The presidential transition of George W. Bush took place following the 2000 United States presidential election. It started after Bush was declared the victor of the election on December 12, 2000, when the Bush v. Gore decision by the Supreme Court halted the election recount in Florida, making Bush the victor in that state. The decision delivered him the state's 25 electoral votes, thus giving him a total of 271 electoral votes. This was one more vote than the 270 needed to win the presidency outright, making him president-elect.
Due to the recount effort and litigation between Bush and his presidential opponent Al Gore leaving the outcome of the election unclear until December 12, 2000, Bush's official transition was abbreviated, at just 39 days. The transition was chaired by vice president-elect Dick Cheney.
Bush's victory was formally certified on January 6, 2001, when a joint session of Congress certified the electoral college count. The transition ended when Bush was inaugurated on January 20, 2001. This was the first presidential transition to be held after the passage of the Presidential Transition Act of 2000.
Abbreviated nature of official transition period Due to the recount effort and litigation between Bush and his presidential opponent Al Gore leaving the election undecided until December 12, 2000, Bush's official transition was abbreviated to just 39 days. The last instance in United States history in which disputes over the election had delayed an individual becoming president-elect of the United States was the after the 1876 United States presidential election, when Rutherford B. Hayes would not become president-elect until after the Electoral Commission's decision.
The official transition's abbreviated length gave the Bush team less time to prepare.
The shortened transition was also seen as having a potential impact on Bush's ability to readily make appointments to offices. The shortened transition meant that there was only a 5-week period before Bush would take office as president for requisite FBI background checks to be performed on many of his prospective appointees for offices which required one. Despite having such a short transition, in his first year as president, Bush managed to appoint more people than any other modern president had in the same timeframe. The 9/11 Commission Report argued that the abbreviated transition had resultantly left many national security positions unfilled by the time of the September 11 attacks, and that slow transitions such as that of Bush's can imperil the nation's national security.
Transition team + Transition team Position Holder Date publicly named to position Previous experience Chairman Dick Cheney November 26, 2000 Vice-presidential running-mate of Bush; former United States Secretary of Defense Executive Director Clay Johnson III November 27, 2000 Gubernatorial chief of staff to George W. Bush since June 1999 Spokesperson Ari Fleischer November 27, 2000 Spokesman for Bush campaign since November 1999 Deputy Spokesperson Juleanna Glover Weiss November 27, 2000 Press secretary to Dick Cheney during campaign Legal Counsel Michael E. Toner November 29, 2000 General counsel for the Bush campaign since March 1999 Director of Congressional Relations David Gribben November 29, 2000 Vice president for corporate affairs at Halliburton
The transition Bush team also announced policy coordination groups on December 15, which included such members Joshua Bolten, Gary Edson, John Bridgeland. The same day it also announced advisory teams, of which Bill Paxon was chair and Maria Cino was executive director.
Fred F. Fielding headed the transition's vetting and clearance process for prospective appointees.Burke, p. 27
The transition team also had a clearance counsel, confirmation teams, and various coordinator positions.
Pre-election activities Some planning for Bush's potential presidential transition began as early as the spring of 1999. Per the later recounting of Clay Johnson III, Bush had asked him in June 1999 to help prepare a plan for a potential presidential transition. Johnson would agree, and would lead Bush's pre-election transition planning. Formal planning for a prospective transition began in August 2000. Throughout the pre-election planning efforts, Johnson would hold occasional meetings with Bush.Burke (2004), pp. 14 and 19 While Johnson would continue to head pre-election planning, shortly after the Republican National Convention, it was decided that Bush's running mate, Dick Cheney would be the post-election transition chairman if the ticket were elected.Burke (2004), pp. 16 and 18 The work Johnson oversaw was almost entirely done out of the public-eye, with little media coverage paid to the pre-election transition work until shortly before the day of the election.
Jonson communicated with Martha Joynt Kumar, head of the nonpartisan "White House Transition Project" group founded in 1999, who were researching presidential transitions. Johnson would later talk about receiving helpful insight from their research, and Bush would also credit them with having aided his transition effort.Burke (2004), p. 16
A decision that Bush had privately decided upon two weeks before the election was that, if elected, he would name Andrew Card his White House chief of staff. This decision was made early due to Johnson's belief that it would be beneficial to have an individual in place for this role early.Burke (2004), pp. 16 and 20
Initial post-election day activities While the election took place on November 7, its winner was unclear due to the unsettled result in Florida.
Bush proceeded with transition efforts while the election result was yet to be formally determined. In contrast to Bush, for some time after election day, Al Gore suspended his transition team's operations. Dick Cheney, conducted some transition work out of a private residence he owned in McLean, Virginia.
Throughout the post-election recount and litigation, as prospective president and vice president, Bush and Cheney retained United States Secret Service protection they had already been receiving before the election, as did Gore's vice presidential runningmate Joe Lieberman (Gore, as the incumbent vice president, was entitled to Secret Service protection at the time, regardless of the presidential election).
Gore had paused his transition efforts, and had involved himself with his team's efforts in addressing the recount in Florida. Contrarily, Bush would largely remain personally removed from his team's operations in Florida, and would instead busy himself with both transition planning tasks and actions related to his job as governor of Texas.Burke (2004), p. 21
Bush began to conduct his transition in a manner strongly mimicking a president-elect after Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris certified her state's results on November 26 (an act that did not settle the result of the election, as Gore launched the Gore v. Harris lawsuit that would later evolve into Bush v. Gore). Operating his transition effort in a public manner was seen to be, in part, a part of the Bush team's strategy to turn public opinion against Al Gore's contesting of the Florida election results, and to pressure Gore into dropping his legal challenge. Bush hoped to establish a perception that his victory was imminent, and would leak word of his national security team, and allow news cameras access to some of his transition meetings. Bush received criticism, particularly from Democrats, for operating such a full-fledged transition before the election outcome was officially determined. However, many Democrats conceded that it was a necessity for Bush to plan a transition so that he would be prepared to take office if he were to be determined the election's victor. Bush held meetings with many prospective appointees. Bush held some of these meetings at his ranch in Texas.
On November 26, Bush announced that Dick Cheney would be officially heading the transition. Cheney took on this work, despite having suffered a heart attack earlier that month. It was reported around this time that Bush had delegated to Cheney significant authority over deciding the composition and management style of the potential Bush administration. The choice to have the vice presidential running mate head the transition team, an unusual move, ultimately foreshadowed the central role Cheney would make in policy decisions during Bush's presidency. Cheney formed a transition team that primarily consisted of individuals that he had preexisting relationships with and many who had been on Cheney's own staff when he was United States Secretary of Defense. In addition to this, Cheney named Clay Johnson III (Bush's gubernatorial chief of staff) as the executive director of the transition. Cheney also named Ari Fleischer, who had been a spokesman for the campaign, as the transition's press spokesman. On November 29, it was announced that Michael E. Toner would be joining the transition team as legal counsel, and that David Gribben would serve as director of congressional relations. By the time the election outcome would be decided, Bush's transition team already consisted of 75 employees and 20 volunteers.
On November 27, the General Services Administration (GSA), led by David J. Barram, stated they would not give the Bush transition team access to government-provided transition office space or $5.3 million in earmarked funding for a transition, "until a final winner" was determined in the presidential election, citing the Presidential Transition Act of 1963's provision requiring the outcome of an election to be clear prior to the government providing any taxpayer funding to aid in a transition. On November 28, Barram announced to staffers of the GSA that he would postpone his planned resignation by two weeks, from November 29 to December 15, so that he could be in office when the office ceded these to an incoming president.
In response to the GSA's decision not to give the Bush transition team access to government office space and funding, Cheney announced on December 27 that the transition team would open a privately funded office in Washington, D.C., and would, to fund their transition effort, establish a nonprofit organization that would accept direct and in-kind, contributions from individuals of up to a maximum of $5,000 per individual, which was the maximum contribution allowed under the Presidential Transition Act of 1963. The Bush transition effort opted to refuse corporate and PAC donations. The Bush camp targeted raising $3.5 million for their transition effort. The Bush transition effort would ultimately raise $1.5 million in funding through contributions by the time the election outcome was determined. It was not unprecedented for a presidential transition to raise private funds, as the previous 1992–1993 Clinton transition had raised $5.3 million to supplement the $3.5 million the federal government had provided it. The Bush team also pledged to voluntarily disclose contributions. However, the choice to raise private funds attracted some criticism, with the group Common Cause urging the Bush team not to continue with their plans to do so. While each saying it was problematic for them to raise private contributions, both OpenSecrets director Larry Makinson and political scientist Larry Sabato conceded that the lack of federal funding for the transition had left the Bush team with little other choice.
On November 29, Cheney publicly announced the transition team's acquisition of office space near Washington, D.C. in suburban McLean, Virginia. The Bush transition moved into the 2,100 square feet of office space the following day. At this time, the transition effort began expanding its staff.