The action of 25 September 1917 was a German methodical counter-attack (Gegenangriff) which took place during the Third Battle of Ypres on the Western Front during the First World War. On the front of the British X Corps (Lieutenant-General Thomas Morland) at the south-east side of the Gheluvelt Plateau, two regiments of the German 50th Reserve Division attacked on both sides of the Reutelbeek stream, on a front. The was supported by German aircraft and and batteries of artillery, four times the usual amount of artillery for a German division.
The German infantry managed to advance for about near the Menin road on the southern flank and on the northern flank beyond the Reutelbeek, close to Black Watch Corner. The attack was supported by artillery-observation aircraft, ground-attack aircraft and a box-barrage fired behind the British front-line, which isolated the British defenders from reinforcements and cut off the supply of ammunition. Return-fire from the 33rd Division south of Polygon Wood and the 15th Australian Brigade of the 5th Australian Division along the southern edge of the wood forced the attackers under cover. German parties re-captured several pillboxes of the near Black Watch Corner, which had fallen to the British during the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge (20 September) but attempts to reinforce the attackers failed.
General Herbert Plumer, the commander of the Second Army, ordered the attack scheduled for 26 September to go ahead but modified the objectives of the 33rd Division. The 98th Brigade was to advance and cover the right flank of the 5th Australian Division and the 100th Brigade to the south was to re-capture the lost ground. The depleted 98th Brigade was delayed and only managed to reach Black Watch Corner, short of its objectives. Reinforcements moved forward into the 5th Australian Division area to the north and attacked south-westwards at noon, combined with a frontal attack from Black Watch Corner. By the attack had succeeded despite massed machine-gun fire; later in the afternoon, the 100th Brigade re-took the lost ground north of the Menin road. Casualties in the 33rd Division were so great that it was relieved on 27 September by the 23rd Division.
Background
Strategic developments
The failure of the Kerensky Offensive in Russia in July had hastened the disintegration of the Russian army, the possibility of a Russian armistice and a huge reinforcement of the German Western Front. From 15 to 25 August, the Battle of Hill 70 was fought against the 6th Army by the Canadian Corps and forestalled the transfer of divisions to Flanders. On 20 August, the French attacked the German 5th Army at Verdun and in four days captured much of the remaining ground lost to the Germans in 1916 and took thirty guns, mortars and The Germans were not able to mount big counter-attacks, because their specialist counter-attack divisions (Eingreif divisions ) had been transferred to Flanders. French preparations continued for an offensive on the Chemin des Dames (the Battle of La Malmaison) in October and the British Third Army planned a surprise artillery and tank attack (the Battle of Cambrai) on the Flesquières Salient. France was running short of manpower; at the end of September, the French Minister of War had been told that another defeat could provoke more mutinies, which would be terminal for the French war effort. The British General Headquarters (GHQ) of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) feared that the French might be forced into a separate peace.
Tactical developments
GHQ quickly studied the results of the attack of 31 July (the Battle of Pilckem Ridge) and on 7 August, sent questions to the Fifth Army headquarters about the new conditions produced by German defence-in-depth. The German 4th Army had spread strong points and pillboxes in the areas between its defensive lines and made rapid counter-attacks with local reserves and divisions against Allied penetrations. At the end of August, Haig moved the Fifth Army–Second Army boundary northwards and put the Second Army in charge of the main offensive effort on the Gheluvelt Plateau. Plumer issued a preliminary order on 1 September, which defined the Second Army area of operations as Broodseinde and the area to the south. The plan was based on the use of much more medium and heavy artillery.
Artillery was brought to the Gheluvelt Plateau from VIII Corps on the right flank of the Second Army and from the Third Army and Fourth Army, further south in Artois and Picardy. The heavy artillery reinforcements for the Second Army were to be used to destroy German concrete shelters and machine-gun nests, which were more numerous in the German battle zones than the outpost zones which had been captured since July and to engage in more counter-battery fire. Few German concrete pill-boxes and machine gun nests had been destroyed during earlier preparatory bombardments and attempts at precision bombardment before attacks had also failed. The and guns and howitzers in the Second Army on 31 July were increased to and medium and guns and howitzers for the battle, which was equivalent to one artillery piece for every of the attack front, more than double the density at Pilckem Ridge.
Plumer made tactical refinements to defeat the German defence-in-depth, by setting closer objectives and then fighting the principal battle against the German . Plumer ensured that the depth of the attacking divisions roughly corresponded to the depth of local German counter-attack reserves and the . By further reorganising the infantry reserves, more men were provided for the later stages of the advance, to defeat German counter-attacks. Advances of no more than were to be made and then the infantry were to consolidate their positions, preferably on reverse-slopes. When the Germans counter-attacked, they would encounter a British defence-in-depth protected by artillery and suffer many casualties to little effect, rather than the small and disorganised groups of infantry that the Germans had driven back on 31 July,
After the big defeat at the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge on 20 September, the 4th Army changed the organisation of regiments and battalions in their defensive positions. During August, each German front-line division had kept two regiments in the front position with all six of their battalions; the third regiment was held further back in reserve. The front battalions had needed to be relieved much more frequently than expected, due to constant British bombardments and the wet weather. Periods in the line were exhausting and battalions had been sent where needed, dispersing units and disorganising their command structures. Regiments in reserve had not been able to conduct an immediate counter-attack (), which had left the battalions furthest forward unsupported, until arrived from the rearmost parts of the defences, some hours later.
By 26 September, all three regiments of the German line-holding divisions () had been deployed the front line, each holding an area wide and deep, with one battalion in the front line, one in support and the third in close reserve. The three battalions of each regiment were to move forward, successively to engage British battalions, which leap-frogged through those of the previous stage of an attack. The were to deliver a methodical counter-attack with artillery and air support () later in the day, before the British could consolidate captured ground. The change was intended to remedy the neutralisation of the front division reserves which had occurred on 20 September, because of the massed bombardments and barrages of the British artillery.
The reserve battalion in each regimental sector would be able to counter-attack before the arrived. On 22 September, new tactical requirements were laid down that more artillery bombardments were to be fired between British attacks, half of the artillery was to conduct counter-battery fire against British artillery and the other half to bombard infantry positions. More infantry raids were to be conducted to induce the British to reinforce the front line and make a denser target for the German artillery. Improvements in artillery observation in the battle zone were also ordered, to increase the accuracy of German artillery-fire as the British attacked.
Prelude
German preparations
On 23 September, Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote in his diary that the higher ground at Zonnebeke and Gheluvelt was vulnerable to another British attack. It was vital that the (hasty counter-attack) tactic did not fail again. Next day, Rupprecht wrote that he hoped that another British attack would be delayed, as the 4th Army had insufficient reserves for the whole of the active front east of Ypres. Rupprecht ordered a (methodical counter-attack) against the British flank between the Menin Road and Polygon Wood, which had been lengthened by the British the advance on 20 September.
Group Wytschaete ( was to attack with the 50th Reserve Division, which had relieved the Bavarian Ersatz Division. The attackers were to recapture of the from the Menin road to Polygon Wood and then establish a position further on. The commander of Reserve Infantry Regiment 229 (RIR 229) warned that the attack would fail unless it was most carefully prepared and supported by an attack by Group Ypres () opposite Polygon Wood but he was over-ruled. The counter-attack was postponed by one day and command was transferred to Major Litzmann, the commander of Reserve Infantry Regiment 230 (RIR 230).
German plan
On 25 September, German troops were to conduct a on the Fifth Army front opposite the 20th (Light) Division in XIV Corps and a bigger attack against the X Corps front, in the centre of the Second Army, south of the I Anzac Corps in Polygon Wood. The 50th Reserve Division had been the division for Group Dixmude () from 10 August to 19 September and was moved south to the Menin area in reserve. The division relieved the Bavarian Division on 21 September, Reserve Infantry Regiment 231 (RIR 231) south of the Menin road, RIR 230 north of the road to the Reutelbeek stream and RIR 229 north of the stream. Each regiment was to attack on a battalion front in each regimental sector, a width of about from the Menin road, north to Polygon Wood on the Gheluvelt Plateau. The attack was to begin at and recapture the opposite , with an advance of about to the west, from the Menin road northwards to the Reutel, road south of Polygon Wood. A company of the 4th Army stormtroop battalion () was to hold the after it was captured. The III Battalion, RIR 229 was to attack north of the Reutelbeek and the III Battalion, RIR 230 (Colonel Litzmann), was to attack from the Reutelbeek north to Polygon Wood; the was to attack in the area of RIR 231, on the Menin road. The German artillery was augmented by artillery and howitzer batteries, the guns of the 25th and 207th divisions to the south, the 3rd Reserve Division and the long-range artillery group () of . The heavy artillery of to the south comprised of heavy howitzers and of heavy guns.
British preparations