Ajñāna (, (Vedic) IPA: /ɐd͡ʑ.ɲɑː.nɐ/; (Classical) IPA: /ɐd͡ʑˈɲɑː.n̪ɐ/) is an ancient nāstika, or 'heterodox,' Indian school of agnosticism that embraces radical skepticism. It emerged as a Śramaṇa movement and was a major rival of early Buddhism, Jainism and the Ājīvika school. They have been recorded in Buddhist and Jain texts. They held that it was impossible to obtain knowledge of metaphysical nature or ascertain the truth value of philosophical propositions; and even if knowledge was possible, it was useless and disadvantageous for final salvation. They specialized in refutation without propagating any positive doctrine of their own. Sanjaya Belatthiputta was one of the major proponents of this school of thought.
Sources All of our knowledge of the Ajñāna comes from Buddhists and Jain sources. The Ajñāna viewpoints are recorded in Theravada Buddhism's Pāli Canon in the Brahmajala Sutta and Samaññaphala Sutta and in the Sūyagaḍaṃga of Jainism. Along with these texts, the sayings and opinions of the Sceptics (ajñānikāḥ, ajñānināḥ) has been preserved by the ninth century Jain writer Silanka, in his commentary on the Sutrakritanga. Silanka considers sceptics "those who claim that scepticism is best" or as "those in whom no knowledge, i.e. scepticism, is evident". Apart from the specific technical meaning, Silanka also uses the word ajñānikah in a more general sense to mean anyone who is ignorant.
Origin The traces of scepticism can be found in Vedic sources such as in the Nasadiya hymn in Rigveda. K. N. Jayatilleke notes "sporadic" traces of "scepticism and agnosticism" from the Rigveda onward, but no "widespread scepticism". In the Brahmanas and Early Upanishads, doubt regarding a person's existence after death is cast, while Yajñavalkya argued for the impossibility of knowing the ultimate reality or the atman. Jayatilleke states that these Vedic "sceptical hints" and Upanishadic "agnostic trends" could have "paved the way for the growth of sceptical schools of thought".
However, the flourishing of sceptical thought seems to have occurred in a period with diverse, conflicting, and irreconcilable theories, regarding morality, metaphysics, and religious beliefs. Jayatilleke argues that "the impetus and the occasion" for the rise of the Sceptics was the presence of such rival doctrines. It is natural, in the absence of a commonly accepted criterion of truth, for some people to wonder if any theory could be true at all. The Sceptics specifically pointed to the conflicting theories of atman and the requirement of omniscience, and hence the criticism of omniscience, to obtain true knowledge. They argued that mutually contradictory claims to knowledge undermined confidence in any single metaphysical doctrine, and that limited knowledge could not verify claim to omniscience.
A proliferation of viewpoints existed during the period immediately preceding the rise of Buddhism, as attested in the Buddhist and Jain texts. The Buddhist Brahmajal Sutta lists four types (or schools) of Sceptics along with fifty-eight other schools of thought, while the Jain Sutrakrtanga lists sixty-seven "schools" of Sceptics among three hundred and sixty-three different schools of thought. While the list is artificially constructed according to Jain categories, the four main schools of thought, Kriyavada, Akriyavada, Ajnanikavada, and Vainayikavada, and their subgroups must have existed. Thus, philosophical Scepticism is thought to have appeared around this historic time frame. Jayatilleke tentatively places the Sceptics in the period 800-600 BCE.
Jain account Existence of dissent According to Silanka, the Ajñāna claimed that the possibility of knowledge is doubtful since the claims to knowledge were mutually contradictory. Silanka quotes, "They posit the theory that since those who claim knowledge make mutually contradictory assertions, they cannot be stating the truth." Regarding Sceptic's point of view, Silanka in his commentary writes, as translated by Jayatilleke:
The conflicting theories of atman can be traced to Early Upanisads. The idea of atman "made of everything" (sarvamayah, idammayah adomayah) would be omnipresent (sarvagatam) (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4.4.5) while the transcendent atman defined negatively (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 3.9.26) would not be so. Again at Katha Upanishad 2.3.17 the atman is of "the size of a digit", while at Chandogya Upanishad 3.14.3, the atman is "smaller than a kernel of a grain of millet". Again at Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 2.3.1, Brahman which is identical with the atman is said "both to have form and also be formless." Likewise at Katha Upanishad 2.3.17 the atman "resides in the heart" while at Aitareya Aranyaka 2.1.4.6 it is located in the head.
Impossibility of omniscience In the same passage, Silanka continues:
This criticism of omniscience seems to be directed at those teachers who claimed omniscience, or to their followers who later claimed them to be omniscient, specifically the Jain leaders and Purana Kassapa, and maybe later to Makkhali Gosala and the Buddha, on the basis of which they claimed to speak with authority. The dictum, that with a limited knowledge no one can know that any person is omniscient, may possibly be an old saying of the Sceptics; and they may have extended the idea to say that since human intellect was limited, no one could claim to know everything with such limited intellect. The passage may also be seen as an epistemology critique.
Relativity of knowledge In the same passage, Silanka further continues:
To the Sceptics, none of the contending theories, proposed by limited intellect, can be known to be true, since they are mutually contradictory. Also, any new theory may contradict existing theories, and hence cannot be true. Hence nothing can be known to be true. Thus the Sceptics conclude that the contradictions of metaphysics and the impossibility of omniscience lead them to accept Scepticism.
In a similar vein, the Sceptics held that
This may also be the reason why the Sceptics held to another dictum that
Likewise, Silanka comments, "owing to the difficulty of knowing another's mind, they do not grasp what is intended by the words of their teacher and thus repeat the other's words like a barbarian without understanding the real meaning."
Regarding this passage and the maxims on knowledge, Jayatilleke compares the Sceptic's views with that of the Greek sophist Gorgias, as given in his book "Nature or the Non-existent," and proposes that the Sceptics may have arrived at their position using similar lines of reasoning. According to Jayatilleke's interpretation of the passage given by Silanka, perception is divided into near, middle, and outer, and we perceive only the near; so each person's view of what they see of an object will be different according their perspective. Since our knowledge depends on our individual perspective, the knowledge would be subjective since different people will have differing perspectives. In the absence of objectivity, there is no knowledge, and all private experiences of impressions of different individuals would be incommunicable.
Futility of knowledge According to Silanka,
This quotation suggests that the Sceptics preferred scepticism not just on intellectual basis, but also for pragmatic or moral reasons. What these disadvantages are, Silanka does not elaborate, but can be found in the Buddhist sources. Regarding the futility of knowledge, Silanka puts these questions of the Sceptics:
The Sutrakrtanga affirms that the Sceptics "teach final beatitude and final deliverance." Thus, the Sceptics may have contended that knowledge is not necessary for salvation but tapas, which seem similar to karmapatha.
Who knows? Silanka in his commentary mentions sixty-seven types of Sceptics. However, these sixty-seven types are obtained combinatorially by taking nine categories (navapadartha) of Jainism, each with seven forms of predication (saptabhangakah), to give sixty-three (9 × 7) forms of sceptical questions, which were considered to represent sixty-three "types" of Sceptics asking these questions. The last four "types" were added to complete the list of sixty-seven types. However, according to Jayatilleke, these last four "types" may represent the kind of questions the Sceptics themselves might have asked. The last four questions are: Who knows whether there is an arising of psychological states? Who knows whether there is no arising of psychological states? Who knows whether there is and is no arising of psychological states? Who knows whether the arising of psychological states is impredicable?
Such psychological speculations seem to be rife during this era, as evinced in Pali Nikayas, especially the Potthapada Sutta.
Buddhist account
In the Pali texts, the Sceptics are called Amarāvikkhepikas, which translates as "eel-wrigglers." Jayatilleke notes that it was probably a nickname, linked with vacavikkhepa ("verbal jugglery"), used by opponents for sceptics who avoided commitment to the truth or falsity of propositions. They are collectively spoken of as "some recluse and brahmins who wriggle like eels. For when a question is put to them on this or that matter, they resort to verbal jugglery and eel-wriggling on four grounds." The Brahmajala Sutta describes four schools of Scepticism. The first three of advocated Scepticism on the basis of fear of falsehood (musavadabhaya), fear of involvement (upadanabhaya), and fear of interrogation in debate (anuyogabhaya), respectively. While these three schools seem to have valued mental equanimity, the fourth school, associated with the philosopher Sanjaya Belatthiputta, appears to have had a different basis for its scepticism. A notable commonality among all these schools is the arrangement of propositions according to five-fold logic, alongside the usual two-fold mode and the four-fold mode (catuṣkoṭi) common in Pali Nikayas. The fifth mode is the denial of denials, that is, the rejection of the dialectician's view.
First school The first school is described in the Brahmajala Sutta:
In the absence of adequate information, the Sceptics prudently recommend suspension of judgement. The Sceptics felt that it was not just intellectually dishonest, but also morally dangerous not to do so. However, according to Jayatilleke, this was probably not a temporary suspension of judgement, until new information could come by to make a better evaluation; but rather it was meant to be a permanent state of affair by outright denying the very possibility of knowledge, and hence of questions regarding morality. Thus, their Scepticism is motivated by both intellectual as well as moral reasoning (i.e. fear of asserting falsehood due to one's prejudices). They seem to have contended that knowledge was not necessary for salvation but for karma-patha.
Second School The second school of Sceptics is described in Brahmajala Sutta in similar terms as the first, except that for them to be led to believe in a proposition by one's likes, desires, aversions, and resentments would be entanglement (upadanam), and such entanglement would be a source of worry (vighato) and as such a moral danger (antarayo).
According to Jayatilleke, this group adopted Scepticism mainly due to morality, since to do so otherwise would lead to worry and mental disquietude (vighata), and not necessarily due to the considerations of rebirth, as understood according to the Buddhist connotation of the word "entanglement".
Third School In Brahmajala Sutta, the third school of Scepticism is shown to put forward such arguments in support for their view point: