Khoo Jeffrey and others v Life Bible-Presbyterian Church and others SGCA ("FEBC v Life Bible-Presbyterian Church") is a landmark case decided in 2011 by the Court of Appeal of Singapore. It is the first case in Singapore which the apex court considered the issue of a breach of a charitable purpose trusts when a religious charity is alleged to have deviated from the fundamental principles upon which it was founded.

Background In 2008, as a result of a dispute between Life Bible-Presbyterian Church and Far Eastern Bible College ("FEBC") over the doctrine of verbal plenary preservation ("VPP"), the church sued the college directors, including the church's founding pastor Timothy Tow, over allegedly “deviant Bible teachings” in an attempt to force FEBC to leave the Gilstead Road premises (the “Premises”).

The Church's suit, Suit No 648 of 2008, was filed on 15 September 2008 in the High Court. After the Attorney-General, in responding to FEBC's application which was objected to by the Church, had given his consent on 8 October 2008 to certain FEBC directors to institute a suit in the High Court for a declaration that the registered proprietors of the Premises hold the properties on a charitable purpose trust for the benefit and use of a Bible College administered by the directors of FEBC, the FEBC directors filed in January 2009 Originating Summons 6 of 2009 which was converted into a writ action in Suit 278 of 2009. The two actions (Suit 648 of 2008 and Suit 278 of 2009) were consolidated in March 2009 with the Church named as the plaintiffs and the FEBC directors as the defendants in Life Bible-Presbyterian Church v Khoo Eng Teck Jeffrey and others and another suit SGHC 187 ("Life Bible-Presbyterian Church v FEBC").

The Church (as plaintiffs) prevailed in Life Bible-Presbyterian Church v FEBC heard in the High Court. However, the FEBC directors (as appellants) won the appeal in FEBC v Life Bible-Presbyterian Church heard in the Court of Appeal.

High Court decision The High Court, which disagreed with the College’s submission that the Church had not obtained the Attorney-General’s consent before commencing its suit and therefore the suit had to fail in limine, agreed with the Church that no such consent was required as its pleaded case was founded in the law of trespass in that the Church was attempting to exercise its proprietary right to evict persons the Church alleged to be trespassers from the Premises; this was unlike the College which contended that it was trying to enforce a charitable trust and therefore would require the Attorney-General’s consent (which was duly obtained), as the existence of such a trust in the College’s favour grants it the right to occupy the Premises. Consequently, without the Church’s case ruled by the High Court as failing, it found that the Church was entitled to the reliefs claimed.

Issues before the High Court See paras 26-31 of the High Court Judgment SGHC 187 for the issues before the Court.

The Church contended that the College is a ministry of the Church. However, if the College is regarded as a separate charitable purpose and entitled to the joint use of the Premises, the Church contended that the Defendants in registering the FEBC in 2004 as a charity with a new constitution (with VPP stated as a doctrine) no longer has the right to use and occupy the Premises. The Church also contended that while the Defendants are members of the 2004 College, they have not proven themselves to be the (original) College's board of directors and the Church is ready and willing to continue with the ministry of the College or a Bible college with the original FEBC constitution.

The Defendants denied the Church's allegations that the College is a ministry of the Church and they have constituted a new college by registering FEBC as a charity in January 2004 with a new constitution to “formalise” the College's independence, since the new constitution was only used because the original constitution could not be found.

Holding of the High Court

On 30 June 2010, the learned Judith Prakash J, as she then was, held that the College is not a ministry of the Church but is an independent organisation constituted as an unincorporated association. While she also agreed with the Defendants that the Premises are subject to charitable purpose trusts for the use and benefit of the Church and the College, because the funds for the acquisition of the land and the construction of the properties on the Premises were raised for both the Church and the College, she ruled that the college run by the Defendants is a different one as it has an entirely new constitution.

As the courts have recognised that doctrine is fundamental to the nature and character of a religious purpose trust (Bishop of Natal v Gladstone (1866) LR 3 Eq 1), Prakash J further held that the 2004 College could not benefit from the charitable purpose trusts as the new constitution has VPP as a cornerstone doctrine while the (original) Constitution makes no mention of the same doctrine. She also held that while the Defendants are the directors of the 2004 College, they have not shown themselves to be the directors of the College. As such, she held that they have no locus standi to bring an application for a declaration of trust on behalf of the College, and the 2004 College has no basis to occupy, possess or use the Premises. The Church was therefore held entitled to the reliefs claimed, which include an injunction to restrain the Defendants and the 2004 College from remaining on or continuing in occupation of the Premises and to vacate and deliver up vacant possession of those parts of the Premises occupied, and to an account of the money held in the accounts of the College as of the date of registration of the 2004 College under the Charities Act.

