The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF; ), also known as the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), is an paramilitary umbrella group that operates within Iraq. Although formally and legally part of the Iraqi Armed Forces and reporting directly to the prime minister, PMF leaders act independently from state control and, in practice, answer to the supreme leader of Iran.
The PMF is composed of about 67 primarily Shia armed factions, almost all of which are Iranian-backed and openly pledge allegiance to the supreme leader of Iran.Multiple sources: In 2024, the PMF's chief of staff, Abu Fadak al-Mohammadawi, openly declared that the PMF took orders from Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei's father and predecessor Ali Khamenei. PMF chairman Falih al-Fayyadh cooperates with the Iranian IRGC to implement Iranian instructions in Iraq and reinforce Iranian influence over the militias.
The PMF was formed in 2014 and fought in nearly every major battle during the War in Iraq against the Islamic State. In December 2016, the Council of Representatives passed a law defining the PMF's legal status under the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC; ), including all PMF groups.
Many of its main forces that belong to the Shia faction trace their origins to the "Special Groups", Iranian-sponsored Shia groups that previously fought in the Iraqi insurgency against the United States and the Coalition forces, as well as a simultaneous sectarian conflict against Sunni Jihadist and Ba'athist insurgents. Pro-Iran organizations in the PMF include the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, Saraya Khorasani, etc. Several militant groups received training and strategic aid from Hezbollah's Unit 3800. It has been labeled the new Iraqi Republican Guard after it was fully reorganized in early 2018 by its then commander-in-chief Haider al-Abadi, previous prime minister of Iraq, who issued "regulations to adapt the situation of the Popular Mobilization fighters". Politically, the PMF was represented by the Fatah Alliance.
Factions within the PMF are designated as terrorist groups by some states, including the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan, and have been widely accused of promoting sectarian violence, perpetrating ethnic cleansing and displacement of Iraqi Sunnis, and carrying out war crimes, including abductions, forced disappearances, massacres, extrajudicial killings, and the destructions of villages in Anbar, Saladin, and Diyala, as well as conducting anti-Sunni campaigns described as inherently genocidal. During the 2019–2021 Iraqi protests, the pro-Iran groups were accused of being responsible for killing and wounding large numbers of protesters and activists.Multiple sources: Pro-Iran PMF groups have also fought against pro-Sistani and Sadrist PMF groups, and their increasing rivalry erupted into violent clashes in 2022. Since 2020, Iranian-backed PMF groups have launched attacks against American forces and its allies in the region, claiming them under the name of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.Multiple sources:
Logos and flags
While the factions have their own flags, a yellow or white flag with the phrase "Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi" is also used by PMF alongside the Iraqi flag. PMF factions also frequently hold up Iranian flags and posters of Iranian religious figures such as Ruhollah Khomeini.
Name With regard to the official native name, the Arabic word (ash-Shaʿbī) translates as "people's" or "popular", as referred to the people; the Arabic word (al-Ḥashd) translates as "mobilization" or "Mass", as in the group of people mobilized rather than the process of mobilization. In other contexts, al-hashd may translate as other terms such as "crowd", "horde", "throng", or "gathering".
Background and formation The PMF trace their origins to the so-called Special Groups, a US term to designate Shiite groups of the Iraqi insurgency, supported and funded by the Iranian Quds Force, as opposed to Ba'athist loyalist or radical Sunni Salafi jihadist insurgents.
The Special Groups fought both the US-led coalition forces alongside the Ba'athist and Sunni insurgents in a sectarian conflict. Originally, there were seven forces in the PMF, which had been operating with former prime minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki's support since early 2014.
