Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the interpretation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. Amy Rowley was a deaf student, whose school refused to provide a sign language interpreter. Her parents filed suit contending violation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. In a 6–3 decision authored by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that public schools are not required by law to provide sign language interpreters to deaf students who are otherwise receiving an equal and adequate education.
Background In the early 1970s, a series of Federal District Court cases – namely Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (1971) and Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia (1972) – found a right to education for children with disabilities on the basis of due process and equal protection.Harvard Law Review, 1979, p. 1104 A 1974 investigation by Congress found that more than 1.75 million children with disabilities received no public education and that another 3 million who did attend school did not receive education services appropriate to their needs. In 1975 Congress passed and President Ford signed into law the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA). The act mandated that all children with disabilities receive a "free appropriate public education." To achieve this goal, the act required the student, parents and teachers together devise an Individualized Education Program (IEP), however the act did not specify that those IEPs include any particular services, standards or outcomes.
In 1976, respondents Clifford and Nancy Rowley met with the principal of Furnace Woods Elementary School in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District of Montrose, New York to discuss accommodations for their hearing-impaired daughter, Amy Rowley, who would be starting kindergarten there the following year. After having placed her in a regular kindergarten class on a trial basis, Amy was provided with an FM hearing aid and completed her kindergarten year, advancing on to first grade. In accordance with the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, an IEP was created for Amy which included the continued use of her FM hearing aid, but did not include a sign language interpreter. The school, in consultation with the school district's Committee on the Handicapped, contended that Amy did not need an interpreter. Her parents disagreed with that finding and received a hearing with an independent examiner. The examiner concluded that "Amy was achieving educationally, academically, and socially without such assistance." After losing their appeal to the New York Commissioner of Education, the Rowleys brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York contending that denial of a sign language interpreter violated the EAHCA's guarantee of a free appropriate public education.
Lower courts The case was heard before District Court Judge Vincent L. Broderick in late September 1979. At the evidentiary hearing, the Rowleys presented evidence that showed Amy, despite her academic success so far, was not able to fully achieve in the classroom with the resources available. They provided test results showing that Amy understood only about 60 percent of discussion in the classroom, while an interpreter would put her closer to 100%. They further provided results from two academic achievement tests Amy took in first grade, one administered in English and the other in American Sign Language. She had average performance on the test administered in English, but performed "well above average" on the test administered in American Sign Language.Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 532. Based upon this evidence, Judge Broderick determined that even with the existing accommodations, Amy was not achieving her full potential.
Because of his determination that Amy would be more successful with an interpreter, Judge Broderick ruled that failure to provide her with one violated the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. He stated that "The Act itself does not define 'appropriate education'" nor had a common law interpretation arisen.Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 533. The requirements of the act, Judge Broderick argued, fell somewhere between a simply "adequate" education and one that allows the student to achieve their full potential, neither extreme being possible. Based on the testimony of Dr. Zavarella, Amy's principal, who said that the district would only provide an interpreter if Amy proved to be failing academically, Judge Broderick determined that the defendants were merely providing an adequate education but not an appropriate education.Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534. The New York Commissioner of Education was overruled and the defendants were ordered to provide Amy a sign language interpreter.
Hendrick Hudson School District and the Commissioner of Education appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The three judge panel issued a per curiam decision affirming the district court's judgement. Circuit Judge Mansfield dissented from the opinion, arguing that the act did in fact define an "appropriate education", that deference should have been given to educational authorities on educational matters, and that certain affidavits admitted into evidence and used in the basis of the decision constituted impermissible hearsay. The Board appealed again and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Supreme Court The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on 23 March 1982. Raymond G. Kuntz, advocate for the petitioners, argued that the Education for All Handicapped Children Act did not require the provision of any specific services, but rather is a funding statute saying "the Act could have described specific services and it did not."Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, The Justices questioned him as to the "full potential" standard laid out in the lower court rulings, particularly whether a sign language interpreter would be required to meet such a standard. Kuntz argued that the "full potential" standard could be satisfied without a sign language interpreter, but maintained that the standard was erroneous. Such a standard, petitioners contended, was "not a requirement that can be fulfilled by any school district" and criticized the District Court ruling as creating "unworkable" tests that could not be adequately applied in practice.Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, Kuntz also raised the argument that determinations of educational services and content were, constitutionally, matters delegated to the states.
Michael A. Chatoff, a deaf lawyer, represented the Rowleys. Although deaf, Chatoff was able to speak and delivered his arguments orally in English while he was able to respond to justices' questions using a computer-aided transcription system involving a stenographer and a computer monitor supplied by Gallaudet University and Translation Systems, Inc.Smith, 1989, p. 20 The equipment had to be specially approved by the Court, and it was the first time the Court approved the use of such electronic equipment and the first time a deaf person argued before the Supreme Court.Kleiman, 24 March 1982
Chatoff argued that "the goal of the act is to provide handicapped children with equal educational opportunities."Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Asked to justify that interpretation, Chatoff pointed to the legislative record arguing it was the intent of the legislation rather than the text of the statute specifically.Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, The justices also questioned him about the implications of upholding such an interpretation, specifically "will your interpretation of the statute require every school board to provide a sign language interpreter for every deaf child in the country?"Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-26, Chatoff argued that the case was specific to Amy and distinguished between what Amy needed and what other students similarly situated may or may not need: "The deaf community is not a monolithic entity....Not every deaf child can be educated in the public school....Children who are educated in special schools or in research rooms have no need for interpreters. Children raised using the oral method have no need for interpreters. It will be only very specific instances."Transcript of Oral Argument at 26,
Arguing on behalf of the United States in support of the respondents, Elliot Schulder focused largely on matters of statutory interpretation rather than specific outcomes for Amy. When pressed by the justices regarding the educational standards required, he contended that the district court opinion went too far: "the emphasis is not on potential or shortfall from potential, but on the making available to handicapped children the same opportunities that are available to non-handicapped children to benefit from the regular educational program that the state or local school authorities provide."Transcript of Oral Argument at 30-31, The justices brought up an issue Kuntz, for the petitioner, touched on: "what's this court supposed to do? Independently make its own judgment or ... [say] all I'm allowed to do is to decide whether the school acted arbitrarily?"Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Essentially, should the court rule on whether aspects of the individual education program allow a disabled child to reach their full potential or is the approval of an individual education program sufficient to satisfy the act. Schulder argues a middle ground: "We don't think the court has to measure potential, but we do believe that the court has to make an independent determination whether, in this particular case, for example, the plan as developed provides the child in question access to the same educational opportunity available to non-handicapped children."Transcript of Oral Argument at 36,
On rebuttal, Kuntz argued against the district court's contention that Amy only understands 59% of what occurs in the classroom. He contended that their evidence was more persuasive to show that Amy was understanding everything without a sign language interpreter. The district court based its finding on a word discrimination test conducted outside the classroom. Their experts, who observed Amy in the classroom, had determined "Amy understands nearly all of what transpires in her classroom."Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Transcript of Oral Argument at 42-46,
Opinion of the Court
On June 28, 1982, the Court handed down a 6–3 decision in favor of the petitioners. Justice William Rehnquist wrote for the majority, with Justice Byron White writing the principal dissent joined by Justices William Brennan Jr. and Thurgood Marshall. The Court answered two questions: "what is meant by the act's requirement of a 'free appropriate public education'? And what is the role of state and federal courts in exercising the review granted by 20 U.S.C. § 1415?"