The Signal Intelligence Regiment () (KONA) was the basic element of the field organisation of the German Army (Heer) signals intelligence organization (first called Inspectorate 7/VI, then LNA, and finally OKH/GdNA) during World War II. The KONA regiments were mobile communication reconnaissance units which were assigned to an army group and operated close to the front lines within the theatre of operations to intercept and build intelligence, via evaluation services (cryptanalysis) and disseminate the intelligence to senior staff locally and in the OKH/GdNA headquarters in the rear. To quote World War II cryptographic historian, Christos Triantafyllopoulos: "The KONA units did not have the ability to solve complicated Allied cryptosystems. Instead they focused on exploiting low/mid level ciphers and even in this capacity they were assisted by material sent to them by the central cryptanalytic department. This was the German Army High Command's Inspectorate 7/VI".

Sources The remains of Signal Intelligence Regiment 1 (abbr. KONA 1) surrendered to American troops near Tausing, located close to and northwest of Liezen, Austria on 9 May 1945. Commanded by the fanatical NaziI-23, Section 1 Major Ernst Hertzer, the remains of the regiment consisted of around 700 officers, enlisted men and women who were sent to the abbey at Stift Tepl, that was being used as a Prisoner of War enclosure. They had destroyed all their papers en route except those documents they considered the most important for reconstruction of their records. The remaining documents were kept in three briefcases plus a single book. On the afternoon of 9 May, with strong rumours of Soviets approaching the area, the three briefcases were burned with only the book remaining. The book remained in the unit vehicles after an extensive search and was never found.IF-10, Page 10

Between 23 May and 28 May 1945, over 350 prisoners were screened at a town called Konstantinsbad close to Plzeň in the Czech Republic. All primary personnel were interviewed, with a further 41 chosen for further questioning. Some reports were written at Plzeň but most Allied Target Intelligence Committee (abbr. TICOM) documents relating to KONA units were written between 30 May and 2 June at Oberursel near Frankfurt am Main. Further interrogations were undertaken and more specific information given when the group was moved to Revin.IF-10, Page 4 In total, the material created consisted of 31 reports supported with supplements giving information of the makeup and organization of unit 1.I-19b Report on Interrogation of Kommandeur der Nachr. Aufkl. 1 (KONA.) at Revin, France, June 1945

History

KONA 1 operated in the southern sector of the Eastern Front from June 1941 until May 1945, intercepting and evaluating Red Army, Soviet Air Forces and People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) traffic.I-67, Page 3 Certain personnel within KONA 1 appeared to have succeeded in reconstructing the detailed Order of Battle of the Soviet military, and in predicting the timing and location of Soviet offensives before they occurredI-19b, Page 1 The results were achieved by close integration of all sources of information as opposed to cryptanalysis of Soviet ciphers, although low and medium grade Soviet ciphers were read. The ratio of general evaluation against pure cryptanalysis was about three to one which was due to the following:

* Soviet High Grade ciphers were generally unreadable, due to the use of one-time pads. * A large amount of information could be obtained from Soviet military practices, movements of strategic reserves, chain of command, intentions to attack as well as including use of Indicators on ciphers, call-signs and a low standard of Soviet wireless discipline.

From an examination of the cryptographical processes of Soviet security, KONA 1 appeared to have determined that one-time pads were used for high grade ciphers, and a number of code books and reciphering tables were used for medium and low grade ciphers. Medium and low grade ciphers appear to have been readable by KONA 1 in most cases.

Captain Roman Roessler, Chief Evaluator of KONA 1, and commanding officer of the Intelligence Evaluation Centre () (abbr. NASS) of the KONA regiment, stated that even if identification of individual formations wasn't possible, KONA was still successful in formulating a picture of groupings and number of formations. As regards the Soviet Rifle Corps and Divisions, KONA had to rely on other means to gather signal intelligenceI-19b, Pages 14-15

Organization and Functions

KONA Regiment

The purpose of a KONA regiment was to supply intelligence to the staff of the Army Corps, Armies and Army Groups. Each KONA unit consisted of a Regimental Evaluation centre and possibly five or six intercept and intelligence companies. The KONA regiment operated with the signal intelligence platoons operating close to the front line, with its companies situated close to army headquarters (abbr. HQ) and the main evaluation unit situated in the rear at Army Group HQ.

Close Range Signal Intelligence Companies () (abbr. NANAK or NAK) were tasked with intercepting low level traffic. This was evaluated as it came in, with all intelligence passed to Senior Staff of their assigned Army Group as it became available, with all intercepts and immediate reports passed back to an evaluation platoon at company headquarters, for further evaluation.

Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies () (abbr. NAFAK or FAK) intercepted high level traffic, undertook some immediate evaluation which was passed to Senior Staff, and also passed back reports and intercepts to the regimental Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre () (abbr. NAAS).

In 1944, the Signal Intelligence Battalion () (abbr. NAA) was introduced into the organization of the KONA. These battalions were small administrative units, which acted to co-ordinate unit activities at Army level.I-19g, Page 5

Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre (NAAS)

The Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre () (NAAS) centre was situated close to an Army Group HQ The NAAS functionality included evaluation and traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, collation and dissemination of intelligence.

Four types of activity was included for the Evaluation and Traffic Analysis of intercepts:I-19b, Page 6 Technical and tactical evaluation of all identified intercepts, i.e. picked up by Long Range units.

Processing of all unidentified intercepts. Traffic analysis from both long and short range units including intercepts which may not be from the enemy armies. Checking and tactical evaluation of reports from Short Range units. Traffic analysis, Direction finding evaluation, update of registry card index, NKVD evaluation and Soviet Air force intercepts processing.

Cryptanalysis in the NAAS primarily meant the solution of unknown systems, the study of developments in known systems, and work on NKVD ciphers and processes. The NAAS worked on 4-figure Soviet ciphers.

The NAAS was responsible for the dissemination of intelligence, passing its results to the Intelligence Officer of the associated Army Group, and also forwarding the intelligence to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the OKH/GDNAI-19g, Page 7

The NAAS had a key position in the direction of coverage for interception. Through the chain of command, it controlled the intercept coverage for all lower units with co-ordination by staff of the headquarters of OKH/GdNA controlling everything elseDF-18, Page 18 Certain items were passed unprocessed straight to the GdNA cryptanalysis unit. Ciphers from the NKVD that were formatted using 5-figure groups were passed automatically to the GdNA cryptanalysis unit for additional cryptanalysis.I-19g, Page 8

Stationary Intercept Company (Feste)

The stationary Intercept Companies (1923–1939 , 1939–1945 ) (abbr. Feste or more commonly FNAST) were designed to work at a lower level than the NAAS, i.e. at the level of an individual Army. The intercepts were designed in the pre-war period, and although they were retained, their traditional functionality and designation of being fixed () in a single location was redesigned to become semi-motorized for use in the East during Operation Barbarossa and later. Feste 10, the stationary company of KONA 1, operated close to Army HQI-19g, Page 6

Feste 10 consisted of five sections, besides the HQ section. An intercept platoon, controlled by the NAAS,DF-18, Page 82 covered unknown traffic in the 3500-5500 kHz band, fixed NKVD nets assigned by NAAS and those formations of mobile network traffic as directed by NAAS.I-19b, Page 3 An evaluation section identified and reported unknown traffic. The study of unidentified intercepts was a primary function of the Feste.I-19b, Page 3-4, 19-20 A cryptanalysis section worked to identify cipher keys, translation of plain-text messages and solutions to ciphers.I-19b, Page 4 The Feste also had a Direction Finding platoon, which provided resources on demand. Communications between the Direction Finding sites and the Regiment were provided by a Communications platoon, which passed results back to the NAAS via telegram or teleprinter.

Long Range Intelligence Company (FAK) These companies () (abbr. FAK) were different from the Feste, in that they were more concerned with identified traffic. Like the Feste, they were semi-motorized and were designed to operate close to Army HQ. They were designed in a manner that each unit should be associated with each army staff covering an army section. In reality however, the operations of these types of companies, and indeed the Feste, took place further and further in the rear. The large amount of work that needed to be undertaken and became heaviest just at the time when safety precautions required a withdrawal, meant that it was found to be more practical to undertake work in the rear where it would be less frequently interrupted.

In gathering intercepts, the FAK's were directed by the cover control section of the Evaluation Centre (NAAS). The traffic intercepts received by the unit was studied as fully as resources allowed. Plain-text messages were translated, with intercepts with known ciphers decoded by specialists attached to the unit. A card index section was maintained by the archivist. Those intercepts which couldn't be analysed via cryptanalysis were forwarded to the traffic analysis section of the NAAS.

Close Range Intelligence Company (NAK)

The Close Range Company () (abbr. NAK), worked at Army Corps level. Its primary task was to intercept traffic and work on low-level 2, 3, and possibly 4 digit ciphers traffic close to the front lines.I-19h, Page 2 Although the unit was designed to work at Army Group level, in practice such companies were also stationed by the commander of regiment with each Army as well.I-19g, page 1 In contrast to the Long Range Companies, these units were designed to operate by platoon. The operation of each company was divided amongst four platoons which were, () which intercepted traffic, () for bearings and fixes on enemy transmitters, Evaluation () and (), which handled all communication problems.I-62, Page 4 The direction finding platoon whose organization was particularly elaborate, operated from tents.I-62, Paragraphs 8-10