Kefaya ( kefāya, , "enough") is the unofficial moniker of the Egyptian Movement for Change ( el-Haraka el-Masreyya men agl el-Taghyeer), a grassroots coalition which prior to the 2011 revolution drew its support from across Egypt's political spectrum. It was a platform for protest against Hosni Mubarak's presidency and the possibility he might seek to transfer power directly to his son Gamal; political corruption and stagnation; "the blurring of the lines between power and wealth; and the regime's cruelty, coercion and disregard for human rights."Egypt on the Brink by Tarek Osman, Yale University Press, 2010, p.136-7
While it first came to public attention in the summer of 2004, and achieved a much greater profile during the 2005 constitutional referendum and presidential election campaigns, it subsequently lost momentum, suffering from internal dissent, leadership change, and a more general frustration at the apparent inability of Egypt's political opposition to force the pace of reform.
Origins While Kefaya first emerged in 2004, its origins can be found in earlier strands of political protest, beginning with the solidarity committees that spread throughout Egypt following the start of the Second Intifada in October 2000.baheyya.blogspot.com, Kefaya: Asking the Right Questions, 30 April 2005 The pro-Intifada demonstrations were particularly notable as they involved a new generation of previously non-politicised youth and, as a direct consequence, resulted in a revival of Egyptian street politics.
Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, these protesters formed the backbone of Egypt's highly vocal anti-war movement,Hossam El Hamalawy, "Comrades and Brothers," Middle East Report No. 242, Spring 2007 and their protests in turn developed into the first public demonstrations against President Mubarak since he had taken office.Khalil Al-Anany, "Egypt's democratisation: reality or mirage?" OpenDemocracy.net, 10 May 2005 The anti-war protest of 20 March 2003 – from which the anti-war movement 20 March derived its name – was one of the biggest spontaneous demonstrations in Egypt's history.Negar Azimi, "Egypt's youth have had enough," OpenDemocracy.net, 1 September 2005
The evolution of this protest movement into Kefaya occurred during the summer of 2004. Speculation, fuelled by state-controlled media, had been mounting that major changes in top-level political personnel were to be announced. The much-anticipated cabinet reshuffle in July resulted in only cosmetic changes, however, and saw the installation of a number of supporters of the President's son, Gamal Mubarak, in important government posts.Mona El-Ghobashy, "Egypt looks ahead to a portentous year," Middle East Report, 2 February 2005
Fearing a hereditary transfer of power similar to that which had occurred in Syria, opposition activists and intellectuals were galvanised into action. In August, a petition was circulated which demanded fundamental constitutional and economic reforms, but most importantly direct presidential elections with competing candidates. The 300 signatories of what became Kefaya's founding declaration called for "democracy and reform to take root in Egypt."Sarah Korshid, "A Cry of Distress," IslamOnline.net, 25 August 2005 Then in October 2004, Tarek El-Bishry, one of Egypt's most respected judges, presented what soon came to be regarded as the movement's first manifesto in which he exhorted his fellow citizens to "withdraw their long-abused consent to be governed" – in effect, a call for civil disobedience.
Kefaya's first rally, held on 12 December, was an historic event, being the first occasion a protest had been organised solely to demand that the President step down. Surrounded by riot police, between 500 and 1,000 activists gathered on the steps of the High Court in Cairo. They "remained mostly silent and taped over their mouths a large yellow sticker emblazoned with 'Kefaya'."
Support-base Described as a "loose knit umbrella of diverse political trends," Kefaya represents a "new style" of opposition in Egypt, with parallels to Ukraine's Orange Revolution and Poland's Solidarity movement.Benjamin Rey, "Will the Kefaya movement be enough to change Egypt?" CafeBabel, 29 March 2005 It draws its support from a cosmopolitan range of sources including Nasserists, Islamists, Liberals, Marxists, Secularists etc., some of which have deep-rooted ideological differences, and have even clashed in the past. Activists frequently stress that it is not a political party aiming to achieve power, but a "national coalition movement" united by the common goal of seeking an end to President Mubarak's rule.
Abdel-Halim Qandil, the editor of the Nasserist newspaper Al-Arabi who was spokesman for the movement until the beginning of 2007, emphasised that the use of the word "Kefaya" was designed to connect with the general public: "Our movement targets Egyptians. We want them to put away their fears, and demand their political and economic rights."Shaden Shehab, "That's Enough," Al-Ahram Weekly, 29 December 2005 Another member, Dr Mohamed Al-Saed Idris, an academic, called it "a national cry against the status quo."
Key events
Kefaya came of age in 2005, a year which saw two events of great significance in Egyptian politics. The first was a referendum on 25 May to approve changes to the constitution that would allow the first ever direct, multi-candidate elections for the presidency. The second was the presidential election itself, held on 7 September.
Constitutional amendments Kefaya had continued its campaign for political reform since its December demonstration, attracting increasing attention from the government. A rally planned for 18 January was banned, while in the same month political scientist and leading activist Mohamed El-Sayed Said, was removed from a panel discussion at Cairo's Book Fair.
