The Directorate of National Coordination or DNC ( – DCN) was the para-commando unit of the Laotian National Police (French: Police Nationale Laotiènne – PNL; Lao: Tamrousat), which was closely modelled after the Royal Thai Police (RTP) Border Patrol Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) commandos and similar in function to the later South Vietnamese National Police Field Force, the DNC was active during the early phase of the Laotian Civil War from 1960 to 1965.
Role The DNC specialized in counter-insurgency, CQB/CQC in urban areas, high-risk tactical law enforcement situations, long-range penetration, operating in difficult to access terrain with commando tactics, special reconnaissance in difficult to access and dangerous areas, and tactical special operations.
Origins The history of the DNC began in the late 1950s when Major general Phoumi Nosavan, the defense minister and strongman of the Kingdom of Laos at the time, appointed his aide de camp Lieutenant colonel Siho Lamphouthacoul as Director General of the Department of National Coordination ();Steiglitz, In a Little Kingdom (1990), p. 96. the exact date of this appointment is uncertain, though it certainly took place in either late 1958 or early 1959.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), pp. 25; 27, note 45; 105-106. When Maj. Gen. Phoumi was deposed by Captain Kong Le's coup in August 1960, it seems not to have curtailed Lt. Col. Siho's power nor the growth of his Directorate of National Coordination. In September of that year, he raised and trained to paramilitary standards two special counter-insurgency battalions ( – BS) within the Laotian National Police (French: Police Nationale Laotiènne – PNL; Lao: Tamrousat), 11 and 33 BS, which were gathered into an incomplete regiment designated 1st Special Mobile Group ( – GMS 1).Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), p. 105.
The DNC in the Laotian civil war
Early GMS 1 operations The new unit soon became involved in Laos' domestic politics during the turbulent period of the early 1960s, with its commander Lt. Col. Siho actively conspiring in Maj. Gen. Phoumi Nosavan's return to power. On 17 November 1960, while acting as Maj. Gen. Phoumi's intelligence officer, he contacted a U.S. Special Forces (USSF) unit, Team Ipsen. Four river gunboats of the Laotian Navy () were positioned in the Mekong River at Ban Sot to block Maj. Gen. Phoumi's troops advance northwards from Savannakhet towards Vientiane. On 19 November, Siho and USSF Team Ipsen set up an ambush for the Laotian Navy gunboats. However, before the boats could show up to spring it, Maj. Gen. Phoumi launched his counter-coup with a combined airborne and amphibious assault on Vientiane. Siho and his GMS 1 battalions boarded Laotian Navy landing crafts in Savannakhet on 21 November to participate in the retaking of Vientiane from Kong Le's rebel Neutralist airborne units.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), p. 37.Stuart-Fox, Historical Dictionary of Laos (2008), pp. 25–26. When Maj. Gen. Phoumi's forces finally reached the Laotian capital, Siho and his paratroopers led the assault on the city. On the last day of the Battle of Vientiane, December 16, GMS 1 successfully captured the Laotian Aviation () military runway at Wattay Airfield.Conboy and McCouaig, South-East Asian Special Forces (1991), p. 17.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), p. 41.
Creation of the DNC When Kong Le and his rebel paratroopers withdrew from Vientiane after Phoumi's coup succeeded, one of the prisoners they took with them was the head of the National Police.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), p. 46, note 39. For his actions during the December 1960 countercoup, Lt. Col. Siho was rewarded with a promotion to Brigadier general and given command of a new paramilitary security organization comprising the police forces of Laos, civil and military, together with the security and information services responsible for propaganda and political action.Conboy and McCouaig, The War in Laos 1960-75 (1989), p. 39.Stuart-Fox, Historical Dictionary of Laos (2008), p. 226. In March 1961 Siho combined his GMS 1 with Laotian National Army or ANL (military intelligence, psychological warfare, and military police units) and PNL (the civil police force and the immigration service) units to form the DNC, which was quickly assigned to the Ministry of Defense.Anthony and Sexton, The War in Northern Laos (1993), p. 98, note 54.
Answering only to Maj. Gen. Phoumi, Brig. Gen. Siho and its new security agency quickly took over police duties in Vientiane, exercising near absolute authority in the capital city and began screening the civilian population for Pathet Lao elements and stragglers, which often led to abuses.Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army advice and support (1981), pp. 72-73. Brig. Gen. Siho's actions cost funding from the U.S. for police training; however, his GMS 1 was considered the most effective paramilitary police unit in the Royal Lao Armed Forces ( – FAR),Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), pp. 105-106. and through Siho's influence, they were the first unit in the PRL and FAR to be completely outfitted with the U.S. automatic M-2 carbine.
DNC operations 1961–1964 The now airborne qualified GMS 1 was soon put to test in April 1961, when they were sent north to prevent Kong Le's Neutralist Armed Forces ( – FAN) troops and their Pathet Lao communist allies from moving down from the Plain of Jars and recapturing Vientiane. On 25 April, they were deployed on the southern bank of the Lik River (Lao language: Nam Lik), successfully blocking the only paved road leading to the capital, Route 13.Anthony and Sexton, The War in Northern Laos (1993), p. 51.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), p. 54.
