György (Móric) Klapka (;Obituary, New York Times, May 18, 1892 p. 4 7 April 182017 May 1892) was a Hungarian general. He was one of the most important Hungarian generals of the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848–1849, politician, member of the Hungarian Parliament, and deputy War Minister.
Early life Klapka was born at Temesvár, Kingdom of Hungary on 7 April 1820 in a German-speaking Roman-Catholic family of Moravian origin. His ancestors migrated there from Moravia during the reign of Joseph II (1780–1790) his grandfather founding military pharmacies during the Austro-Turkish War of 1787–1791.Zsolt Vesztróczy 125 éve hunyt el Klapka György, Komárom hős védője , (2017) In the following decades the families prestige grew, and György Klapka's father, József Klapka, was mayor of Temesvár for nearly 15 years, as well as elected twice as deputy in the Hungarian Diet, and later ennobled by the king. His mother was Júlia Kehrer.Szinnyei József: Magyar írók élete és munkái VI, Klapka György (Móricz) Budapest, 1899
He had five brothers and sisters. He lost his mother at an early age. As a child, he recalls, I had the greatest pleasure of watching military ceremonies, where I admired the uniforms of the Hungarian generals, as well as spending much time on the ramparts of the fortress of Temesvár. Despite his Moravian origin Klapka considered himself a Hungarian.Bona Gábor Tábornokok és törzstisztek az 1848/49. évi szabadságharcban , (2015) His early education was at Roman Catholic secondary schools in Kecskemét and Szeged. His mother tongue was German, he learned Latin in the school, then Hungarian in Kecskemét. His parents wanted him to become a priest, but he was attracted to a career as a military officer. After graduating from military school in Karánsebes, he joined the Imperial-Royal Army in 1837.
No sooner had I put on the uniform than the oath I was to take was read out in front of me. As soon as I said the words, my bosom tightened, for I felt that from now on I was no longer a free man, but a slave: that I was no longer ruled by my own will, but by the will of others. But these shackles were of my free will, and such shackles must be worn, and so I endured them with patience. Very soon I got used to the strict iron discipline of my position, saw the necessity of it, and adapted to it he wrote in his memoirs about the beginning of his military career. He served as a cadet in the 2nd Artillery Regiment in Vienna, then in the Bombardier Corps.
In the spring of 1842, after the confirmation of his family's nobility, he was commissioned, at the proposal of Sebő Vukovics, to the Hungarian Nobiliary Royal Bodyguards (Magyar királyi nemesi testőrség), as a delegate of the Temes County, continuing his career in the Guards of Vienna, where he became friends with Artúr Görgei.Tarján M. Tamás / 1820. április 7. Klapka György születése Temesváron, Rubicon. (2010 VII/11) He was transferred from Vienna to Pancsova, to the 12th Border Guard Infantry Regiment of the German-Banat border guards, until his retirement from the army in 1847 with the rank of artillery Lieutenant. Here he was sent as lieutenant to the Border Region Division, but soon he disarmed. In 1847 he thought of travelling to Lahore in northern India (now Pakistan), to join the army of one of the Indian princes, but on hearing the news of the revolution from Paris from February 1848 he decided to remain in Hungary.
His military career in the Hungarian War of Independence
Before becoming a general After the victory, on 15 March, of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, Klapka volunteered in the Hungarian army, where he was made captain. In May 1848 he was sent by the Batthyány Government along with two Hungarian officers to Kolozsvár and the Székely Land to learn if public sentiment in Transylvania was in favour of reunification with Hungary, and to assess how many of the Székely border guard units could be sent to Hungary. On 13 June he was appointed as a captain to the 16 Hungarian Battalion in Veszprém and in August joined the Hungarian military operations in Bácska in southern Hungary against the Serbian insurgents.
On 25 September he was sent to be the temporary director of the Komárom fortress, known as the Gibraltar of the Danube. During that time he prevented Wilhelm Mertz, the constable of the fortress, from delivering it in the hands of the Habsburgs, and played a role in forcing Mertz and the officers loyal to the Habsburgs, to leave Komárom, securing this very important stronghold for Hungary. From 16 October Klapka also supervised the fortification works in Pozsony. As the commander of the concentrated Hungarian national guards concentrated at Nagyszombat, he participated in military operations against the Austrian troops led by Balthasar von Simunich, which broke into Hungary from Moravia.
On 13 November he was appointed chief of general staff of the Bánság army corps, and together with General Antal Vetter, he produced a plan to crush the Serbian insurgency, but this failed owing to weak execution by the main commander of the military operations, General Ernő Kiss. By the end of December 1848 he was attached to the general staff section of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence.
That month Austrian imperial troops led by Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz attacked Hungary, and Klapka was appointed major in the Hungarian army, and by 9 January 1849 colonel. Together with Vetter he planned the retreat of the Hungarian troops along the Tisza river, and became commander of the Upper Tisza Corps (Felső-tiszai hadtest).
Before this the Upper Tisza Corps was led by the Minister of War General Lázár Mészáros, who was defeated by the Austrian troops led by Lieutenant-General Franz Schlik in the Battle of Kassa.. Klapka took over these beaten troops in January 1849, reorganized them, and beat Schlik in three consecutive battles at Tarcal (20 January), Bodrogkeresztúr (23 January), and Tokaj (31 January). Thanks to these victories Klapka held the Hungarian defensive line along the Tisza river, and won precious time for the Hungarian commandment to organize the counter-attack against Windisch-Grätz imperial troops. From 29 January 1849 he was under the command of Lieutenant-General Henryk Dembiński the main commander of the Hungarian armies. After their victory at 5 February 1849 in the Battle of Branyiszkó, the Upper Danube Corps led by Artúr Görgei approached to the Tisza river from the northwest, menacing, together with Klapka's corps, to encircle and destroy Schlik's army.. Understanding the importance of this chance, Klapka tried to convince Dembiński to attack Schlik's corps from the south, but the latter refused, ordering Klapka to retreat. This wrong decision of the main commander enabled Schlik to escape the danger, and to retreat. Klapka defeated him again on 8 February at Hidasnémeti, but the Austrian general was able to retreat towards the west, joining the main imperial troops led by Windisch-Grätz.
Klapka participated during 26–27 February in the Battle of Kápolna, commanding the right wing of the Hungarian army at Verpelét. The battle was lost because of Dembiński's poor army leading and indecision. After Dembiński's order of retreat, at 1 March Klapka fought successful rearguard actions against the Austrian corps led by Ladislaus von Wrbna at Egerfarmos.
At 3 March he was one of the leaders of the revolt at Tiszafüred of the Hungarian officers dissatisfied with Dembiński's leadership, and forced him to resign, supporting Görgei's election to the main command.
For his victories against Schlik he received on 13 March the 3d Class Hungarian Military Decoration.
General and deputy War Minister At 28 March, only 29, he received the rank of General.
Klapka elaborated the plan of the Spring Campaign of the Hungarian army, which in the end of May, after a series of victories, brought the liberation of almost all Hungary from the Austrian armies. The plan's main purpose was to distract the attention of the Austrian commanders with the attack from the north of the VII Corps, while the other three corps (I, II, III) had to march undetected from the south and to attack from the flank the main Austrian troops stationed at Gödöllő. But Klapka was the one who, unwillingly revealed the plan to the enemy, which could cause a catastrophe for the Hungarian army. Initially, the victory of the Hungarian VII Corps led by András Gáspár against Schlik in the Battle of Hatvan at 2 April, deceived Windisch-Grätz to think that the attack of the Hungarian forces would come from that direction but the failed attack of Klapka's I corps against the Austrian I Corps led by Josip Jelačić in the first phase of the Battle of Tápióbicske (he sent his troops in the city without scouting before that, to see if any enemy troops were in there, thus his troops were ambushed by enemy infantry and a cavalry brigade),. forced the III corps led by János Damjanich to intervene, and to turn the tide of the battle – which could have become a serious defeat for the Hungarians – into a victory, made the Austrian Field-Marshal suspicious, that the main Hungarian attack could come from other directions, and not from where he expected that. However Jelačić's vain report to Windisch-Grätz that his troops won the battle of Tápióbicske, deceived him, to think that the Croatian general was attacked only by minor Hungarian forces, so he still was not sure from where to expect the enemy's attack. Furthermore, Windisch-Grätz was informed about the attack of a Hungarian detachment, on 24 March against Losonc, which took prisoner half of the 500-600 strong Austrian detachment, making him to think that important Hungarian troops will attack also from the northeast. But Klapka's attack made Windisch-Grätz aware of a danger coming from the south, which may be considered his error..
In the Battle of Isaszeg from 6 April, the first decisive battle of the Spring Campaign, after initial successes, Klapka's I Corps were pushed back by Jelačić's superior forces, which made Klapka waver, and to think seriously to retreat from the battlefield, letting Damjanich's III Corps alone, but the arrival of Görgei, and his order to resist at all costs, then the arrival of the II Corps led by Lajos Aulich, convinced him to remain and fight. At the end of the battle Klapka's I corps charge chased the enemy from Isaszeg and brought the victory for the Hungarians.. The fluctuating behavior of Klapka during the battle showed that despite being a good strategist, creating good operation plans, which, in the Spring Campaign, enabled him to defeat the superior imperial troops (55,000 Austrians against 47,500 Hungarians), he could be hesitating in their execution. During the battle of Isaszeg Damjanich criticized Klapka of being too timorous and sensible to the complaints of his soldiers, instead of being resolute and determined. Luckily the main commander of Army of the Upper Danube (Feldunai Hadsereg) was Görgei, who was the most able Hungarian general to carry out Klapka's plans, led the army in the best way, being able to take quickly the correct decisions after short thinking, being very determined in his decisions, showing no hesitation even before the most unexpected situations, and thanks to this the Hungarian army emerged victorious in the Spring Campaign..