Then on 26 February 2005, President Mubarak caused consternation when he announced a proposal to amend Article 76 of the Constitution to enable multiple candidates to contest presidential elections directly for the first time. Under the old system, the election process was indirect: the candidate was nominated and confirmed by the People's Assembly (Majlis al-Sha'b), controlled by the National Democratic Party (NDP), before being approved in a nationwide "yes" or "no" referendum.Jeremy M Sharp, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 21 September 2005
The immediate repercussion to this announcement was the decision by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to cancel a proposed visit to the country in protest at the arrest and imprisonment of opposition politician Ayman Nour, leader of the al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party.Joshua Muravchik, Among Arab Reformers, Commentary, Vol. 120, No. 2, September 2005 More generally, American President George W. Bush had been putting pressure on key regional allies, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to introduce some form of electoral reform as part of efforts to spread democracy – the so-called "forward strategy for freedom."Youssef M Ibrahim, 'Kefaya': A Word, A Movement, USA Today, 28 March 2005 The Washington Post described President Mubarak's plans as "an act of minimalism intended to deflect domestic and international pressure."'Kefaya' in Egypt, Washington Post, 15 March 2005 Kefaya immediately denounced the proposals as "theatrics" and a "fake reform" designed merely as a "reformulation of the dictatorship".
The timing of the President's announcement was significant, coming only a few weeks after the close of the annual voter registration period (1 November to 31 January) specified under Article 5 of Egypt's constitution.Mona El-Ghobashy, Egypt's Paradoxical Elections, Middle east Report, Spring 2006 When the specifics of the constitutional amendment were presented by lawmakers, the opposition's fears seemed justified. Under the new rules, each candidate would require the support of at least 250 elected officials from national or local bodies. As these were controlled by the NDP, it would be virtually impossible for signatures to be collected. In addition, political parties that wished to put their candidates on the ballot would need to have been licensed for a minimum of 5 years and have at least 5% of seats in the lower and upper house. This move seemed designed to place even greater pressure on established opposition parties, in particular the already-proscribed Muslim Brotherhood.
The opposition were scathing in their criticism of the NDP. Hussein Abderazzek of the left-wing Tagammu party declared: "The NDP will not only choose its own candidate but also his competitors," while Kefaya accused the party of "aborting people's hopes for freedom and democracy."Chris Toensing, US Stays with Egyptian Dictator, Middle East Report, 30 June 2005
The referendum campaign The run-up to the referendum saw popular demands for reform "skyrocket."Kareem M Kamel, Simmering Discontent – The Persistence of Popular Protest in Egypt, IslamOnline.Net, 23 May 2005 Kefaya held regular protests, calling for the "cancellation of the state of emergency law and all special laws that restrict freedoms" (ilgha'halat al-tawari'wa kafat al-qawanin al-istithna 'iyya al-muqayyada lil-hurriyat).Joshua Stacher, "Rhetorical Acrobatics and Reputations: Egypt's National Council for Human Rights," Middle East Report, Summer 2005 In addition, they attacked the government for its record on social welfare, job creation and education. In April, simultaneous demonstrations were planned in 13 cities under a banner of "No Constitution Without Freedom".
Kefaya's activities served as a catalyst for other opposition groups. Egypt's largest opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood, held its own demonstrations calling for political reform, while university professors held a silent protest on 19 April calling for an end to state control of campuses.Amira Howeidy, "A Chronology of Dissent," Al-Ahram Weekly, 2005 The previous month Misr Digital, the country's first independent digital newspaper, was launched quickly becoming the main source of information on Kefaya's activities.
Egypt's judiciary, regarded as having almost replaced the opposition in the past,Mona Makram-Ebeid, "Egypt's 2000 Parliamentary Elections," Middle East Policy, Vol. VIII, No. 2, June 2001 put additional pressure on the government over the issue of the domestic monitoring of elections. At a meeting on 15 April of the Alexandria Judges Club, 1,200 judges threatened to withdraw their supervision of presidential and parliamentary elections unless they were guaranteed independence and control of all stages of elections.
Throughout this period, while police and security forces continued to harass Kefaya and other opposition activists, there was no full-scale crackdown. In effect, a stand-off had developed: while the opposition was not strong enough to topple the government, the government was equally unable to stamp-out the opposition, at least partly in fear of the international outcry that would follow. Egyptians described the situation as "political congestion".Magdi Abdelhadi, "Winds of Change Blow Through Egypt Politics," BBC News, 20 May 2005
25 May 2005 On 25 May, the day of the referendum, demonstrations organised by Kefaya in front of the Press Syndicate headquarters and Sa'd Zaghlul Shrine in Cairo were attacked by Mubarak supporters and plain-clothes policemen, whilst riot police looked on. A reporter gave an eyewitness account of what happened in front of the press building: