The King–Crane Commission, officially called the 1919 Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey, consisting primarily of an American delegation was a commission of inquiry concerning the disposition of areas within the former Ottoman Empire.
The Commission began as an outgrowth of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The Commission visited areas of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Anatolia, surveyed local public opinion, and assessed its view on the best course of action for the region. Originally meant to be led by French, British, Italian, and American representatives, it ended as an investigation conducted solely by the United States government after the other countries withdrew to avoid the risk of being "confronted by recommendations from their own appointed delegates which might conflict with their policies".
Referring to the Allies' commitment to the principle of self-determination, the commission stated that any territorial settlements should reflect "the free acceptance" of "the people immediately concerned", rather "upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery". It warned that existing diplomatic agreements and mandate plans were already shaping outcomes in ways that did not reflect the expressed preferences of local populations and recommended that "only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated".
The Commission submitted its report to the Paris Peace Conference in August 1919. Its work was undercut from the beginning by France and the United Kingdom's pact, including the Sykes–Picot Agreement, and colonialist policy objectives, under which mandate arrangements and territorial divisions had largely already been decided through diplomatic negotiations before the report was completed.David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 1989, pp 396-97The proposal was viewed as childish by the French and British career officials, who did not believe that public opinion, in the European and American sense, existed in the Middle East. Nonetheless the British Prime Minister tried to make the best of it by attempting to get the commission to focus exclusively on the claims of France--and the resistance to those claims by the Arabs whom France sought to rule.... The British, like the French, had staked out an enormous claim in the Middle East, but Lloyd George successfully kept the British claims from being scrutinised. When President Wilson's Commission of Inquiry went out to ascertain the wishes of the Middle Eastern peoples, it did not go to Mesopotamia, where British India had instituted direct rule. Citing, U.S. State Department, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 11, p. 75. Although the report's recommendations was not adopted by the Paris Peace Conference, it has since been cited as an early documented survey of political opinion and a historical reference point in debates on self-determination and foreign intervention in the region.
Context
At the Paris Peace Conference, France and Britain sought to divide the Ottoman Empire among themselves using the mandate system while President Wilson sought to oppose such plans. The conference began in 1919. In the wake of World War I, the participants were exhausted and particularly interested in the fate of their imperial rival, the Ottoman Empire.
The French, in particular, had extensive claims in the Middle East. Since as early 1900, the French began to build relationships and claims on political, moral and economic grounds. They created a role for themselves as the traditional protector of Lebanese Christians. The French supported the Maronites in Lebanon with missionaries and schools, deepening their relationship with the Christian religious community. Many Lebanese Christians feared domination as a religious minority and vocally supported the French Mandate.
Finally, French capitalists controlled 63% of the Ottoman Public Debt. This economic tie made France concerned about the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The French were adamant that because of their unique relationship with Syria, they should be one of the nations to receive a mandate in Syria.
Meanwhile, after World War I, people in the Levant, including Palestine, sought independence due to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and global revolutionary activities, namely, the “year of traveling revolutions” across the North Africa and the Middle East. They aimed to establish independent nation-states, inspired by President Wilson's emphasis on self-determination. The King–Crane Commission played a crucial role in evaluating their aspirations. Many had relied on Wilson's assurances of security and autonomy, expecting democratic principles to guide the postwar period. They hoped for Western support to achieve self-rule, marking the end of imperialism in the Middle East.
Secret negotiations
The French allied themselves with the British in order to press their claims. While the British did not have the same connection with the Middle East, they were still interested in expanding and defending their existing colonial empire. In what came to be known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, the French and the British agreed to divide the Middle East between the two of them after the war. When they reached the Paris Peace Conference, this agreement made negotiation on the Middle East nearly impossible. When American diplomats proposed the King–Crane Commission to investigate popular sentiment in the region of Syria, both French and British diplomats greeted it with public approval, but behind the scenes the outcome had already been decided.
The British also engaged in secret negotiations with the emir of Mecca in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence before the conference occurred. Ultimately, this would cause the British to fall into poor standing with the Arabs because they would betray Arab trust by conducting simultaneous negotiations in the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration.
The commission
The Commission was originally proposed by the United States as an international effort to assess ''the state of opinion there with regard to [the post-Ottoman Middle East], and the social, racial, and economic conditions.'' The plan received little support from the other nations, with many claimed delays. The Americans gradually realized that the British and French had already come to their own backroom deals about the future of the region, and new information could only muddy the waters. So, the United States alone sponsored the commission.
The Commission's representatives appointed by President Woodrow Wilson were Henry Churchill King, a theologian and fellow college president (of Oberlin College), and Charles R. Crane, a prominent Democratic Party contributor.
The dispatch of the Commission, combined with Wilson's claim that the “nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of an autonomous development,” sparked optimism in the Arab world that the era of imperialism was coming to an end. The Arabs united to form their political proposals, based on ideas of self-determination and minority rights.
The Commission's effectiveness was hampered by the fact that it was the British army that actually protected them and controlled the translators, giving a skewed view of opinion where it was considerably easier to decry the French than the British. In spite of this, based on interviews with local elites, the Commission concluded that, while independence was preferred, the Americans were considered the second-best choice for a colonial power, the British the third-best, and the French easily the worst choice.
Based on these interviews, King concluded that while the Middle East was "not ready" for independence, a colonial government would not serve the people well either. He recommended instead that the Americans move in to occupy the region, because only the United States could be trusted to guide the people to self-sufficiency and independence rather than become an imperialist occupier. From King's personal writings, it seems that his overriding concern was the morally correct course of action, not necessarily tempered by politics or pragmatism. The Republicans had regained control of the United States Senate in the 1918 midterm elections. In light of Republican isolationism, the probability of a huge military involvement and occupation overseas, even given British and French approval, was practically nil.
The British Foreign Office was willing to allow either the United States or Great Britain to administer the proposed Palestine mandate, but not the French or the Italian governments.Minutes of the Eastern Committee, UK Archives, PRO CAB 27/24. The point ended up being moot in any case, as Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, heads of governments of Great Britain and France, prevailed in drafting the provisions of the San Remo conference and the Treaty of Sèvres. Lloyd George commented that "the friendship of France is worth ten Syrias." France received Syria while Britain would get Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine, contrary to the expressed wishes of both the interviewees and the Commission itself. In the United States, the report floundered with Wilson's sickness and later death.
Delay in publication The Report was not intended to be published until the US Senate actually passed the Treaty of Versailles, which it never did. As a result, the report was only released to the public in 1922, after the Senate and House had passed a joint resolution favoring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine along the lines of the Balfour Declaration. Public opinion was divided when it was learned that the Arab majority had requested an American mandate with a democratically elected constituent assembly.
Conclusions regarding Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon The King-Crane Commission's report covered the Arab territories of the defunct Ottoman Syria, then under the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. This area covered would today encompass modern Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, as well as Hatay and Cilicia. The Commission conducted fieldwork over 42 days in mid-1919, collecting petitions and holding consultations across the region from June 10 to July 21, 1919; 15 days were spent in OETA South, 10 in OETA West, 15 in OETA East, and 2 in OETA North.
With respect to OETA North ("Cilicia"), the Commission "did not endeavor to give thorough hearings... feeling that it is not seriously to be considered a part of Syria, and desiring not to open up as yet the question of the Turkish-speaking portion of the former Turkish Empire." The population estimates included in the report are as follows:Report, Office of the Historian, page 756
OETA South OETA West OETA East Totals Muslims 515,000 600,000 1,250,000 2,365,000 Christians 62,500 400,000 125,000 587,500 Druses 60,000 80,000 140,000 Jews 65,000 15,000 30,000 110,000 Others 5,000 20,000 20,000 45,000 Totals 647,500 1,095,000 1,505,000 Grand Total 3,247,500
The Commission Report, which was published in 1922, concluded that the Middle East was not ready for independence and urged mandates be established on the territories whose purpose was to accompany a process of transition to self-determination.