The Tonghua Incident (), also known as the February 3 Incident in Tonghua () or the Tonghua 3 February Riot () was an armed uprising that broke out in Tonghua on 3 February 1946. It occurred during the post–World War II transition period when Nationalist and Chinese Communist Party forces were competing to take control of formerly Japanese-occupied territories following the surrender of Japan.
According to contemporary Chinese sources, the uprising was organized by Kuomintang agent Sun Gengyao, who gathered former collaborators and remnants of the Japanese Kwantung Army led by Fujita Jitsuhiko in an attempt to seize control of Tonghua from Communist authorities. The conspirators established multiple command posts in the city, recruited Japanese residents through coercion and publicity, and planted informants within hospitals and local government offices.
On 2 February 1946, the plot was uncovered by the local People’s Government and the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. The main command center was raided and key leaders, including Sun Gengyao (), were arrested. With the scheduled start of the uprising only hours away, several principal conspirators were executed after interrogation.
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on 3 February, armed participants launched coordinated attacks on major government, military, and communications installations in Tonghua. Some buildings, including the Public Security Bureau, were briefly seized. After roughly two hours of fighting, Communist forces suppressed the uprising. Subsequent searches throughout the city led to the capture of additional participants, including Fujita Jitsuhiko ().
Background
Following Japan’s surrender on 15 August 1945, the former puppet state of Manchukuo collapsed, leaving a power vacuum in many northeastern cities, including Tonghua. In the months that followed, three principal forces emerged in the area: Communist-led forces, Nationalist (Kuomintang) organizations, and large numbers of remaining Japanese military personnel and civilians.
Communist forces In the immediate aftermath of Japan’s surrender, local Communist activists organized self-defense units in and around Tonghua. By September 1945, these forces had taken over former puppet administrative bodies and established new local governments under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Units of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army were stationed in the city, and the Tonghua Detachment was formed under the Liaodong Military District. The Korean Volunteer Army also deployed forces in the region. In late 1945, military training institutions, including aviation and artillery schools, began preparations in Tonghua.
Kuomintang organizations Several Kuomintang county party headquarters were established in Tonghua after Japan’s surrender. These included organizations formed by Nationalist agents and former collaborators. Some of these groups organized armed units under various titles and engaged in political agitation and sabotage, aiming to secure Tonghua for the Nationalist government.
Internal rivalries existed among these Nationalist-affiliated groups, but their broader objective was to undermine Communist control in preparation for a Nationalist takeover.
Japanese population and military remnants At the end of 1945, more than 16,000 Japanese civilians remained in Tonghua. In addition, substantial numbers of former Kwantung Army personnel, including elements of the 125th Division, were dispersed in the surrounding region. Some concealed their identities or posed as civilians.
While many Japanese civilians cooperated with local authorities and organized themselves into associations under Communist supervision, Chinese sources state that certain former military officers and agents formed clandestine groups and engaged in acts of sabotage, including assassinations and bombings.
Eve of the Incident On 20 November 1945, Fujita Jitsuhiko was recommended to Mo Dehui—commander of the Kuomintang Northeast Southern Advance Army—by Ikeda Sumihisa, who had defected to the Kuomintang. Mo promptly appointed Fujita as the "Commander of the Tonghua Forward Area," tasking him with gathering the remaining Japanese troops in the Tonghua region to oppose the People’s forces and facilitate the Nationalist takeover of Tonghua. Shortly thereafter, Fujita established contact with Sun Gengyao. The two met on 15 December. Sun assured Fujita that the Japanese in Tonghua would not be repatriated and would not lose their employment; Fujita, in turn, demanded that a Sino-Japanese joint government be established in Tonghua after the plan succeeded. Both sides accepted the other’s conditions and began making concrete plans for an uprising. Fujita at one point attempted to win over Japanese leaders within the Japanese Repatriation Association (Nichigekiren), but was soon arrested by the People’s Government. Having detected irregularities, the People’s Government launched a citywide search in Tonghua and surrounding areas for concealed Japanese officers. By January 1946, more than one hundred Japanese officers had been arrested, including over 120 with the rank of captain or above.
On 13 January 1946, with assistance from Japanese collaborators, Fujita escaped from the third floor of the Tonghua Detachment headquarters while his guards were asleep, injuring his ankle in the process. On 15 January, under the direction of former Japanese puppet agent Liu Zhengxiu, who had arrived from Shenyang, Sun Gengyao, Fujita Jitsuhiko, and others convened a secret meeting at Sun’s residence. They established the so-called "Provisional Eastern Border Region Military-Political Committee," with Sun as chair and Fujita and others as members, and created subordinate bodies including political, military, and finance departments. The "committee" initially planned to launch the uprising on 17 January, but the plan fell through due to a lack of outside support. On 18 January, Liu Zhengxiu returned to Shenyang. Thereafter, Fujita established contact with the Liaoning Provincial Party Headquarters of the Kuomintang in Shenyang and received special attention from its Executive Committee chair, Li Guangchen. From that point forward, Fujita intensified preparations for the uprising.
On 22 January, Fujita Jitsuhiko and Sun Gengyao established the so-called "Armed Uprising Command Headquarters" at the home of agent Liu Jingru on South Cross West Street (Yongyou Oil Mill). The "headquarters" created three sub-command posts. The first was located near the Tonghua Catholic Church; the second was at the residence of agent Jiang Jilong on Yumin Street; and the third was at the residence of agent Chi Wenyu in Tonghua’s Nanguan District. Each command post was staffed with designated commanders. Subsequently, Japanese agents including Kondō Haruo dispatched nine liaison teams to areas such as the Changbai Mountains to gather remaining elements of the Kwantung Army. They also began recruiting collaborators, former puppet troops and police officers, as well as local thugs within the city.
The total number of remaining Japanese personnel reportedly planned to participate reached 30,000, including more than 3,000 within the city—primarily disarmed remnants of the Kwantung Army—and large numbers concealed in areas such as the Changbai Mountains outside the city. In addition, nearly 20,000 Kuomintang members and bandits were said to be involved. Most weapons consisted of knives and clubs, while insiders supplied a limited number of rifles and pistols.
The uprising was scheduled for the early morning of 3 February (Chinese New Year). Primary targets included the Tonghua Administrative Inspector’s Office, the Tonghua Detachment Headquarters, the Tonghua Municipal People’s Government, the Tonghua County People’s Government, the Tonghua County Brigade, the Tonghua Municipal Public Security Bureau, the Tonghua Telegraph Office, the Tonghua Electric Power Bureau, the Tonghua Radio Station, the Tonghua Daily newspaper office, Tonghua First Hospital, the Northeast Mint, and the Northeast Artillery School and Northeast Aviation School affiliated with the Northeast Military and Political University. The signal to launch the uprising was to be three consecutive citywide power outages; after the third blackout, power would not be restored. In suburban areas, the signal would be beacon fires lit atop Yuhuang Mountain. Other planned identifying signals included aircraft displaying red cloth strips, tanks flying triangular flags marked "Provisional Northeast Region Forces," and three blasts of steam whistles. According to the plan, insurgents would shine flashlights in three circles toward buildings housing insiders, who would respond by waving white towels three times.
The insurgents’ activities gradually came to the attention of the People’s Government. By the afternoon of 2 February, Liu Zizhou, who was responsible for the second command post, attempted to persuade Shen Diankai—the section chief of supplies in the Logistics Ordnance Department of the Liaodong Military District—to defect. Shen was lured to the "General Headquarters" and subjected to threats and inducements. He feigned agreement, obtained partial information about internal collaborators, and soon excused himself under the pretext of retrieving his weapon from his office, thereby escaping control. He immediately reported the situation to Ordnance Minister Wu Yunqing, who in turn informed Liu Xiyuan, commander and political commissar of the Tonghua Detachment, and arranged for Shen to report in person at headquarters.
At the same time, Tonghua Deputy Mayor Dong Bin () and Tonghua Detachment Chief of Staff Ru Fuyi () also received reports. The information conveyed to Dong Bin came from county brigade clerk Guan Siyu, who had previously been abducted by infiltrated Kuomintang agents. The information provided to Ru Fuyi was delivered by his communications officer Li (a Tonghua native and former student of Sun Gengyao who had also previously been abducted by Nationalist agents). In addition, soldiers of the Korean Volunteer Army’s South Manchuria Detachment discovered individuals wearing uprising armbands while patrolling the streets, arrested them, and learned details of the plot during interrogation.
After assessing the situation, the People’s Government and military authorities determined that the only People’s forces stationed in the city were the 2nd and 5th Companies of the 1st Battalion of the Korean Volunteer Army’s South Manchuria Detachment, along with the People’s Government Guard Company, totaling just over 500 personnel. Preliminary information indicated that at least 600 Japanese insiders were concealed within various departments. The authorities therefore contacted other units engaged in bandit-suppression operations to return for reinforcement, while simultaneously dispatching a platoon to arrest or place under house arrest suspected collaborators and seize weapons under their control.
At 10:00 p.m. that night, the military subdistrict telegraphed the aviation corps, reporting that a Japanese pilot intended to fly an aircraft in support of the uprising; the corps security section promptly arrested the pilot. Meanwhile, Japanese insurgents infiltrated a People’s Army garrison in an attempt to remove a tank. Tank driver Gao Ke noticed the engine noise and, together with several soldiers, subdued the infiltrators. From them, he learned that five Japanese POWs capable of operating tanks intended to participate in the uprising; these five were soon brought under control.