During the following year a 30-person contingent was sent to Thailand to attend Airborne and Commando courses taught by Royal Thai Police (RTP) instructors from the PARU at their Camp Narusuan training facilities located near Hua Hin in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province. Upon their return they formed the cadre of a new special battalion, 99 BS, which enabled GMS 1 to attain full regimental strength. A DNC training depot and an airborne course were established at Phone Kheng in Vientiane, where 11, 33, and 99 BS were all given parachute training.Conboy and McCouaig, South-East Asian Special Forces (1991), pp. 17-18.
Involvement in illicit activities Once the threat to Vientiane had passed, the DNC settled into a low-level struggle with the Royal Lao Army (RLA) for control of the Vientiane vice trade, with Siho and Kouprasith constantly skirmishing over the corrupt prerequisites of power. Both Generals wanted payoffs for allowing gambling, opium dealing, smuggling, and the importation of essential medicines.Kuzmarov, Modernizing Repression (2012), p. 131. Although originally intended to be used in intelligence-gathering and commando operations and rated as the most capable military unit in Laos, the GMS was primarily kept in Vientiane to support Siho's illicit activities.Conboy and McCouaig, South-East Asian Special Forces (1991), p. 18. In reality, the GMS served principally as Siho's private army, gaining a reputation among the civilian populace for both corruption in police duties and military ability as para-commandos.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), p. 113, note 1. One source refers to them as "gangsters" involved in prostitution, gambling, extortion, sabotage, kidnapping, torture, assassination and political repression.Kuzmarov, Modernizing Repression (2012), pp. 130-131. Siho staffed the DNC with his own non-professional personnel, transferred from the Laotian Army. Many of the senior professional Police officials were transferred or found places in the Army and other government slots. A number of illiterate and otherwise unqualified personnel were allowed to join the LNP over the next four years operation under the DNC; these included 1,600 supporters (the majority illiterate) of Maj. Gen. Phoumi that were added to the force in Savannakhet.Walton, A Survey of the Laos National Police (1965), p. 1.
On 5 November 1961, Brig. Gen. Siho's DNC personnel arrested a FAN intelligence officer who was on business in Vientiane; the detainee was released two days later.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), p. 97. Later on November 29, a DNC unit began irregular operations near Thakhek in the Military Region 3 (Savannakhet).Ahern, Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos (2006), pp. 109-110. However, this action came to an abrupt end in December when Siho's demands for tactical control of the operation through the communications network was refused.Ahern, Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos (2006), p. 111, note 51. In 1963 Brig. Gen. Siho appointed Lieutenant colonel Thao Ty as his replacement at the head of the GMS 1 para-commando regiment.Conboy and McCouaig, The War in Laos 1960-75 (1989), p. 46, Plate G1.
Siho's coup attempt
In February 1964 GMS 1 was brought down to Savannakhet in Military Region 3 to recapture the village of Nong Boua Lao held by Pathet Lao guerrilla forces, which had already repelled several assaults by the RLA. Although the three para battalions successfully assaulted the village, they were withdrawn to conduct yet another coup d'état in VientianeConboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), p. 106. (however, another source states that the GMS battalions were actually withdrawn before they could reach their objective). On 17 April 1964 the Kingdom of Laos Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma made the decision to enter negotiations with the Pathet Lao leader, his communist brother Prince Souphanouvong on the Plain of Jars. Upon learning this, Brig. Gen. Siho decided to take matters into its own hands and stage a pre-emptive coup d'état. The following day, DNC police units seized the capital's public infrastructure and took control of the country.Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam (1993), p. 64. However, the coup of 18 April 1964 was short-lived, as Brig. Gen. Siho received international criticism and was quickly outranked by Major general Kouprasith Abhay, who succeeded in being nominated Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the RLA, whilst his ally Major general Ouane Rattikone became the RLA Commander-in-Chief. In response, Siho changed the GMS designation to Border Police (), and kept a low profile.Anthony and Sexton, The War in Northern Laos (1993), p. 119.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War (1995), p. 123.
The August 1964 coup Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Phoumi's powers were so diminished that he was allowed little input into the successful Operation Triangle of July 1964. However, Phoumi evaded the agreement that ended the 18 April coup, which deprived him of troops to command. He still led a full-strength training battalion in the capital, as well as the cadre for a second, and had a couple of "economic battalions" of RLA veterans at his disposal stationed at Thakhek and Pakse. On 4 August 1964, Phoumi unleashed his training battalion in a new coup attempt. The trainees erected roadblocks throughout Vientiane, but they were promptly crushed by Kouprasith's troops as Siho's DNC sat out the fight.Anthony and Sexton, The War in Northern Laos (1993), pp. 119; 125.
In December 1964, Brig. Gen. Siho detained the socially prominent editor of a Vientiane newspaper, sparking widespread outrage from the military. The DNC and the Royal Lao Army were poised for an armed clash. However, King Sisavang Vatthana was coincidentally in town, and interceded to defuse the situation.
Disbandement
On 1 February 1965 the DNC, which had held de facto control over Vientiane during the previous year, was defeated in yet another coup d'état led by Maj. Gen. Kouprasith, who adroitly kept Brig. Gen. Siho from committing the Border Police to action.