The order of battle for the Viet Cong was a contested American intelligence issue during the Vietnam War. Arising in the mid-1960s, its focus was the count of enemy combatants. Often called the order of battle controversy, the debate came to divide the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and challenge military intelligence. The politics and strategy of the war also became involved in the debate.
Order of battle (O/B) is a military term for a description of the strength of an armed force, its composition and particulars. A key factor is the total number involved. Here the count was of communist forces in South Vietnam. While then chiefly the Viet Cong (VC), it also included forces coming from North Vietnam: the People's Army of Viet Nam (PAVN). This article addresses the order of battle (O/B) not for any single engagement of the war, but rather for the overall strength of communist forces in South Vietnam at the time, e.g., 1967.There are several Wikipedia articles which discuss the O/B for particular engagements of the war.
Determining the O/B number for VC and PAVN forces was complicated by the wide range of personnel involved, especially among VC. There were trained and equipped 'regular soldiers', but also other forces, e.g., rural militias, many part-time, with various or little training and weapons. In addition were politically organized support groups of civilians, some full-time, highly trained party cadres, often collectively called by American intelligence the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).
The American Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established in 1962. MACV intelligence provided reports on the enemy O/B. A few years later the CIA, too, began to study the VC. A dispute then arose as to the number of enemy forces, because the CIA had arrived at significantly higher figures than MACV.
During 1967 this controversy became widely known in American intelligence. It held important implications for how the Vietnam War was described to the American people, the prospects for victory. When the year's Special National Intelligence Estimate for Vietnam (SNIE 14-3-67) was prepared, it became difficult to reconcile the competing number estimates for VC. Charges were made, e.g., by Sam Adams an analyst for the CIA, that MACV's low numbers were the result of political interference with the data of intelligence work. Later that year the controversy was resolved in favor of the lower numbers which MACV had forcefully and persistently asserted.
In January 1968, communist forces dramatically changed their low-profile strategy: they brazenly attacked many cities and other targets across South Vietnam. Their Tet Offensive surprised South Vietnamese and American military forces, and only after heavy fighting were they able to defeat the attackers. Although eventually a major military victory for the US and its allies, in the end it proved to be a great political victory for the communist cause. Shortly after, President Lyndon Johnson withdrew from reelection to the Presidency. The war became increasingly unpopular with American voters after their surprise and shock at the magnitude and intensity of the VC offensive.
As a result of Tet, the American intelligence community significantly adjusted the O/B to reflect the CIA's higher numbers. The O/B controversy then quietly lost much of its importance. The issues, however, resurfaced in 1982 because of a CBS television documentary followed by a civil trial for libel, Westmoreland v. CBS.See text below for notes to sources.
Order of battle controversy At its foundation, the American O/B controversy derived from the appraisal by analysts of a foreign enemy's ability to field combatants. Its wider effect involved a host of issues: the entire war in Southeast Asia and domestic public opinion, the politics of military intelligence and the utility of combat/support formations, presidential electioneering confronting an intelligence estimate suggested by the CIA.
Magnifying its importance in the mid-1960s was the metrics of the American strategy of attrition in South Vietnam. Complicating its resolution were the conflicting perspectives of the institutional players, in the year before the U.S. presidential election. The O/B controversy came to an unexpected denouement, however, as a result of a failed military offensive by the VC that nonetheless reaped their cause significant political rewards.
Attrition strategy, cross-over The Johnson Administration and the US Army, particularly Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), in consultation arrived at their chosen Vietnam strategy, basically a war of attrition.Krepinevich (1986), pp. 164–167, 170–171. Krepinevich called attrition warfare a strategy of tactics.Adams (1994). In early 1966 this strategy was made explicit in a writing to General William Westmoreland, then commander of American forces in Vietnam. A narrative derived from the strategy worked to coordinate both the military's explanation of the war, and the President's special care to maintain voter support for it. Instead of territory taken as shown on a map, or a series of enemy retreats or surrenders, the attrition narrative demonstrated progress in the war by the steady destruction of enemy forces.Ranelagh (1986).Tucker (2000), p. 31, "Attrition".Cf. William C. Westmoreland, "A Military Strategy of Attrition" at pp. 57–71, in Thompson and Frizzell (1977). In this nuanced article, General Westmoreland describes six different American strategies used between 1954 and 1969 (pp. 57–58). He discusses the importance of 'search and destroy' operations (pp. 64–65). He defends attrition strategy, but refers to the Battle of Verdun of 1916, and cites the "relatively limited manpower" of the VC (pp. 65–66). Alternate strategies, namely "the enclave strategy" are discussed (pp. 69–70, cf. p. 58 the fourth: enclave).
