Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982 in a military operation code-named Operation Rosario (). The invasion served as a catalyst for the subsequent Falklands War. The Argentines mounted amphibious landings and the invasion ended with the surrender of Falkland Government House, due to the location of the fighting the invasion is occasionally known as the Battle of Government House.
Defence Governor Rex Hunt was informed on 1 April 1982, by the British Government of a possible Argentine invasion. At 3:30 pm that day he received a telegram from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stating:
Forces involved The Governor summoned the two senior Royal Marines of Naval Party 8901 to Government House in Stanley to discuss the options for defending the Falklands. He said during the meeting, "Sounds like the buggers mean it."
Major Mike Norman was given overall command of the Marines due to his seniority, while Major Gary Noott became the military advisor to Governor Hunt. The total strength was 68 Marines and 11 sailors from the Antarctic patrol ship Endurances survey team, commanded by RN Lieutenant Chris Todhunter.Invasion! Under fire, as the Falklands come under attack That number was greater than would normally have been available because the garrison was in the process of changing over—both the replacements and the troops preparing to leave were in the Falklands at the time of the invasion.Battles: The Argentine Invasion royalnavy.mod.uk. Accessed 26 August 2007.
This was decreased to 57 when 22 Royal Marines embarked aboard HMS Endurance to join the 13-man British Antarctic Survey (BAS) team under base commander Steve Martin to observe Argentine soldiers on South Georgia. The Royal Navy and author Russell Phillips state that a total of 85 marines were present at Stanley."Consequently, there were 85 Royal Marines on the islands, with 25 men of the Falkland Islands Defence Force, although some retired members of the FIDF also reported for duty that around 40 men were available for the FIDF." A Damn Close-Run Thing, Russell Phillips, Shilka Publishing, 2011
Their numbers were reinforced by at least 25 Falkland Islands Defence Force (FIDF) members.Anderson, pp. 17–19. Graham Bound, an islander who lived through the Argentine occupation, reports in his book Invasion 1982: Falkland Islanders at War that the higher figure of 40 membersSpirited resistance against the invader was provided by the thirty-five or so Royal Marines of Naval Party 8901, but on the night of April 1st 1982, thirty two members of FIDF, ranging in age from sixteen to sixty, also volunteered to leave their comfortable homes in Stanley to defend essential installations against attack, with every reason to expect that they might never come back alive.Falklands' forgotten soldiers, remembered at last"Meanwhile, the Falkland Islands Defence Force (FIDF) was preparing for the invasion quite independently of the Marines. Their OC, Major Phil Summers, had tasked the approximately forty parttime militiamen to guard such key points as the telephone exchange, the radio station and the power station." Invasion 1982: The Falkland Islanders' Story, Graham Bound, p. 45, Casemate Publishers, 2007 (including 15 ex-FIDF members) of the FIDF reported for duty at their drill hall. Their commanding officer, Major Phil Summers, tasked the volunteer militiamen (including his son Brian Summers) with guarding such key points as the telephone exchange, the radio station and the power station. Skipper Jack Sollis, on board the civilian coastal ship Forrest, operated his boat as an improvised radar screen station off Stanley. Four other civilians, former Royal Marines Jim Fairfield and Anthony Davies,"Anthony Davies, known as 'Taff', was the only experienced soldier among them. Taff had been a Marine and met his wife Jackie when serving with Naval Party 8901 in the late 1970s. He left the Corps in 1979 and settled in Stanley. That night he felt he had to do something to help and became the FIDF's newest member." Bound: Invasion 1982: The Falkland Islanders' Story, p. 46 a Canadian citizen, Bill Curtiss and Rex Hunt's chauffeur, Don Bonner"Rex Hunt's chauffeur and major-domo Don Bonner was deeply attached to his boss and Government House, where he had a grace-and-favour cottage. Don had borrowed Rex's 12-bore shotgun, staked out the flagstaff on the lawn and told Mike Norman that he planned to shoot 'any Argy who tried to bring down the flag.'" Bound: Invasion 1982: The Falkland Islanders' Story, p. 47 also offered their services to the governor.Insight team Sunday Time (1982), Chapter I: Surrender (I) and Chapter VIII: An ungentlemanly act. There is a mention of volunteers, such as Jim Fairfield, a former marine, Bill Curtis, a Canadian national and air controller and the skipper Jack Sollis, captain of the Forrest. Rex Hunt himself was armed with a Browning 9 mm pistol. Rex Hunt himself was armed with a Browning 9 mm pistol.
Before the main Argentine landings, nine of the British sailors present were placed under the command of the Chief Secretary, Dick Baker, and rounded up 30 Argentine nationals living in Port Stanley and placed them in protective custody next to the Police Station."Led by Colour Sergeant J. Noone RM, and accompanied by the Chief Secretary as the representative of the civil power, they had rounded up thirty Argentine nationals residents in Port Stanley by 4.00 am, placing them in protective custody." The Royal Navy and Falklands War, David Brown, p. 57, Pen & Sword, 1987 He recalls:
The nine sailors came back to Government House, where they established an information service, leaving the prisoners in custody of RN Lieutenant Richard Ball.Nick Van Der Bijl (2007), p. 15
Operation Rosario
The Argentine amphibious operation began in the late evening of Thursday 1 April, when the destroyer disembarked special naval forces south of Stanley. The bulk of the Argentine force was to land some hours later from the amphibious warfare ship near the airport on a beach previously marked by frogmen from the submarine . The operation had been called Azul (Blue) during the planning stage, but it was finally renamed Rosario.Ruiz Moreno, p. 21
ARA Santa Fe Rosario began with the reconnaissance of Port William by the submarine ARA Santa Fe and the landing of 14 members of the near Cape Pembroke, including the commander of this elite unit, Lieutenant-Commander Alfredo Raúl Cufré. The reconnaissance mission began as early as 31 March, when the trawler Forrest was spotted through the periscope at 10:00 p.m. off Port Stanley. The next day, Santa Fe learned that the authorities in Stanley were aware of the Argentine plans, so a change was necessary. Instead of landing right on Pembroke, the commandos would initially take a beach nearby.Bóveda, Jorge (2007). La Odisea del submarino Santa Fe. IPN editores, pp. 56, 75–76.
The commandos left Santa Fe at 1:40 p.m. and from the beach headed towards Pembroke peninsula in Zodiac boats. They reached Yorke Bay at 4:30 a.m. on 2 April. After planting beacons for the main landing, they took over the airfield and the lighthouse without encountering significant resistance. After the British surrender at Port Stanley, this team was given the task of gathering the Royal Marines and taking them into custody.
Attack on Moody Brook barracks
On the night of 1–2 April 1982, Santísima Trinidad halted off the mouth of Mullet Creek, on the northern bank of Port Harriet, and lowered 21 Gemini assault craft into the water. They contained 84 special forces troopersBusser, Operación Rosario. The force was composed of 76 Amphibious Commandos and 8 members of the Buzos Tácticos (tactical divers) elite group. of Lieutenant-Commander Guillermo Sánchez-Sabarots's 1st Amphibious Commandos Group and a small partyThe so-called Patrulla Techo (Roof patrol). under Lieutenant-Commander Pedro Giachino, who was second-in-command of the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion and had volunteered for the mission"Meanwhile, Lieutenant Commander Pedro Giachino, who was the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion Second-in-Command, and had volunteered for the mission, approached Government House with eight amphibious commandos and the eight tactical divers." Victory in the Falklands, Nick Van Der Bijl, p. 18, Pen & Sword, 2007 to capture Government House. Argentine Rear Admiral Jorge Allara, through a message radioed from Santisima Trinidad, had requested from Rex Hunt a peaceful surrender, but the request was rejected.
Giachino's party had the shortest distance to go: two and a half miles due north. Moody Brook Barracks, the destination of the main party, was away over rough terrain. Sánchez-Sabarots, in the book The Argentine Fight for the Falklands, described the main party's progress in the dark:
It was a nice night, with a moon, but the cloud covered the moon for most of the time. It was very hard going with our heavy loads; it was hot work. We eventually became split up into three groups. We only had one night sight; the lead man, Lieutenant Arias had it. One of the groups became separated when a vehicle came along the track we had to cross. We thought it was a military patrol. Another group lost contact, and the third separation was caused by someone going too fast. This caused my second in command, Lieutenant Bardi, to fall. He suffered a hairline fracture of the ankle and had to be left behind with a man to help him. We were at Moody Brook by 5.30 a.m., just on the limits of the time planned, but with no time for the one hour's reconnaissance for which we had hoped.
The main party of Argentine Marines assumed that the Moody Brook Barracks contained sleeping Royal Marines. The barracks were quiet, although a light was on in the office of the Royal Marine commander. No sentries were observed, and it was a quiet night. Sánchez-Sabarots could hear nothing suggesting any action at Government House nor from the distant landing beaches. Nevertheless, he ordered the assault to begin. Sánchez-Sabarots's account continued:
It was still completely dark. We were going to use tear-gas to force the British out of the buildings and capture them. Our orders were not to cause casualties if possible. That was the most difficult mission of my career. All our training as commandos was to fight aggressively and inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. We surrounded the barracks with machine-gun teams, leaving only one escape route along the peninsula north of Stanley Harbour. Anyone who did get away would not be able to reach the town and reinforce the British there. Then we threw the gas grenades into each building. There was no reaction; the barracks were empty.
The noise of the grenades alerted Major Norman to the presence of Argentines on the island, so he drove back to Government House. Realising that the attack was coming from Moody Brook, he ordered all troop sections to converge on Government House to enable the defence to be centralised. Around this time, most of the Falkland Islands Defence Force received similar orders and fell back to Drill Hall. Sergeant Gerald Cheek from the FIDF recalled: "We were requested to phone in to HQ whenever possible, and when I made the routine call at 06.00 hours Phil Summers informed me that the Governor had said FIDF members were not to engage with the enemy under any circumstances, and they were to surrender when ordered to do so without offering any resistance."Invasion 1982: The Falkland Islanders' Story, Graham Bound, p. 46, Casemate Publishers, 2007