energies to the very difficult task of reclaiming dioceses lost to Protestantism, but to build large-scale missions in overseas colonial possessions that could convert the natives by the thousands using devoted members of society such as the Jesuits.Norman Davies, Europe: A History (1996) p 593–94. According to Scott Hamish, the realist model assumes that "foreign policies were guided entirely by "Realpolitik," by the resulting struggle for resources and, eventually, by the search for what became known as a 'balance of power.'Scott Hamish, book review in English Historical Review (Oct 2013) pp 1239–1241.
Diplomacy before 1700 was not well developed, and chances to avoid wars were too often squandered. In England, for example, King Charles II paid little attention to diplomacy, which proved disastrous. During the Second Anglo-Dutch War, England had no diplomats stationed in Denmark or Sweden. When King Charles realized he needed them as allies, he sent special missions that were uninformed about local political, military, and diplomatic situations, and were ignorant of personalities and political factionalism. Ignorance produced a series of blunders that ruined their efforts to find allies.J.R. Jones, Britain and the World: 1649–1815 (1980), pp 38–39.
France set the standards for the new professional diplomacy, which were soon emulated by the other powers; the French language became the diplomatic tongue. The professional model slowly spread other national government agencies, and included distinct specified scope of operations, a full-time career oriented professional leadership at the top and middle ranks; a code of ethics and standards of expected behavior; and attractive pay scales and retirement pensions. Expertise was highly valued, although at the very highest level aristocratic status and family connections played an important role. The new bureaucracy preserved its documents carefully and central archives, maintain a professional office staff, and gained a reputation at home and abroad for the quality of its work in expressing both the short term needs and long-term alliances and values of the state.John C. Rule, "Colbert de Torcy, an emergent bureaucracy, and the formulation of French foreign policy, 1698–1715." in Ragnhild Hatton, ed., Louis XIV and Europe (1976) pp. 261–288. King Louis XIV worked hard to systematically develop the most sophisticated diplomatic service, with permanent ambassadors and lesser ministers in major and minor capitals, all preparing steady streams of information and advice to Paris. Diplomacy became a career that proved highly attractive to rich senior aristocrats who enjoyed very high society at royal courts, especially because they carried the status of the most powerful nation in Europe. Increasingly, other nations copied the French model; French became the language of diplomacy, replacing Latin.Gaston Zeller, "French diplomacy and foreign policy in their European setting." in Carsten, ed., The New Cambridge Modern History vol 5 (1961) p 198–99, 206. By the early 18th century European diplomats had established an elaborate system of etiquette and ceremonies. Most diplomats came from high-status nobility, and were familiar with such elaborate customs. In the realm of diplomacy, ceremonial methods served to distinguish the relative power and importance of the different countries involved, and facilitated informal discussions among senior diplomats.William Roosen, "Early modern diplomatic ceremonial,” . Journal of Modern History (1980) 52#3 pp 452-476.
By 1700, the British and Dutch, with small land armies, large navies, and large treasuries, used astute diplomacy to build alliances, subsidizing as needed land powers to fight on their side, or as in the case of the Hessians, hiring regiments of soldiers from mercenary princes in small countries.Charles W. Ingrao, The Hessian mercenary state: ideas, institutions, and reform under Frederick II, 1760–1785 (2003). The balance of power was very delicately calculated, so that winning a battle here was worth the slice of territory there, with no regard to the wishes of the inhabitants. Important peacemaking conferences at Utrecht (1713), Vienna (1738), Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), and Paris (1763) had a cheerful, cynical, game-like atmosphere in which professional diplomats cashed in victories like casino chips in exchange for territory.Davies, Europe (1996) pp 581–82.
Second Hundred Years' War: France as the pivot of warfare
In 1648 France was the leading European power, and most of the wars pivoted around its aggressiveness. No one could match its population and wealth, central location, or very strong professional army. It had largely avoided the devastation of the Thirty Years War. Its weaknesses included an inefficient financial system that was hard-pressed to pay for all the military adventures, and the tendency of most other powers to form alliances and coalitions against it.
During the very long reign of King Louis XIV, France fought three major wars: the Franco-Dutch War, the Nine Years' War, and the War of the Spanish Succession. There were also two lesser conflicts: the War of Devolution and the War of the Reunions.John A. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV 1667–1714 (1999). The wars were very expensive but they defined Louis XIV's foreign policies, and his personality shaped his approach. Impelled "by a mix of commerce, revenge, and pique," Louis sensed that warfare was the ideal way to enhance his glory. In peacetime he concentrated on preparing for the next war. He taught his diplomats that their job was to create tactical and strategic advantages for the French military.James Nathan, "Force, Order, and Diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV." Virginia Quarterly Review 69#4 (1993) 633+. By 1695, France retained much of its dominance, but had lost control of the seas to the combination of England and Holland. What's more, most countries, both Protestant and Catholic, were in alliance against it. Vauban, France's leading military strategist warned the king in 1689 that a hostile "Alliance" was too powerful at sea. He recommended the best way for France to fight back was to license French merchants ships to privateer and seize enemy merchant ships, while avoiding its navies: France has its declared enemies Germany and all the states that it embraces; Spain with all its dependencies in Europe, Asia, Africa and America; the Duke of Savoy [in Italy], England, Scotland, Ireland, and all their colonies in the East and West Indies; and Holland with all its possessions in the four corners of the world where it has great establishments. France has ... undeclared enemies, indirectly hostile hostile and envious of its greatness, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Portugal, Venice, Genoa, and part of the Swiss Confederation, all of which states secretly aid France's enemies by the troops that they hire to them, the money they lend them and by protecting and covering their trade.Quoted in Geoffrey Simcox, ed., War, Diplomacy, and Imperialism, 1618–1763 (1974), pp. 236-37.
Vauban was pessimistic about France's so-called friends and allies: