The Dissent Channel is a messaging framework open to Foreign Service officers and other U.S. citizens employed by the United States Department of State and Agency for International Development (USAID), through which they are invited to express constructive criticism of government policy.
Established in 1971, the Dissent Channel was used 123 times in its first four decades. In modern times, about four or five dissent cables are sent each year. U.S. foreign policies that have been the subject of dissent cables have varied widely. The 1971 Blood telegram, named for its author Archer Blood, condemned the U.S. policy of support for Pakistani dictator Yahya Khan, who oversaw a genocide in East Pakistan. Other dissent cables have criticized U.S. support for various authoritarian leaders, dissented from U.S. inaction in crises and genocides, or criticized U.S. involvement in various military conflicts. For example, a 1992 dissent cable protesting the U.S. failure to act during the Bosnian genocide is credited with helping lead to the Dayton Accords. The dissent cable with the largest number of signatories, by far, was a 2017 dissent cable condemning President Donald Trump's executive order imposing a travel and immigration ban on the nationals of seven majority-Muslim countries; about 1,000 diplomats are listed as signatories.
Dissent cables circulate to senior State Department officials; messages receive a response from the department's Policy Planning Staff. Under department regulations, diplomats who submit dissent cables are supposed to be protected from retaliation or reprisal. Nevertheless, some U.S. diplomats are hesitant to use the Dissent Channel for fear that it could impede their career progress.
History and uses The Dissent Channel was established in 1971, as a response to concerns that dissenting opinions and constructive criticism were suppressed or ignored during the Vietnam War. Secretary of State William P. Rogers created the system. In February 1971, the right of Foreign Service officers to dissent was explicitly codified in the Foreign Affairs Manual.
The Dissent Channel is reserved for "...consideration of responsible dissenting and alternative views on substantive foreign policy issues that cannot be communicated in a full and timely manner through regular operating channels or procedures." Use of the channel is reserved for dissenting or alternative views on policy concerns; views on "management, administrative, or personnel issues that are not significantly related to matters of substantive foreign policy may not be communicated through the Dissent Channel." Messages sent to the Dissent Channel are distributed to senior members of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, must be acknowledged within 2 days, and must receive a response within 30–60 days.
Diplomats who write such dissent cables are supposed to be protected from retaliation or reprisal.Paul D. Wolfowitz, A Diplomat's Proper Channel of Dissent, The New York Times (January 31, 2017).Neal K. Katyal, Washington Needs More Dissent Channels, The New York Times (July 1, 2016). The Foreign Affairs Manual provides that "[f]reedom from reprisal for Dissent Channel users is strictly enforced." Nevertheless, many U.S. diplomats fear to use the channel for fear of retaliation.Kishan S. Rana, The Contemporary Embassy: Paths to Diplomatic Excellence (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 66–67. A 2020 Project on Government Oversight study of dissent channels used at the State Department and five other federal agencies found that most were "used infrequently" and that "Across presidential administrations, irrespective of political party, and at agencies across the government these channels are often viewed as ineffectual, and many career employees with access to a dissent channel still fear retaliation for using it."Report: Official Dissent Channels Often Viewed as Risky, Waste of Time, Fedweek (August 4, 2020).Daniel Van Schooten & Nick Schwellenbach, Stifling Dissent: How the Federal Government's Channels for Challenging Policies from Within Fall Short, Project on Government Oversight (July 31, 2020).
From 1971 to 2011, there were 123 dissent cables. A 2020 report stated that over its half-century of existence, the Dissent Channel averaged between five and ten uses per year. The most dissent cables sent in a single year came in 1977, when 28 dissent cables were filed "under the Carter Administration, which everyone agrees created an atmosphere in which use of the channel was encouraged—or at least not stigmatized." Some of the surge in Dissent Channel use in the late 1970s was attributable to a single individual.
After Ronald Reagan became president, the number of dissent cables declined sharply, to 15 in 1981 and just five in 1982. This decline was due to a feeling in "U.S. embassies around the world ... that the Reagan White House and State Department were not receptive to viewpoints that diverged from the ambassadors' assessments," and that dissenting cables was likely to damage a diplomat's career.Morris Morley & Chris McGillion, Reagan and Pinochet (Cambridge University Press), p. 27 (citing Kai Bird, "Ronald Reagan's Foreign Service," APF Reporter 7, no. 3 (1984)). For example, some diplomats feel that using the Dissent Cable reduces their chance of appointment to an ambassadorial post. In the 2010s, about four or five dissent cables were sent each year.Gary J. Bass, Dissent at the U.S. State Department: Why Trump Should Welcome It, Foreign Affairs (February 2, 2017).
Some notable uses of the Dissent Channel include:
In March 1971, Archer Blood, the U.S. consul-general in Dhaka, joined by 28 other U.S. diplomats, sent the famous Blood telegram. The cable condemned the U.S. policy of support for Pakistani dictator Yahya Khan, who oversaw a genocide in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh).Ellen Barry, To U.S. in '70s, a Dissenting Diplomat. To Bangladesh, 'a True Friend.'", The New York Times (June 27, 2016). In 1972, a dissent cable strongly criticized the U.S. bombing of Haiphong Harbor, arguing that this constituted "a breach of the spirit if not the letter of our stated policy to disengage from the Indo-China conflict." Also in 1972, a dissent cable criticized the U.S. "policy of non-intervention in Burundi during massive murdering of Hutu tribesmen" and argued that a genocide was occurring in Burundi. In a July 1972 dissent cable, diplomat Alexander Peaslee wrote that he was retiring from the Foreign Service in disgust over the My Lai Massacre and other atrocities in Vietnam, writing: "One of the reasons for retiring at the age of 50 after 29 years of government service is that I do not want to be associated with the actions of an executive branch that takes no effective steps against atrocities too similar to those of the Nazis."U.S. Government Responsibility for My Lai, from Alexander L. Peaslee, Halifax, July 17, 1972, Limited Official Use (published by National Security Archive, George Washington University). In 1978, a dissent cable criticized U.S. support for the dictatorial Somoza regime in Nicaragua. In 1982, a dissent cable urged the U.S. government not to give unconditional recognition to the regime of General Efraín Ríos Montt, who had seized power in Guatemala in a coup. In 1992, several Foreign Service officers used the channel to protest U.S. failure to act during the Bosnian genocide. The cable is credited with helping lead to the Dayton Accords. In 1994, four career diplomats at the U.S. Embassy in Dublin sent a dissent memorandum questioning the decision of U.S. Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith to grant a U.S. visa to Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams. Two of the four signatories received career-damaging performance appraisals from Smith and were "excluded from Embassy functions relevant to their jobs."Stephen Engleberg, U.S. Says Envoy to Ireland Wrongly Punished 2 Colleagues, The New York Times (March 8, 1996). This led to a yearlong investigation by the State Department Inspector General's office, which issued a "scathingly critical" reportRichard Gilbert, Dissent in Dublin – For 2 FSOs, Cable Drew Retribution And Frustration , Foreign Service Journal, (July 1996). that found "inescapable evidence" that Smith had retaliated against the two diplomats. In 1997, then-U.S. Ambassador to Angola Donald Steinberg sent a dissent cable (entitled "Dissent Against U.S. Positions on Landmines at Oslo APL Conference") that criticized a State Department instruction directing ambassadors in the developing world to press other governments to weaken anti-personnel landmine measures in the Ottawa Treaty (which was then under negotiation) by allowing "the United States and presumably other countries to exercise numerous waivers, exempt anti-tank weapons, exclude South Korea, and accept lengthy implementation timeframes."Donald Steinberg, When Professionalism Mattered: Dissent Against U.S. Policy on Landmines, Just Security (February 18, 2020). In his cable, Steinberg referred to the U.S. position as "indefensible, filled with contradictions, and inconsistent with true U.S. national security and foreign policy interests" and referred to the devastating effects of mines on civilian populations after the Angolan Civil War, writing, "How can America's global responsibilities and foreign policy interests dictate that we protect weapons so horrible and barbaric that virtually all our closest allies are seeking a global treaty to eliminate them without delay?" The cable was declassified in 2020. In early 2003, Ann Wright, the chargé d'affaires in Mongolia, used the channel to protest the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq.Ann Wright, "America and the World" in America & The World: The Double Bind (eds. Majid Tehranian & Kevin P. Clements: Transaction Publishers, 2005), pp. 93–94. John Brady Kiesling, another U.S. diplomat, also used the dissent cable to express opposition to the war.John Brady Kiesling, Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower (Potomac Books, 2006), appendix B. In 2004, diplomat Keith W. Mines, then posted to Budapest, sent a dissent cable arguing that the United Nations should be given charge over the political transition in Iraq.Peter Slevin, Diplomats Honored for Dissent: Envoys Challenged Bush Foreign Policy, The Washington Post (June 28, 2004), A19. In June 2016, 51 Foreign Service officers used the channel to protest the U.S.'s failure to intervene in Syria, a record number at the time.Max Fisher, The State Department's Dissent Memo on Syria: An Explanation, The New York Times (June 22, 2016). The cable—a draft copy of which was obtained by The New York Times—called for limited military strikes against the Assad regime. In January 2017, about 1,000 Foreign Service officers signed a dissent cable condemning Donald Trump's Executive Order 13769, which imposed a travel and immigration ban on the nationals of seven majority-Muslim countries. This is by far the largest number to ever sign on to a dissent cable.