The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) declared the establishment of the State of Palestine on November 15, 1988. As of September 2025, the State of Palestine is recognized as a sovereign state by 157 of the 193 member states of the United Nations, or just over 80% of all UN members. It is a non-member observer state at the United Nations since November 2012. United Nations A/67/L.28 General Assembly . 26 November 2012. This limited status is largely due to the United States, a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power, which has consistently used its veto or threatened to do so to block Palestine’s full membership to UN. The existence of a state of Palestine is recognized by the states that have established bilateral diplomatic relations with it.Segal, Jerome M., Chapter 9, "The State of Palestine, The Question of Existence", in Philosophical perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Tomis Kapitan editor, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, .Boyle, Francis A. Creation of the State of Palestine; 1 Eur. J. Int'l L. 301 (1990)Kearney, Michael and Denayer, Stijn, Al-Haq Position Paper on Issues Arising from the Palestinian Authority's Submission of a Declaration to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute (24 December 2009), para 43.a.Dugard, John (22 July 2009; Op-Ed essay). "Take the Case". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 September 2011. There is a wide range of views on the legal status of the State of Palestine, both among international states and legal scholars.

Statehood for the purposes of the UN Charter Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had been recognized as "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," competent on all matters concerning the question of Palestine by the UN General Assembly in addition to the right of the Palestinian people in Palestine to national independence and sovereignty, and was granted observer status at the UN General Assembly as a "non-state entity", from 1974. In mid-November 2011, the PLO submitted an official application to become a full member of the UN. A successful application would require approval from the UN Security Council and a two-thirds majority in the UN General Assembly. However, the Security Council's membership committee deadlocked on the issue and had been "unable to make a unanimous recommendation to the Security Council". The report was the result of seven weeks of meetings, detailing myriad disagreements between the council members on whether Palestine fulfills the requirements set forth in the U.N. charter for members countries. With their application for full membership stalled, the PLO sought an upgrade in status, from "observer entity" to "non-member observer state". In November 2012, UN General Assembly accepted the resolution upgrading Palestine to "non-member observer state" within the United Nations system, reasserting PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

The UN Charter protects the territorial integrity or political independence of any state from the threat or use of force. Philip Jessup served as a representative of the United States to the United Nations and as a Judge on the International Court of Justice. During the Security Council hearings regarding Israel's application for membership in the UN, he said:"[W]e already have, among the members of the United Nations, some political entities which do not possess full sovereign power to form their own international policy, which traditionally has been considered characteristic of a State. We know however, that neither at San Francisco nor subsequently has the United Nations considered that complete freedom to frame and manage one's own foreign policy was an essential requisite of United Nations membership.... ...The reason for which I mention the qualification of this aspect of the traditional definition of a State is to underline the point that the term "State", as used and applied in Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, may not be wholly identical with the term "State" as it is used and defined in classic textbooks on international law."

In 2009, Riyad al-Maliki, the Palestinian Foreign Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, provided proof that Palestine had been extended legal recognition as a state by 67 other countries, and had bilateral agreements with states in Latin America, Asia, Africa and Europe.

Declaration and Act of State Doctrine Many states have recognized the State of Palestine since 1988. Under the principles of customary international law, when a government is recognized by another government, recognition is retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.See for example "The Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 443 "The Act of State Doctrine", Commentary a., RN 3; or Oetjen v. Cent.Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918).

Stephen Talmon notes that many countries have a formal policy of recognizing states, not their governments. In practice, they usually make no formal declarations regarding recognition. He cites several examples including a memorandum on US recognition policy and practice, dated 25 September 1981, which said that recognition would be implied by the US government's dealings with the new government.Talmon, 1998, pp. 3–4. Many countries have expressed their intention to enter into relations with the State of Palestine. The US formally recognized the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "one area for political, economic, legal and other purposes" in 1997 at the request of the Palestinian Authority. At that time, it asked the public to take notice of that fact through announcements it placed in the Federal Register, the official journal of the US government. The USAID West Bank/Gaza, has been tasked with "state-building" projects in the areas of democracy, governance, resources, and infrastructure. Part of the USAID mission is to "provide flexible and discrete support for implementation of the Quartet Road Map", an internationally backed plan which calls for the progressive development of a viable Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza. The European Union (EU) has announced similar external relations programs with the Palestinian Authority.

The view of the European states, which did not extend full recognition was expressed by French President François Mitterrand who stated: "Many European countries are not ready to recognize a Palestine state. Others think that between recognition and non-recognition there are significant degrees; I am among these." But, after the PLO recognized the state of Israel, Mitterrand welcomed the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, in Paris, in May 1989.Filiu, Jean-Pierre (Winter 2009). "Mitterrand and the Palestinians". Journal of Palestine Studies. 150. p. 34.

Consequences of the occupation

After 1967, a number of legal arguments were advanced which dismissed the right of Palestinians to self-determination and statehood. They generally proposed that Palestine was a land void of a legitimate sovereign and supported Israeli claims to the remaining territory of the Palestine Mandate.Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279, 289–90 (1968)Eugene V. Rostow, "Palestinian Self-Determination": Possible Futures for the Unallocated Territories of the Palestine Mandate, 5 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 147 (1980) Historian and journalist Gershom Gorenberg says that outside of the pro-settlement community in Israel, these positions are considered quirky. He says that, while the Israeli government has used them for PR purposes abroad, it takes entirely different positions when arguing real legal cases before the Israeli Supreme Court. In 2005 Israel decided to dismantle all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and four in the northern West Bank. Gorenberg notes, the government's decision was challenged in the Supreme Court by settlers, and the government won the case by noting the settlements were in territory whose legal status was that of 'belligerent territory'. The government argued that the settlers should have known the settlements were only temporary.See Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967–1977, Macmillan, 2007, , page 363 and South Jerusalem On Settlement Legality, 24 November 2008

Most UN member states questioned the claim that Israel held better title to the land than the inhabitants, and stressed that statehood was an inalienable right of the Palestinian people.Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People Legal experts, like David John Ball, concluded that "the Palestinians, based on the principles of self-determination and the power of the U.N., appear to hold better title to the territory."Ball, David John, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 990 (2004), Toss the Travaux – Application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Middle East Conflict – A Modern (Re)Assessment The International Court of Justice subsequently reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the prohibition under customary and conventional international law against acquisition of territory by war.

The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, cited a case involving the disengagement from Gaza and said that "The Judea and Samaria areas are held by the State of Israel in belligerent occupation. The long arm of the state in the area is the military commander. He is not the sovereign in the territory held in belligerent occupation. His power is granted him by public international law regarding belligerent occupation. The legal meaning of this view is twofold: first, Israeli law does not apply in these areas. They have not been "annexed" to Israel. Second, the legal regime which applies in these areas is determined by public international law regarding belligerent occupation." (internal citations and emphasis omitted).

The court said that most Israelis in Gaza did not own the land they built on there. "They acquired their rights from the military commander, or from persons acting on his behalf. Neither the military commander nor those acting on his behalf are owners of the property, and they cannot transfer rights better than those they have. To the extent that the Israelis built their homes and assets on land which is not private ('state land'), that land is not owned by the military commander. His authority is defined in regulation 55 of The Hague Regulations. [...] The State of Israel acts [...] as the administrator of the state property and as usufructuary of it." (quoting the decision in The Gaza Coast Regional Council v. The Knesset et al.).

Decisions of international and national tribunals