The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense at the Atlantic Council, formerly known as the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, is an organization of former high-ranking government officials that analyzes US capabilities and capacity to defend against biological threats. According to the commission's mission statement, the organization was formed to "provide for a comprehensive assessment of the state of U.S. biodefense efforts, and to issue recommendations that will foster change."
The commission is supported by donor organizations. New Venture Fund serves as the commission's fiscal sponsor. Current donors include Open Philanthropy and Bavarian Nordic.
Commissioners, staff, and ex officio members
The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense is co-chaired by former Secretary of Homeland Security and Governor Tom Ridge and former Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala. Former Senator Joe Lieberman co-chaired the Commission with Governor Ridge for ten years prior to his death in 2024. RoleNameExperienceCo-chairTom RidgeSecretary of Homeland Security, Governor of Pennsylvania, United States RepresentativeCo-chairDonna ShalalaSecretary of health and human services, United States RepresentativeCommissionerTom DaschleUnited States Senator, Senate Majority Leader, and Senate Democratic LeaderCommissionerFred UptonUnited States Representative, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and CommerceCommissionerAnna EshooUnited States Representative, At-Large Democratic Whip, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on HealthCommissionerJim GreenwoodUnited States Representative, chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Pennsylvania General Assembly member, Pennsylvania state senatorCommissionerSusan BrooksUnited States Representative CommissionerMargaret A. (Peggy) HamburgCommissioner of Food and Drugs, FDACommissionerKen WainsteinUnder Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security; Homeland Security Advisor to President George W. BushCommissionerRaj PanjabiSenior Partner at Flagship Pioneering, Senior Director and Special Assistant for Global Health Security and Biodefense, National Security Council, for President Joe BidenDirectorAsha M. George, DrPHSubcommittee staff director and senior professional staff at the United States House Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. Army military intelligence officer and paratrooperAssociate DirectorRobert BradleyProfessional Staff at the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental AffairsAssociate DirectorJohn T. "JT" O'Brien, MSResearcher, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford UniversityEx Officio
MemberWilliam Karesh, DVM President of One Health Concepts, Executive Vice President for Health and Policy of EcoHealth Alliance, President of the World Organisation for Animal HealthEx Officio
MemberRachel Levinson, MA Executive director of national research initiatives at Arizona State UniversityEx officio
MemberLewis "Scooter" Libby, JD Distinguished Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Senior Vice President at Hudson Institute; Assistant to Vice President Dick Cheney for National Security Affairs Sources:
Background Between 2001 and 2014, the U.S. spent around $80 billion on biodefense. Beginning in fall 2014, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense conducted meetings, interviews, and research. It studied the 2001 anthrax attacks and biodefense programs undertaken during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations, and continued with its examination of the activities undertaken during the Biden and Trump Administrations.
In October 2015, the commission released its recommendations to publicly and submitted them to Congress in the form of the report, A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts. They concluded that the United States was not prepared to respond to a large scale biological event - naturally occurring, accidentally released, or intentionally introduced. As for the cause of the problem, the report said, "Simply put, the Nation does not afford the biological threat the same level of attention as it does other threats."
A National Blueprint for Biodefense The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense conducted a year-long study of how the U.S. should address biological threats. The study covered human-generated (i.e., terrorism, warfare, accidents) and naturally occurring biological threats. The study culminated in a report to the public and Congress released on October 28, 2015.
The group's report was titled A National Blueprint for Biodefense. The report described many biological threats, including those posed by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, as well as nation states, and "mishandling of lethal biological agents by the U.S. government," as reasons for making biodefense a high national priority. This report contained 33 recommendations and 87 specific action items associated with those recommendations.
The report proposed congressional oversight hearings to address the following issues: Major biological threats Animal disease reporting Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority National Biodefense Strategy Biosurveillance Budgeting for biodefense Cyber vulnerabilities to the life sciences industry Food supply protection and response Global health security and response Medical countermeasures (MCM) innovation Military-civilian biodefense collaboration Origin of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) PHEMCE coordination of MCM efforts Select Agent Program Vulnerable populations
Major problems identified
In the Blueprint for Biodefense report, the commission said that almost no urgency within the federal government for dealing with the risk of a biological event existed.