Court of Appeal decision The Defendants appealed the decision of the learned Prakash J to the Court of Appeal of Singapore, the apex court in Singapore's legal system, and their appeal was allowed: see Court of Appeal SGCA 18.

In allowing the appeal, the appellate court in its judgement of 26 April 2011 remarked – with regard to whether the Appellants (i.e. the Defendants in the High Court case) are the current members of the College Board – that if the High Court Judge was of the opinion that the members of the College Board (who are members of the College as an unincorporated association) cannot be ascertained, she should have ordered the dissolution of the College under the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court: Re Lead Company’s Workmen’s Fund Society 2 Ch 196 – but she did not – and the property held for the purpose of the College should have been dealt with according to the relevant provisions in the Charities Act. (See below in "Issues before the Court of Appeal" on the third and the fourth issues.)

Issues before the Court of Appeal Chao Hick Tin JA, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, listed in para 18 the appellate court's analysis of the High Court Judge's decision on the following issues:

(i) Is the College a ministry of the Church?

(ii) Is the College an unincorporated association or a charitable trust?

(iii) Are the Premises impressed with a charitable trust in favour of the joint use of the College and the Church?

(iv) Are the Appellants the current directors of the Board of the College?

(v) What is the legal effect arising from the Appellants’ act of registering a college in the College's name but with a different constitution?

Also before the appellate court was the issue of whether the College's adoption (and teaching) of VPP, as alleged by the Respondents, would constitute such a fundamental shift that the College should be regarded as pursuing something so different from its original objects that it ceases to be entitled to use the Premises, as trustees holding the Premises must ensure that only persons/entities pursuing the objects of the trust will be allowed to enjoy the benefits under it.

Holding of the Court of Appeal On the first two issues, while the Court of Appeal agreed with Prakash J that the College is not a ministry of the Church and the College is an unincorporated association, the latter finding is regarded by the appellate court as hardly of any consequence since a charity may exist in one of several legal structures with the most basic forms being the trust, the unincorporated association or the incorporated entity (see Peter Luxton, The Law of Charities (Oxford University Press, 2001) at 255). In addition, the appellate court pointed out that there is no reason why Prakash J should require the Appellants to give the Respondents an account of the money held in the accounts of the College as of the date of its registration as a charity, since the College is found to be not a ministry of the Church.

On the third issue, the appellate court also agreed with Prakash J that the Premises are impressed with a charitable trust for the joint use of the Church and the College. However, it disagreed with Prakash J on the fourth issue that the Appellants have not established, on a balance of probabilities, that they are the members of the Board of Directors of the College. The appellate court pointed out that if Prakash J was of the opinion that the members of the Board (who are members of the College as an unincorporated association) cannot be ascertained, she should have ordered – which she did not – that the College be dissolved under the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court and the property that is held for the purpose of the College (i.e., that part of the Premises that is impressed with a charitable purpose in favour of the College and the money in the College's accounts) should then either be applied cy-pres, handed to the Public Trustee, or turned over to the Commissioner of Charities (ss 21, 23 and 26B respectively). (Section 26B is now section 27 in the current version of the Charities Act: see “Power to direct application of charity property after charity ceases to exist” in section 26B of the 2 January 2021 version (pdf) and in section 27 of the 31 December 2021 version (pdf) of the Charities Act 1994 at the Singapore Attorney-General Chambers' website.)

On the fourth issue, the appellate court was of the view that the College's board did not dissolve in 1989 when Dr Tow Siang Hwa stepped down as President and new members were appointed/elected to replace those who had resigned after Dr Tow left. The Church's witness Mr Khoo Peng Kiat, who was a member of the board from 1979 to 2003, had during cross-examination said that “the board continues” after the resignations in 1989. Although Mr Khoo was ambivalent on re-examination, the Judges of Appeal were fortified in their view that the Board did not dissolve in 1989 as the FEBC Constitution does not have any provision for the dissolution of the Board. Under the Constitution, the Board was intended to be a self-perpetuating body whereby the current members would elect new individuals to fill any vacancies on the Board.

On whether the Appellants had adduced sufficient evidence to show that they are the current members of the Board, the appellate court underscored that none of the Respondents’ witnesses, who claimed to be past members of the Board (Mr Khoo Peng Kiat, Mr Quek Kiok Chiang, Mr Joshua Lim, etc.), produced any documentation as proof of their membership. The Judges of Appeal held that it would be unfair to challenge the Appellants’ claim to membership of the Board as what is sauce for the goose must certainly be sauce for the gander.