The Raid on Yakla was a joint United States/United Arab Emirates military operation carried out on January 29, 2017 in al-Ghayil, a village in the Yakla area of the Al Bayda Governorate of central Yemen, during the Yemeni civil war. Prepared by U.S. counterterrorism officials under President Barack Obama, the mission was ultimately authorized by President Donald Trump nine days into his presidency. The mission's goal was to gather intelligence on al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and to target the group's leader, Qasim al-Raymi. The raid was led by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) with resources from U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as commandos from the United Arab Emirates Army.
Between 10 and 30 civilians (including Nawar al-Awlaki, the eight-year-old American daughter of the deceased al-Qaeda preacher Anwar al-Awlaki) were killed in the raid along with up to 14 al-Qaeda fighters, as well as American Navy SEAL William Owens. A Bell Boeing MV-22B Osprey was destroyed during the operation.
The raid in Yemen was described as "risky from the start and costly in the end"; the "botched" operation raised questions about the choice to go forward with the raid "without sufficient intelligence, ground support or adequate backup preparations".
Background The United States has supported an ongoing Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen in their campaign against Houthi militants with weapons, intelligence, advice on operations, maritime operations, and refueling of aircraft. The United States also has an ongoing campaign against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The last US-led ground operation against AQAP in Yemen was in 2014. In 2016, the US and Emirati armed forces sent Special Operations forces to Yemen to monitor AQAP. The US conducted eight drone strikes against suspected AQAP operatives in Al Bayda during 2016, and a further strike on January 21, 2017.
The International Crisis Group reported in February 2017 that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula "is stronger than it has ever been" and is "thriving in an environment of state collapse, growing sectarianism, shifting alliances, security vacuums and a burgeoning war economy" brought on by Yemen's Civil War. In 2011, AQAP created Ansar Al-Sharia (AAS), a Yemen-based affiliate focused on waging an insurgency rather than international attacks on the West. In the view of the International Crisis Group, AQAP is "an internally diverse organisation with varying layers of support among the local population" and many AAS members and allies are not committed to AQAP's international agenda. As of early 2017, AQAP and AAS were currently in a struggle for territorial control with the Houthi/Saleh forces in the governorates of al-Bayda, Shebwa, Marib, Jawf and Taiz.
The principal targets of the raid were members of the al-Dhahab family and their houses, led by Abdelrauf al-Dhahab. Their clan is influential and Abdelrauf reportedly could call on a tribal force of 800 men. A number of the eighteen sons of patriarch Sheikh Ahmed Nasser al-Dhahab have joined AQAP or its armed affiliate organizations, including Tariq, Qaid, and Nabil. Qaid was killed by an August 2013 drone strike. Nabil was killed by a November 2014 drone strike. Tariq died while leading an AAS takeover of Rada'a, which also claimed the life of his half-brother Hizam, fighting on the other side.
Whether or not Abdelrauf was affiliated with Al Qaeda is disputed. As of 2014, Slate reported, Abdelrauf "skirt[ed] the line between an AQAP sympathizer and outright supporter." Abdelrauf al-Dhahab "repeatedly denied belonging to al-Qaida," and publicly pledged to drive them out of Al Bayda province in 2013. Prior to the raid, Abdelrauf al-Dhahab held a five-day meeting with military officials in the US-backed government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The military reportedly gave him some 15 million riyals (US$60,000) to fight against the Houthi rebels. Hadi government military spokesman Maj. Gen. Mohsen Khasrouf has stated that al-Dhahab was working with the government to retake the city of Rada'a from the Houthis.
The US military reported that the raid had been planned "for months" and is "one in a series of aggressive actions against al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen." The Obama administration refused to approve the raid; the Guardian reported that it had been reviewed several times, citing an anonymous government source. Colin Kahl, who served as Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President until January 2017, has publicly stated that "This particular raid was NOT discussed," but that it fell under an expanded plan to authorize military actions prepared by the Department of Defense. Further, Kahl stated, "Obama made no decisions on this before leaving office, believing it represented escalation of U.S. involvement in Yemen." In a report for the Washington Post, multiple defense sources stated they expected the Trump Administration to more readily approve similar operations.