In a war of attrition a grim victory went to the army that more quickly reduced the size of its opponent. Hence, the importance of search and destroy missions and of body counts, which affected the O/B numbers.Karnow (1983). A significant benchmark of success was the cross-over point, achieved when the prevailing army wears down an enemy until he begins to suffer casualties at a rate higher than he can replace. This carnage allows the expectant victor to see "light at the end of the tunnel". The war ends, eventually, when the losing side can no longer field sufficient forces to sustain the fight.Prados (2009), p. 219 re "light at the end of the tunnel" phrase.Karnow (1983). Yet the metrics of replacement, from existing reserves, new recruitment, or infiltration from outside, were debatable.McNamara (1995).
For President Johnson, favorable changes in the O/B numbers for the VC, such as reduction in the number of their main force, would directly indicate the war's progress. American combat forces were introduced in 1965. Their numbers were steadily augmented until reaching over half a million troops. Military doctrines generally had required a ten to one advantage to defeat a guerrilla 'people's army'. Yet because American technology provided better mobility (e.g., helicopters) and increased firepower in weaponry, a mere three to one ratio was thought sufficient.Krepinevich (1986). General Westmoreland mentioned the possibility of reaching a cross-over point ahead.Ford (1995).McNamara (1995), p. 238.Brewin and Shaw (1987), Westmoreland and cross-over point .
A war of attrition was one of several conventional military approaches. Yet in Vietnam a revolutionary situation existed, a civil war whose combatants were not only regular soldiers but also part-time guerrillas who were civilians by day. The fighting was largely without borders as control of much of the country was openly contested. A conventional conquest of territory was seldom an option. The 'search and destroy' operation, a tactic used by American forces to attrit the enemy, was difficult as the VC resisted detection; merely finding such an elusive enemy was a major problem.Fitzgerald (19172).Krepinevich (1986)."The Strategy of Attrition" at pp. 73–93, in Thompson and Frizzell (1977).Duncanson (1968), pp. 304 (attrition), 306–307 (lack of military intelligence, with result that elusive VC "slipped through its net".Bui Diem (1987), pp. 155, 168–169 (VC sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia).
An entirely different approach was counterinsurgency, a strategy in which protection (pacification) of the population was a prime objective. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, this latter approach was given much more emphasis. In the meantime, for the American military in the mid-1960s, attrition strategy generally governed the way the war was fought.Hunt (1995), p. 209.Prados (2009).
Institutional context The O/B controversy attracted the interests of powerful institutions in the federal government. In such a climate, an intelligence agency became vulnerable to pressures tending to influence, or compromise, its finished product. Consequently, the intelligence community as a whole, including military intelligence and the CIA in particular, had to chart a course through a maze of national policy, administration agendas, demanding politicians and generals, the evidenced probabilities and their professional mandate.Lowenthal (2003), pp. 105–107 ('politicized intelligence').
President Johnson sought popular support for the Vietnam War. He spoke of the struggle's necessity, and assured the American people that the nation would prevail. Always he welcomed news of the progress of American arms, specifically, news of a steady decline in the number of enemy combatants, which fit the established politico-military narrative toward victory. For several years the Army released falling numbers suggesting such progress, based on the attrition strategy.Prados (2009).McNamara (1995).Weiner (2007).Ranelagh (1986). Starting in early 1966, however, the CIA, as well as some analysts at military intelligence, began discussing evidence indicating that the number of enemy combatants was much larger than earlier thought.Powers (1979), 214–215.Adams (1994), pp. 50, 54–58, 64–69.Andersen (1994), ¶8.Randolph (1985), ¶¶ 26–27.Hiam (2006), pp. 75–77.
The American military takes its orders from the civilian administration, specifically from the President as Commander-in-Chief, who may act through the Secretary of Defense. The administration also influences military's strategy, operations, officer assignments, and (along with Congress) the military's budget. A harmony of interests between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves the nation. In the extreme, the success or failure of a President's foreign policy can depend on the military's victory or defeat in war.McNamara (1995).Prados (2009).Karnow (1983).Allen (2001). In Vietnam the Army generals encountered unexpected difficulties, e.g., because the local politics of the struggle seemed to favor the native communists and because of the unexpected ability of VC to avoid detection and escape engagement. Eventually, as the war continued, American domestic political support began to erode.Summers (1981), pp. 17–19.McMaster (1998).