The People's Liberation Army – PLA (), also known as the Armée populaire de libération (APL) in French or Forces of the Martyr Kamal Jumblatt (), was the military wing of the left-wing Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which fought in the Lebanese Civil War. The PSP and its militia were members of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) from 1975 to 1982 and its successor, the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF) from 1983 to 1990.

Emblem

First adopted in 1976 and modified in 1977–78, the PLA official emblem consisted of a red flag with a white square on the centre, featuring a crossed dip pen and pickaxe superimposed on an AK-47 assault rifle in the middle standing upwards, all in silver, inserted on a golden circular wreath, the latter consisting of two interlocking branches and leaves of the Oak tree and the Lebanese Cedar tree.Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), p. 107.

Origins Although the PSP was officially a secular political party, its military wing was not only well-organized, but also one of the largest sectarian militias in Lebanon. It was first founded unofficially by the Party's president, the za'im (political boss) Kamal Jumblatt at the height of the 1958 Civil War with a strength of about 1,000–2,000 militiamen, which fought alongside the Pan-Arab/leftist anti-government forces against the Lebanese Army, and the pro-government conservative Christian and Muslim militias in Beirut and the Chouf District.

Disbanded upon the conclusion of the war, the PSP was left without an official paramilitary branch until the early 1970s, when – despite Kamal Jumblatt's initial reluctance to engage in paramilitarism – the Party's leadership board decided to quietly raise a new militia force with the help of the Palestine Liberation Organization or PLO (mainly from Fatah, PFLP and DFLP) in response to the Christian rightist Parties' own clandestine military build-up.Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-Up Areas (1979), p. 2. Initial progress was slow, however, since the PSP under Kamal Jumblatt had no regular militiamen, but relied mostly on its Druze irregulars, which could be mobilised when needed. Because of the secrecy surrounding the formation of its military wing, the PSP was only able to gather 175-185 militiamen, most of them drawn from an existing Boy Scout organization,Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), pp. 14-15. and each recruit had to finance himself.Sex & Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), p. 26. The weapons that these fighters used, usually a left-over from the PLO or a regional country, were obsolete, somewhat basic and in short supply, as Jumblatt had neither the means nor the will to invest heavily in his new militia.Rabah, Conflict on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the Maronites and Collective Memory (2020), p. 153.

From 1971 to 1974, this initial intake of young recruits was trained by a Druze medical doctor and former officer in the Mexican Special Forces, Colonel Ghazi Karami, who manned an advanced Commando course at a PSP-run secret training camp set up near Choueifat in the Aley District.Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), pp. 16-17. Eventually, the group of 185 highly trained fighters that graduated from the course in 1974 with excellent military skills and tactics went to provide the founding cadre for the PSP's first unconventional warfare unit, which was given the title Popular Commandos Forces – PCF (Arabic: قوات الكوماندوز الشعبية | Quwwat al-Kumanduz al-Sha'abya). Led by Ramez Assaf, they first saw action in Beirut during the Battle of the Hotels in 1975-76.Abi-Chahine, The People's Liberation Army Through the Eyes of a Lens, 1975–1991 (2019), p. 13. Under Kamal Jumblatt's leadership, the PSP was a major element in the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) alliance, which supported the recognition of Lebanon's Arab identity and sympathised with the Palestinians. When the Lebanese Civil War broke out in April 1975, as a member of the LNM the PSP and its small PCF militia were active founders of the movement's military wing, the Joint Forces (LNM-JF).

On 7 August 1976, following an open appeal by Kamal Jumblatt urging Lebanese Muslim youths to join the LNM-JF militias, the PSP's own military wing was re-organized and expanded to a force not exceeding 400 men, being officially established as the Popular Liberation Forces – PLF (Arabic: قوات التحرير الشعبية | Quwwat al-Tahrir al-Sha'abya).Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-Up Areas (1979), Appendix B, B-39.Rabah, Conflict on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the Maronites and Collective Memory (2020), p. 154. In the process, the PLF absorbed the PCF which was integrated in the newly created structure as the Tanukh Brigade (Arabic: لواء تنوخ | Liwa' Tanukh). The name 'Tanukh' clearly indicated Kamal Jumblatt's wish to link his current political venture to that of the early Druze Tanukhid settlers tasked with defending the Lebanese coast against foreign invasions during the Crusades. In any case, this brigade was the basis for many of the fighting units that were formed in PSP-affiliated areas, especially those engaged in combat at this early stage.Rabah, Conflict on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the Maronites and Collective Memory (2020), pp. 153-154. The PLF continued to expand and by early 1977, it mustered 2,500–3,000 lightly armed fighters drawn from the Druze and Shia Muslim communities of the Chouf,Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon (1984), p. 77.McGowan, Roberts, Abu Khalil, and Scott Mason, Lebanon: A Country Study (1989), pp. 240–241.Collelo, Lebanon: A Country Study (1989), pp. 240–241.O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 19. although other sources place its numbers as high as 5,000.El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon (2000), p. 302.Bicard, Prospects for Lebanon – The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias (1999), p. 9.

Nevertheless, it was not until the death of Kamal Jumblatt in 1977, that a process to build a real military structure was set in motion in collaboration with the Soviet Union and Syria. On a military level both the Soviets and the Syrians took the PSP under their wing and gradually transformed its PLF militia into a proper army, with modern training and unrestricted access to weaponry when needed. The transformation of the PSP militia into an organised fighting unit was entrusted to Raja Harb, a Druze Lebanese Army Lieutenant (later, Major), who supervised training programs and military equipment deliveries to PLF units in Lebanon. All these developments allowed Walid Jumblatt to finally declare on 1 June 1978 the founding of the People's Liberation Army – Forces of the Martyr Kamal Jumblatt (PLA – FMKL). The Lebanese Druze, under the leadership of Walid Jumblatt (who combined the PSP's presidency with that of the LNM at the time), now had an army capable of confronting any serious challenge, especially the perceived threat that was looming with the rise of Bashir Gemayel and his newly unified Lebanese Forces (LF) Christian militia backed by Israel.

Military structure and organization In 1975–77 the PLA was a predominantly infantry force, with the basic combat unit being a militia group of about 50 men, in some cases drawn entirely from one extended family, loosely organized into larger company-sized formations provided with light weapons drawn from PLO stocks or pilfered from LAF and ISF barracks. There was no strict chain of command and no set hierarchy existed in the PLA, although Walid Jumblatt usually delegated responsibilities to commanders at various echelons in the militia's organization. In fact, PLA unit, sector or corps' commanders were chosen by consensus as a result of courage displayed in combat, leadership ability, or family ties. Many of these selected commanders had formal military training, being former Lebanese Army officers who had joined the Druze PSP militia when the LAF split under confessional lines in January 1976.CIA Lebanon report, Directory of Libanese Militias – A Reference Aid, NESA 84-10171C, June 1984 (2009), pp. 6–7.

After suffering casualties during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon of June 1982, the PLA was quietly re-organized late that year by Walid Jumblatt, who turned it into a disciplined fighting force provided with Soviet-made armoured vehicles and artillery. Headquartered at the Druze town of Baakline in the Chouf, the PSP militia by 1983 aligned 16,000–17,000 troops, consisting of 5,000–6,000 uniformed regulars backed by 12,000 male and female reservists, staffed and led by a qualified, professionally trained officer corps.Makdisi and Sadaka, The Lebanese Civil War, 1975–1990 (2003), p. 44, Table 1: War Period Militias.Taqi al-Din, Al-Tajribah al-ʿAskarīyah al-Durzīyah wa-Masāruhā al-Taqaddumī (1987), pp. 175–176. Whereas the PLA regular fighters were organized into conventionally structured companies and battalions, the PSP militia own reserve was based on a system of interlocking irregular village defense companies arranged so that each fighter defended his own home. This arrangement was particularly suited to the clan-based Druze community, where allegiance usually is based on the individual's perception of family interests. During the heavy clashes occurred in September 1983 in the Chouf district, the Druze village-based reserve companies and the PLA's regular battalions proved able to coordinate their activities, holding successfully their ground against both the Lebanese Army and the Christian LF militia.CIA Lebanon report, Directory of Libanese Militias – A Reference Aid, NESA 84-10171C, June 1984 (2009), pp. 6–7.

In addition to mobilizing Druze civilian volunteers with no prior military experience, the PLA also absorbed many Druze regular soldiers which had served with the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) upon its forceful disbandment in 1977-78,Barak, The Lebanese Army: A National institution in a divided society (2009), p. 104. being subsequently enlarged in the wake of the Mountain War with the inclusion of a number of Druze officers, NCOs and enlisted men from the Lebanese Army's Fourth Brigade after its disintegration in February 1984.O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 136. During that conflict, the PLA also received the active support of the 1,800 men-strong, primarily Druze Eleventh Brigade commanded by Colonel Amin Qadi, stationed at Hammana and Beiteddine.Collelo, Lebanon: a country study (1989), pp. 224-225.Rolland, Lebanon: Current Issues and Background (2003), pp. 185-186.Barak, The Lebanese Army: A National institution in a divided society (2009), p. 155. Although its membership and command structure was predominantly Druze, the PLA did included a number of Sunnis and Shi'ites in their ranks; most Druze recruits continued to come from the Mountain and, until the return of the Syrian Army in 1987, from the Sanayeh (Kantari District) and the seafront quarters of West Beirut.