Approval of the raid The approval of the Yakla raid did not follow the rigorous procedure used during the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, which involved a Situation Room meeting that detailed the operational plan, operational goals, a risk assessment (to both U.S. personnel and civilians), and a legal assessment of the operation. Instead, the raid was approved over dinner conversations between Trump, his son-in-law and adviser Jared Kushner, his special adviser Steve Bannon, and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis.What went wrong in the deadly raid on al-Qaida in Yemen?, PBS Newshour (February 2, 2017): "DAVID SANGER, The New York Times: Well, the process was somewhat unusual, Hari. Usually, a president goes down in the Situation Room, is presented with what they call a full package for the attack. There’s a legal assessment of the legal authorities under which they’re doing these. There’s a risk assessment to the commandos who would be doing it. There is a risk assessment of what could happen to civilians who are in the area. ... And it looks like President Trump got briefed on it, by and large, at a dinner, not in the Situation Room, not with legal advisers around. His secretary of defense, Jim Mattis, was there. Vice President Pence was there. Stephen Bannon, who has emerged as the newest member of the National Security Council, known really more for his political advice than military, was there. So was his new national security adviser, Michael Flynn, who is a veteran of many of these. But the discussion took place in a dinner situation. And he approved the raid at that dinner." David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Yemen Withdraws Permission for U.S. Antiterror Ground Missions, New York Times (February 7, 2017): "[Trump's] approval of the Jan. 29 raid came over a dinner four nights earlier with his top national security aides, rather than in the kind of rigorous review in the Situation Room that became fairly routine under President George W. Bush and Mr. Obama." Questions mount over botched Yemen raid approved by Trump, The Guardian (February 2, 2017): "The mission was approved over dinner five days after the presidential inauguration by Trump and his closest advisers, including his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his special adviser and former Breitbart executive Stephen Bannon, as well as defence secretary General Jim Mattis." Mattis, along with General Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented the plan; then-National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was also at the dinner. No representatives from the State Department were present, departing from the norms of previous administrations. Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner both reportedly opposed the mission. Flynn reportedly strongly advocated for the mission to President Trump.
The decision did not go through the normal National Security Council (NSC) channels, through which heads or deputy heads of all agencies with a stake in the operation would be consulted. U.S. military officials stated that the assault went forth "without sufficient intelligence, ground support, or adequate backup preparations."
The raid On January 26, a team of DEVGRU operators were staged from Djibouti to the USS Makin Island amphibious readiness group. At dawn on January 29, several dozen commandos from the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), as well as operators from the United Arab Emirates, were landed by a pair of MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft near the home of al-Qaeda leader Abdul Rauf al-Dhahab in the mountainous Yakla region of Al-Bayda. While approaching, the operators were informed via a communications intercept that al-Qaeda forces had become aware of their position. The DEVGRU team "found itself dropping onto a reinforced al Qaeda base defended by landmines, snipers, and a larger than expected contingent of heavily armed Islamist extremists."
Surviving villager Sheikh Abdelilah Ahmed al-Dhahab reported that his eleven-year-old son, Ahmed Abdelilah Ahmed al Dahab, was the first to address the soldiers, asking "Who are you?" He was fatally shot.
At the village, the US-UAE team engaged in a heavy firefight with the al-Qaeda forces. US helicopter gunships and fighter aircraft also fired on the town. One of the U.S. operators, Chief Petty Officer William Owens, was struck by gunfire above his armor plating and fatally wounded. During the extraction of the DEVGRU operators, a United States Marine Corps (USMC) MV-22B Osprey was damaged in a hard landing (crash landed) after losing power, injuring three additional American operators aboard. The Osprey was subsequently destroyed by a friendly airstrike carried out by a Harrier jet to avoid any of the crashed aircraft's sensitive electronics from being captured by the enemy. The DEVGRU operatives successfully extracted and departed the area after completing their raid.
The operation severely damaged a local clinic, the mosque, and the school in the Yemeni village.
Objective After the raid, unidentified U.S. military and intelligence officials told NBC News that its objective had been to capture or kill Qasim al-Raymi, a U.S.-designated terrorist and the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which the military did not originally acknowledge. According to military officials, the prospect of killing or capturing al-Raymi convinced the U.S. chain of command that the mission was worth the risk.
Shortly after the raid, on 5 February al-Raymi released an audio message online taunting U.S. President Donald Trump as the "fool of the White House" who "got slapped" early on in his role as Commander in Chief. The audio clip was found to be authentic by sources in the military. The Associated Press reported that the audio has not been independently verified, but it was "similar to that of previous recordings by al-Raymi".Ahmed Al-Haj (May 2, 2017). "Leader of al-Qaida in Yemen mocks Trump after raid" . Associated Press. It was not clear whether al-Raymi was tipped off to the raid, whether he simply wasn't there, or whether he escaped when the special operations forces arrived.
A month after the raid, the U.S. military denied that al-Raymi was the target of the operation. Instead, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer and the Pentagon described it as a "site exploitation mission" to gather intelligence.
Casualties Al-Qaeda