The gas attacks at Wulverghem (30 April and 17 June 1916) were German cloud gas releases during the First World War. The gas was released on British troops at Wulverghem in the municipality of Heuvelland, near Ypres in the Belgian province of West Flanders. The gas attacks were part of the sporadic fighting between battles in the Ypres Salient on the Western Front. The British Second Army held the ground from Messines Ridge northwards to Steenstraat and the divisions opposite the German XXIII Reserve Corps had received warnings of a gas attack. From 21 to 23 April, British artillery-fire exploded several gas cylinders in the German lines around Spanbroekmolen, which released greenish-yellow clouds. A gas alert was given on 25 April when the wind began to blow from the north-east and routine work was suspended; on 29 April, two German soldiers deserted and warned that an attack was imminent. Just after midnight on 30 April, the German attack began and over no man's land, a gas cloud drifted on the wind into the British defences, then south-west towards Bailleul.
The gas used at Wulverghem was a mixture of chlorine and phosgene, which had been used against British troops on 19 December 1915 in the phosgene attack at Wieltje, north-east of Ypres. This and earlier gas attacks, beginning at the Second Battle of Ypres (21 April – 25 May 1915) had given the British time to replace improvised gas masks with effective mass-produced versions, obtain other anti-gas equipment and to establish anti-gas procedures. Helmets impregnated with chemicals to neutralise chlorine had been issued in several variants, each more effective than the last. By April 1916, British troops had PH helmets and some specialist troops like machine-gunners, were equipped with box respirators. The German gas attack at Wulverghem on 30 April, caused the defenders casualties and fatalities but German raiding parties, looking for mine entrances to destroy, were repulsed with small-arms and artillery fire. A second attempt by the Germans on 17 June caused about the same number of gas casualties but the British again easily repulsed German patrols.
Background
1915
Second Battle of Ypres
During the evening of 22 April 1915, German pioneers released chlorine gas which drifted into the positions of the French 87th Territorial and the 45th Algerian divisions, on the north side of the salient and caused many of the troops to run back from the cloud, leaving a gap in the Allied line. The German attack was a strategic diversion, rather than a breakthrough attempt and insufficient forces were available to follow up the success. As soon as German troops tried to advance into areas not affected by the gas, Allied small-arms and artillery fire dominated the area and halted the German advance. The surprise gained against the French was increased by the lack of protection against gas and because the psychological effect of the insidious nature of the substance. A soldier could evade bullets and shells but gas seeped into trenches and dugouts and had a ghastly, slow, choking effect. The gas was quickly identified as chlorine and the first Allied mass-produced anti-gas helmet was a flannel bag soaked in glycerine, hyposulphite and sodium bicarbonate.
19 December 1915
On 19 December 1915, the German 4th Army conducted an attack at Ypres using a new gas, a mixture of chlorine and phosgene, a much more lethal concoction. The British took a prisoner who disclosed the intended gas attack and gleaned information from other sources, which led to the divisions of VI Corps being alerted from 15 December. The gas discharge was accompanied by German raiding parties, most of which were engaged by small-arms fire, while attempting to cross no-man's land. The British anti-gas precautions were successful and prevented a panic or a collapse of the defence, even though British anti-gas helmets had not been treated to repel phosgene. Only the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division had a large number of gas casualties, caused by soldiers in reserve lines not being warned of the gas in sufficient time to put on their anti-gas helmets. A study by British medical authorities counted casualties, of whom died. After the operation, German opinion concluded that a breakthrough could not be achieved solely by the use of gas.
1916
First Army front
A German gas attack took place from 27 to 29 April, by divisions of the II Bavarian Corps against I Corps on the First Army front near Loos-en-Gohelle. Just before dawn on 27 April, the 16th (Irish) Division and part of the 15th (Scottish) Division were subjected to a German cloud gas attack, near Hulluch. The gas cloud and artillery bombardment were followed by raiding parties, which made temporary lodgements in the British lines. Two days later there was another gas attack, which blew back over the German lines and caused a large number of German casualties, increased by British troops firing at German soldiers as they fled in the open. The gas was a mixture of chlorine and phosgene, which was of sufficient concentration to penetrate the British PH gas helmets. The 16th (Irish) Division was unjustly blamed for poor gas discipline and it was put about that the gas helmets of the division were of inferior manufacture to allay doubts as to the effectiveness of the helmet. Production of the M2 gas mask, which had worked well during the attack, was accelerated.
Second Army front In late April 1916, the centre of the Second Army (General Herbert Plumer) front was held by V Corps (Lieutenant-General Hew Fanshawe) from the Warneton road south of Messines, for to the south-west of St Eloi. The front line ran from the valley of the river Douvre, up the Wulverghem spur and then curved back over the Ypres ridge south-west of Wytschaete, then along the lower west slopes of the ridge, north-east to the corps boundary. From the German trenches higher on the ridges, observers overlooked the British positions. On 29 April, the V Corps front was held by the 24th Division (Major-General John Capper) and the 3rd Division (Major-General Aylmer Haldane), after the 3rd Division had relieved the 50th (Northumbrian) Division (Major-General P. S. Wilkinson), which had moved into reserve in villages back. The two divisional sectors were divided into three brigade areas, with two battalions in each. There were front and support trenches, two lines of strong points and Wulverghem Switch, a reserve line.
Since the Actions of the Bluff and The Actions of St Eloi Craters the Second Army front from Armentières northwards to Boesinghe had been quiet, except for frequent German artillery bombardments on the front line and rear communications of the British defences. The bombardments were predictable, which made them easy to evade. The British had dug a shallow network of defensive mines and begun work on a deeper system, preparatory to an attack to recapture Messines Ridge. Secrecy was vital but the German bombardments blocked routes to the mine shafts and prevented the removal of spoil. During April, there was little underground activity, with only seven German mines sprung on the Second Army front but on 24 April, a deep mine dug by the British under La Petite Douve Farm was demolished.
Prelude
German preparations Gas cylinders were placed along the front of the XXIII Reserve Corps, with the 45th Reserve Division and the 123rd Division, opposite V Corps. Reserve Infantry Regiment 209 of the 45th Reserve Division held the divisional front and a party of Reserve Infantry Regiment 210, consisting of and men, was organised to conduct a patrol in force and destroy mine galleries during the gas attack. The men of Reserve Infantry Regiment 209 disliked gas operations, since they had to carry the cylinders and live next to them before the discharge, which led to many gas casualties from cylinders damaged by British artillery-fire; the troops had to sleep wearing gas masks. The plan was set for 26 April then postponed, with the orders for the attack being issued at on 29 April, for the gas discharge to begin at At listening-posts were withdrawn and when the code words 'issue rations' () were received, the gas was to be released from and cylinders for The sound of the gas was to be masked by small-arms fire.
British anti-gas procedures
Standing orders for anti-gas precautions had been enforced by the British after the gas attacks earlier in 1915. The state of the wind was monitored by an officer in each corps area and during conditions favourable for a gas release a "Gas Alert" was issued. A sentry was posted near every alarm horn or gong, at every dug-out big enough for ten men, each group of smaller dugouts and at signal offices. Gas helmets and alarms were tested every twelve hours and all soldiers wore the helmet outside the greatcoat or rolled up on their heads, with the top greatcoat button undone to tuck the helmet in. Special lubricants were provided for the working parts of weapons in forward positions.
Intelligence
From 20 to 30 April, the British received indications that a German gas attack was likely. From 21 to 23 April, gas cylinders in the German front line were exploded by British artillery-fire for about a length of the German front line near Spanbroekmolen and green-yellow clouds were seen to drift along the German front line. When the wind began to blow from the north-east on 25 April, the gas alert was issued. On 26 April, two German deserters surrendered to the British near Spanbroekmolen and disclosed that gas cylinders had recently been installed, ready to be used as soon as there was a favourable wind. As a precaution against German raiding parties, the deep mine entrances were filled in and disguised; the 3rd Division stopped all wiring and working parties to minimise the number of detached parties who might not receive a gas warning. The 24th Division carried on as normal, except for ration parties and runners who might be vulnerable if artillery-fire smothered the sound of gas alarms.
Late on 29 April, two more Germans deserted from the Spanbroekmolen area to the positions of the 76th Brigade of the 3rd Division. The Germans said that an attack was due that night or in the early morning. The Brigade headquarters (HQ) reported the news to the division HQ and to the flanking brigades, which issued warnings by and men went forward of the front line to listen for gas. A warning from a meteorologist, that the wind was too fast for a gas attack was kept confidential. The British infantry had PH anti-gas helmets but were close to the German front line, which would mean that a gas discharge would be dense when it arrived. If the gas was released after dark, vision through the helmet eye-pieces would be poor, particularly since the new moon was only two days away.
Attacks
30 April
Just after midnight, German small-arms fire began along the fronts of the 73rd and 72nd brigades, in the centre and left of the 24th Division and the 76th Brigade on the right flank of the 3rd Division. Soon after, a gas discharge began on a front from La Petite Douve Farm to Spanbroekmolen. (In German reports of the operation, the gas was said to rise above head-height and was illuminated by British flares. British return-fire began and after five minutes, artillery-fire commenced.) Along most of the line, German rifle and machine-gun fire blanketed the hiss of gas and smothered the sound of alarm gongs and klaxons. The first warning for many British soldiers, was the smell, since with the wind speed and no man's land being only wide in places, the gas arrived without warning. The British donned their helmets and a volley of Very lights revealed the gas cloud. German artillery began a bombardment behind the British front on artillery positions, observation posts, support trenches and strong points.