The report stated that the government does not appear to take events related to biodefense seriously enough. One member stated, "The tragic saga of the death of Thomas Eric Duncan from Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) serves as a perfect demonstration of the shambolic state of biodefense in the United States in late 2014." Another estimated that the consequences of inaction on Commission recommendations would be that the report would serve as a "guidebook for placing blame."
The commission also noted that the federal government had also failed to update its practices and procedures as they relate to biological threats. For example, there is a system within the National Institutes of Health and Food and Drug Administration that would fast-track the approval of medical countermeasures in the event of a biological attack. However, during a hearing with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Governor Tom Ridge stated that the fast-track process is obsolete. Page 52 of the report reads, "A systemic, risk averse culture has emerged that is stifling innovation. If this continues to evolve, progress on biodefense objectives will be curtained and the still nascent biodefence industry will have little incentive to participate."
Another example is the practice of stockpiling vaccines against a biological agent. This practice is considered obsolete by some. Nation states and terrorist organizations are already able to "merge the toxic attributes of more than one agent." To replace vaccine stockpiles, the Panel recommended a "vaccines-on-demand approach."
Need to strengthen White House Leadership of the national biodefense enterprise One of the commission's major recommendations was to place responsibility for biodefense leadership into the hands of the Office of the Vice President of the United States. By doing so, biodefense would have "the ear of the president and the ability to coordinate budgets and plans across agencies." In such a scenario, the White House Biodefense Coordination Council would execute the day-to-day work, Senator Lieberman said during testimony in front of the House Homeland Security Committee. By making the vice president responsible for biodefense, it would "transcend the bureaucratic and budgetary rivalries of various agencies in order to create an effective platform for dealing with biological attacks."
Among the eleven new recommendations found in Biodefense in Crisis (the commission's second status report describing federal implementation of its recommendations from A National Blueprint for Biodefense), the commission advises the president to establish a dedicated deputy national security advisor for biodefense, overseen by the vice president and supported by NSC staff. The commission clearly notes that one federal department cannot tell other departments and agencies what to do, especially in a critical area of responsibility like biodefense. A dedicated higher-level leader in the White House without responsibilities for multiple weapons of mass destruction, terrorist avenues, and national disasters is crucial.
Need for a national biodefense strategy Dr. George told Homeland Preparedness News that in order for the government's defense against a biological attack to be sufficient, a new comprehensive program needs to be developed. The programs and activities under a new approach would need to be "coordinated, collaborative and innovative." The report recommends that all types of biological threats should be addressed by a single comprehensive strategy. By different types, they meant biological warfare, bioterrorism, naturally occurring deadly disease, and accidental release.
In accordance with the commission's third recommendation from A National Blueprint for Biodefense, on September 18, 2018, President Donald Trump released the 2018 National Biodefense Strategy and signed National Security Presidential Memorandum 14 to direct the federal government to execute this strategy. Together, they sought to improve the federal government's readiness and capability to respond to human-generated, naturally occurring, and accidentally released biological threats to the Nation. The Strategy was mandated by Congress and has five extensively detailed goals. It established a new cabinet-level Biodefense Steering Committee chaired by the scretary of health and human services. National Security Advisor John Bolton said, "The Biodefense Steering Committee will monitor and coordinate implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy across 15 federal agencies and the Intelligence Community." The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense commended the Trump Administration for creating the strategy in accordance with the commission's third recommendation in its National Blueprint for Biodefense.
Need for a biological attribution apparatus The commission held a public meeting on October 3, 2017 about the biological attribution of crime, terrorism, and warfare, and continues to pursue this important topic. The continuing debate and uncertainty surrounding the origins of COVID-19 demonstrate the need for biological attribution. Biological attribution refers to the process of determining who and what was responsible for a biological attack. Perpetrators could be criminals, terrorists, or state actors. During this meeting, the commission learned about the federal government's existing capabilities to determine the sources and characteristics of deadly pathogens. The commission has taken a particular interest in the National Bioforensics Analysis Center (NBFAC). In fiscal year 2013, the NBFAC supported more than 45 investigations of potential biological crimes. Previously run by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the commission recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assume management of the NBFAC, as all specimens going into the facility come from the FBI. In 2018, DHS and the FBI signed a memorandum of agreement that transferred NBFAC management to the FBI.
Need to budget for biodefense