Ku Cheng-kang or Gu Zhenggang (; 30 April 1902 – 11 December 1993) was a Chinese politician, scholar and ranking member of the Kuomintang in service to the Republic of China. He was the co-founder of both Chinese Association for Relief and Ensuing Services and World League for Freedom and Democracy and widely regarded as the "Father of Disaster Relief in the Republic of China", "Social Welfare Advocate" and the "Iron Man of Anti-Communism".
Early life and education
Ku Cheng-kang was born in Anshun, Guizhou Province during the late Qing Empire. He had an older brother, Ku Cheng-lun (1889–1953), a general known as the "Father of the Republic of China's Military Police," and a younger brother, Ku Cheng-ting (1903–1974), who, along with his wife Pi Yi-shu (1905–1974), served as a member of the first Legislative Yuan.
Ku attended school in Germany where many of the Kuomintang's elite were also educated. He obtained his bachelor's degree from Humboldt University of Berlin. In 1924, whilst still a student, Ku and his younger brother joined the Kuomintang.
In 1925, the two brothers traveled to the Soviet Union to continue their studies at Moscow Sun Yat-sen University, a comintern school.
In 1926, as tensions emerged within the First United Front, Ku and his younger brother Ku Cheng-ting, then studying at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, were deeply affected by the political crisis. Together with a number of KMT students, they became active in forming the “Sun Wen'ism Society, Sun Yat-sen University Branch,” which openly criticized the Chinese Communist Party. Their activities provoked resentment among KMT students sympathetic to the CCP. After the group’s activities were exposed, the Ku brothers and their associates were expelled and sent back to China.
Early Political career
The brothers returned to China in 1926. In 1928, they fell in with Chen Gongbo and Ku Meng-yu to form the Reorganization Group, a faction loyal to Wang Jingwei.
In May 1927, Ku was appointed a member of the Preparatory Committee for the Central Political School, established under Chiang Kai-shek, and was charged with related organizational work. After the school opened, he served as Deputy Director of the Moral Training Department. Because Director Ding Weifen was unable to be present at the school to oversee daily affairs, Ku effectively managed the department’s work. Known for his oratorical skill and strong persuasive appeal, he gained considerable influence among the students.
On 22 November 1927, during a public mass rally in Nanjing celebrating the Northern Expedition’s recent victories, Ku—representing the Central Political School—called on the crowd to “support Generalissimo Chiang’s reinstatement” and to “overthrow the Central Special Committee and the Western Hill faction.” Demonstrators then set out on a coordinated protest march. Troops aligned with the Western Hill faction intervened to halt the procession and opened fire, resulting in dozens of casualties.
In 1928–1929, amid the intra-party power struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, Ku Cheng-kang, then a member of the Reorganization Group, became directly involved in opposition to Chiang’s consolidation of power. Chiang and his close ally Chen Guofu announced plans to alter the selection of delegates to the Kuomintang’s Third National Congress, changing the process from elections held by local party branches to direct appointment by the central leadership, a move widely criticized as authoritarian.
On 14 March 1929, Ku presided over a protest rally in Nanjing under the slogan “Oppose dictatorship, oppose centrally appointed representatives,” an event organized in line with the speeches delivered by Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo three days earlier, which called for resistance against Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to centralize control of party representation. The demonstration was violently suppressed by police dispatched by Chen Guofu; Ku was reportedly beaten so severely that his life was nearly endangered. However, he was spared from imprisonment, reportedly due to the political connections of his elder brother, Ku Cheng-lun, who was an ally of Chiang Kai-shek.
Throughout 1929, Ku remained an active supporter of Chen Gongbo and Ku Meng-yu in their efforts to resist Chiang’s dominance within the party. On 25 May, he published a strongly worded article condemning Chiang’s leadership, accusing him of usurping control of the Kuomintang and abandoning its revolutionary ideals. In this piece, Ku argued that since Chiang’s rise, “the party’s revolutionary doctrine has been discarded, its program destroyed, its forces broken, and its spirit lost. The present Kuomintang has become merely the instrument of warlords and bureaucrats, a conglomeration of corrupt elements.”
In 1931, following the Mukden Incident, Chiang Kai-shek sought to consolidate the Kuomintang by fostering cooperation between his own faction and that of Wang Jingwei. As part of this rapprochement, Ku was assigned to Beijing and Tianjin to assist with party organization work, and in December he was elected to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.
In December 1934, Ku was appointed as the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Industry and in 1935, he secured a promotion to serve as vice minister of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. During this period, he continued to support the political interests of the Wang Jingwei faction, while also moderating the intensity of his earlier attacks on Chiang Kai-shek.
Shortly after taking office as permanent secretary of the Ministry of Industry between February and March 1935, Ku became involved in the widely publicized “Seventh Shenxin Mill Incident.” Although the dispute was framed publicly as a debate between laissez-faire and state-controlled economic approaches—represented by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry respectively—the underlying issue reflected a political contest between Chiang Kai-shek’s faction, led by Minister of Finance H. H. Kung, and the Wang Jingwei faction, represented by Minister of Industry Chen Gongbo.
Following an Executive Yuan directive, the National Economic Council was ordered to investigate the matter. The Cotton Industry Control Committee, together with representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry, and managers of the Shenxin Company, jointly drafted a preliminary rescue plan. Chen Gongbo subsequently proposed reorganizing the company and converting it into a state-run enterprise. Chen argued that China’s industry was “still in an infant state” and that “industrial organizations were scattered and weak,” insisting that only state control—not liberal economic measures—could provide an effective remedy.
Rong Zongjing, seeking to retain control of the Shenxin mills, mobilized his political connections and enlisted senior KMT figure Wu Zhihui to oppose Chen’s proposal for state management. As a result, Chen’s industrial control plan was set aside. Ku, however, continued to speak in support of Chen’s position. While defending Chen’s統制 (control) policy, he criticized the Ministry of Finance for inaction. Writing in the Ministry of Industry’s official publication, Ku stated that “although the case of the auction of Shenxin Mill No. 7 by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation concerns only a commercial loan of two million yuan, its implications for law, diplomacy, and the economy are extremely serious.”
After analyzing the internal and external factors behind the textile crisis triggered by the Shenxin incident, Ku argued that responsibility did not lie with the Ministry of Industry. He wrote that “when the Shenxin crisis erupted last year, the government appointed specialists to devise a detailed plan and determined a method of reorganization. Yet due to Rong Zongjing’s opposition and the words of so-called ‘party elders,’ the government’s plan became nothing more than a painted cake.” He sharply criticized Shanghai’s financial sector, declaring that because investment in industry did not yield profits comparable to “government bonds, bidding fees, or speculative real estate,” and because industrial loans carried the risk of non-repayment, financiers were “unwilling to assist the industrial sector in its difficulties.”
As a remedy for future crises in the textile industry, Ku advocated the implementation of “cotton-yarn control,” arguing that “industrial control is the latest policy adopted by industrial nations to consolidate their productive forces in resisting foreign economic aggression or pursuing economic expansion abroad.”Xu Fenghua (徐峰华), "企业、政府、银行之间的利益纠葛———以1935年荣氏申新七厂被拍卖事件为中心", 《历史研究》2011年第6期, p.56.Ku Cheng-kang (谷正纲), "从申新七厂事件说到中国的纱业", 《中国实业杂志》1935年第4期, pp.573, 582–583.
Personal life Ku married Wang Mai-hsiu (zh: 王美修, c. 1907–1998), whom he met through a mutual friend named Lucy. Wang later served as his English translator. The couple had two daughters and five sons: Ku To-yi (zh: 谷多儀, born 1936) Ku To-lin (zh: 谷多齡, born 1940) Ku Chia-tai (zh: 谷家泰, born 1942) Ku Chia-hua (zh: 谷家華, born 1944) Ku Chia-sung (zh: 谷家嵩, born 1946) (zh: 谷秀衡, 1948–2005) - he went on to become director of Taiwan Cyanamid Company Ku Chia-heng (zh: 谷家恒, born 1948)
Wartime service In 1937, with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, he was appointed Deputy Minister of the 5th National Government Military Commission. In June 1938, he served as interim secretary for the society of the Three Principles of the People Youth Corps and was also made the group's Central Executive Officer. In addition, he served as KMT Chairman and party boss for Zhejiang Province.
In November 1939, Ku was appointed as the minister of social affairs and was placed in charge of all wartime social welfare projects. In 1940, the ministry was reorganized into the National Social Department where Ku continued to serve as Minister of National Government Social Affairs, a position he held until March 1949.
As the only Minister of Social Affairs under the Executive Yuan of the Republic of China (distinct from the Kuomintang Party’s own Ministry of Social Affairs headed by Chen Lifu before him). Ku’s state-published biography asserts that Ku played a formative role in the origins of modern social welfare administration in the Republic of China. At the time, most legislation and regulatory frameworks concerning social affairs had yet to be created. While overseeing wartime relief and the resettlement of displaced populations, Ku simultaneously initiated studies on national social security policy and welfare institutions. The biography states that, through Ku’s efforts and personal appeals, a number of scholars and intellectuals participated in the drafting of early social policy proposals.
During his tenure, a series of social laws were promulgated, including the People’s Organizations Act, Social Relief Act, Employment Service Act, Child Welfare Act, Mining and Industrial Inspection Act, Trade Union Act, and Farmers’ Association Act. According to the biography, Ku not only promoted legislation but also sought practical implementation by establishing social administration organs in both rear-area and frontline provinces. He further advocated cooperative economic institutions, encouraging local communities to establish production, marketing, labor, credit, and consumer cooperatives.
In 1941, Ku was in charge of casualty processing during the Japanese bombing of Chongqing and in 1944, he was in charge of Chinese military and civilian casualties on the Guangxi, Guizhou warfronts.
In 1945, Ku was elected to the Chinese Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and the 6th Standing Committee. He also served as Chairman of the Chinese Kuomintang Central Committee of agricultural workers.