Original seven groups Badr Brigades (military wing of the Badr Organization) Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (military wing of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqn, IRI-affiliated) Kata'ib Hezbollah (IRI-affiliated) Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (IRI-affiliated) Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (IRI-affiliated) Kata'ib Jund al-Imam Kata'ib al-Imam Ali
Additional groups Imam Ali Combat Division (military wing of Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf) Liwa al-Muntadhar Saraya Ashura Liwa Karbala' Liwa Ali al-Akbar Liwa al-Tafuf Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr (military wing of the Islamic Dawa Party) Turkmen Brigades Saraya al-Jihad Saraya al-Khorasani Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (IRI-affiliated) Tashkil al-Hussein al-Tha'ir Liwa al-Taff Al-Abbas Combat Division Quwat al-Shaheed al-Qa'id Abu Muntadhar al-Muhammadawi Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda Kata'ib Ansar al-Hujja Shabak Brigade Kata'ib al-Tayyar al-Risali (military wing of The Upholders of the Message) Quwat Wa'ad Allah (military wing of the Islamic Virtue Party) Lalish Regiment Liwa al-Hussein Harakat al-Abdal Liwa Ansar al-Marja'iyya Babylon Brigades (military wing of the Babylon Movement) Salah al-Din Brigade Liwa Hashd Shuhada' Kirkuk (military wing of the Union of National Forces Party) Fursan al-Jubur Jaysh al-Mu'ammal Ninawa Guards Saraya al-Salam (military wing of the Sadrist Movement, 2014-2021) Sinjar Resistance Units Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds (IRI-affiliated) Al-Thawriyyun group (IRI-affiliated) Tribal Mobilization Ya Ali Popular Formations (alleged)
According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for the Carnegie Middle East Center, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki used these forces to combat the emergence of ISIL and maintain his influence in predominantly Sunni areas.
The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) were formed by the Iraqi government on 15 June 2014 after top Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani's non-sectarian fatwa on "Sufficiency Jihad" on 13 June. The fatwa called for defending Iraqi cities, particularly Baghdad, and to participate in the counter-offensive against ISIL, following the Fall of Mosul on 10 June 2014. The forces brought together a number of Shia militias, most of which receive direct support from Iran, along with a small number of Sunni tribesmen by uniting existing militias under the "People's Mobilization Committee" of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in June 2014. The forces would fall under the umbrella of the state's security services and within the legal frameworks and practices of the Ministry of Interior. On 19 December 2016, Iraqi president Fuad Masum approved a law passed by parliament in November that incorporated PMU in the country's armed forces. The pro-Assad website Al-Masdar News reports that, with this incorporation, the PMU are now subject to the supreme commander of the national armed forces and will no longer be affiliated to any political or social group. However, many of these irregulars have continued to operate independently of the Iraqi state.
On 21 March 2017, the PMU announced the launch of a special forces course, in order to create a Special Forces Division. The training program covered a variety of missions with direction from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. On December 11, 2017, the PMU began to be entirely consolidated under the Iraqi Armed Forces, following a call by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to integrate. However, as late as May 2018, this integration had yet to take place, and PMF members remained without the same wages and privileges as soldiers in the regular Iraqi Armed Forces.
According to some sources, the Popular Mobilization Forces have made significant advances on the battlefield, as they have undermined the superiority of ISIL at the level of guerrilla warfare, as well as at the level of the psychological operations.
Structure In 2025, the Popular Mobilization Forces are led by a chairman appointed by the prime minister, and a chief of staff. The PMF operates in a decentralized manner.
Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces The chairman of the PMF is assisted by a dedicated office. There are also nine central directorates subordinate to the chairman, being: Administrative Affairs; Doctrinal Guidance; Financial Affairs; Legal Affairs; Media; Planning; Public Relations; Security; Inspector-general of the Popular Mobilization Forces.
Chief of staff of the Popular Mobilization Forces The chief of staff of the Popular Mobilization Forces exercises command over five deputy chiefs of staff, being the: Deputy chief of staff for medical affairs, combatants, and sacrifices; Deputy chief of staff for logistics support; Deputy chief of staff for administrative and personnel affairs; Deputy chief of staff for intelligence and information affairs; Deputy chief of staff for operations affairs.
Operations commands The Popular Mobilization Forces are subdivided into eleven regional-based Operations Commands, being the: Anbar Operations Command Baghdad Operations Command Basra Operations Command Diyala Operations Command Kirkuk and East Tigris Operations Command Jazeera and Badia Operations Command Middle Euphrates Operations Command Ninewa Operations Command Rafidain Operations Command Salah ad Din Operations Command Samarra Operations Command
Active units Unit Commander Parent militias, parties, and tribes 1st Brigade Badr Organization and Liwa al-Imam Muhammad al-Jawad 2nd Brigade Imam Ali Combat Division 3rd Brigade Tashkil Asad Amerli Badr Organization 4th Brigade Badr Organization 5th Brigade (Tashkil al-Karar unit) Abu Dergham al-Maturi (formerly) Badr Organization 6th Brigade Ahmad al-Asadi Kata'ib Jund al-Imam (Islamic Movement in Iraq) 7th Brigade Dagher al-Mousawi Liwa al-Muntadhar 8th Brigade Abu Ahmed Khadhim al-Jabiri