Operation Pamphlet, also called Convoy Pamphlet, was a World War II convoy operation conducted during January and February 1943 to transport the 9th Australian Division home from Egypt. The convoy involved five transports, which were protected from Japanese warships by several Allied naval task forces during the trip across the Indian Ocean and along the Australian coast. The division embarked in late January 1943 and the convoy operation began on 4 February. No contact was made between Allied and Japanese ships, and the division arrived in Australian ports during late February with no losses from enemy action.
The operation came after the British and United States governments agreed to an Australian government request that the 9th Division be returned home, and ended the role of the Second Australian Imperial Force in the Western Desert Campaign. This followed a lengthy debate between the respective national leaders, with Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt attempting to convince the Australian Prime Minister John Curtin to withdraw his request until the Allied victory in North Africa was complete. Curtin was unwilling to delay, as he and the Allied military leaders in the South West Pacific believed that the veteran division was needed to bolster the forces for offensive operations in New Guinea.
A convoy to return the 9th Australian Division to Australia was assembled in the Red Sea near Massawa from late January to early February 1943. The ships began their voyage across the Indian Ocean on 4 February, refuelled at Addu Atoll, and arrived safely at the Western Australian port of Fremantle on 18 February. Four transports continued to the Australian east coast, one docking at Melbourne on 25 February and the remainder arriving at Sydney two days later. After its return to Australia, the division made an important contribution to operations in New Guinea in late 1943.
Background
During 1940 and 1941, three infantry divisions and other units assigned to I Corps of the Second Australian Imperial Force (AIF) were transported to the Middle East, where they took part in several campaigns against German, Italian and Vichy French forces.Faulkner and Wilkinson (2012), p. 168 Following the outbreak of the Pacific War, the corps headquarters and the 6th and 7th Divisions were returned to Australia in early 1942 to reinforce the defence of Australia in Operation Stepsister. The Australian Government agreed to British and United States requests temporarily to retain the 9th Australian Division in the Middle East in exchange for the deployment of more United States Army units to Australia and British support for a proposal to expand the Royal Australian Air Force to 73 flying squadrons.Hasluck (1970), pp. 73–87, 177 The 9th Division played an important role in the First Battle of El Alamein during July 1942 and the Second Battle of El Alamein between 23 October and 4 November.Coates (2006), pp. 166–176 The division suffered many casualties during the latter engagement and did not take part in the pursuit of the Axis retreat.Long (1973), pp. 283–284
Several factors influenced the decision made by the Australian Government in October 1942 to recall the 9th Division to Australia. Most importantly, the Government and the commander of the Australian Military Forces, General Thomas Blamey, wanted to relieve the 6th and 7th Divisions from combat in the New Guinea Campaign and Blamey considered the 9th Division to be better prepared for this responsibility than the Australian Army's militia forces or US Army units.Hasluck (1970), pp. 193, 202 The commander of Allied forces in the South West Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur, had also been pressing the US and Australian Governments for reinforcements to conduct offensive operations against Japanese positions. Other factors influencing the Australian Government's decision were a desire to concentrate the Australian Army in a single theatre, the increasing difficulty of finding replacements for the 9th Division's casualties given the Army's manpower shortages, the political difficulties associated with implementing reforms to permit militia units to serve outside Australian territory, and concerns that a prolonged absence from Australia would affect morale among the 9th Division's soldiers.Hasluck (1970), pp. 193–194
On 17 October 1942, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin cabled British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to request that the 9th Division be returned to Australia. In the cable Curtin stated that, owing to Australia's manpower shortage and the demands of the war in the Pacific, it was no longer possible to provide enough reinforcements to sustain the division in the Middle East. The British Government initially resisted this request on the grounds that the 9th Division was required for the upcoming offensive at El Alamein. On 29 October (six days into the battle) Curtin again cabled Churchill, stating that Australia needed the division in the Pacific and in a fit state to participate in offensive operations.Long (1973), p. 285 On 1 November, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to Curtin proposing to send another US Army division to Australia if the Australian Government agreed to retain the 9th Division in the Middle East. Curtin, acting on the advice of MacArthur, responded to Roosevelt on 16 November rejecting this suggestion, and again requested that the 9th Division be returned.Maughan (1966), p. 749
On 21 November, the commander of the 9th Division, Major General Leslie Morshead, was informed by General Harold Alexander, the commander-in-chief of the Middle East Command, that a decision had been made to return the division to Australia. Churchill told the Australian Government on 2 December that while he was prepared to recommend to Roosevelt that the 9th Division be returned, the resultant diversion of shipping would reduce the size of the build-up of United States military forces in Britain and North Africa by 30,000 men. In the same cable, Churchill also stated that due to a shortage of shipping the 9th Division's heavy equipment would need to remain in the Middle East.Hasluck (1970), p. 201 On 3 December, Roosevelt again wrote to Curtin to suggest that the 9th Division remain in the Middle East until the final defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa. Roosevelt also informed Curtin that the US Army's 25th Infantry Division would be transferred to Australia during December. Following these messages the Australian Government sought advice from Blamey and MacArthur on whether it was necessary for the 9th Division to return with its heavy equipment, and was informed that the necessary supplies could be sourced from American resources once the unit arrived in Australia.Maughan (1966), p. 750
Curtin replied to Churchill and Roosevelt on 8 December, and again stressed the need to return the 9th Division to Australia as soon as possible to make good the Army's losses to tropical diseases and prepare for future offensives in the Pacific. In his message he agreed to leave the division's heavy equipment in the Middle East, and requested only that it travel with items necessary to quickly re-enter combat in the South West Pacific.Hasluck (1970), p. 202 No further debate took place, and on 15 December Churchill informed Curtin that shipping would be made available in late January to transport the division and a small portion of its equipment to Australia.
Preparations
The 9th Division's role in the Second Battle of El Alamein ended on 5 November 1942.Maughan (1966), p. 742 From 30 November the division travelled to Palestine by road, and all its units arrived there by 9 December. After settling into camps located between Gaza and Qastina, the 9th Division undertook a period of rebuilding and training, and many soldiers were granted leave.Maughan (1966), pp. 747–748 On 22 December, a formal parade involving the entire division was conducted at Gaza Airport.Maughan (1966), pp. 751–752
Preparations to return the 9th Division to Australia began in late December 1942. On 26 December, all of the AIF unit commanding officers in the Middle East were informed that their commands were to return to Australia; the movement was code-named "Liddington". Tight security was instituted, and more junior personnel who needed to be informed were told that their units were being transferred to Egypt. Many members of the AIF initially believed that they would take part in further fighting in the Mediterranean, but as preparations continued it became obvious that the units were about to undertake a long sea voyage. The 9th Division's artillery, tanks and other heavy equipment were transferred to ordnance depots during early January 1943, and on the 16th of that month the division began moving to the Suez Canal area, from where it was to embark.Maughan (1966), p. 753 During this period all of the personnel assigned to the AIF Reinforcement Depot in Palestine were transferred to the 9th Division, resulting in the formation being larger than its authorised strength.Dean (2018), p. 288 The movement of the 9th Division took place in groups, each of which spent one or two days at a transit camp at Qassin, where all vehicles were handed to British authorities. The 9th Division also began training for jungle and amphibious warfare before departing the Middle East. During January, each brigade spent three days exercising in the rough terrain near Bayt Jibrin, which was believed to be the nearest equivalent to a jungle in Palestine. Most of the brigade commanders and several officers from each of the infantry battalions also attended short courses at the British amphibious warfare school on the Bitter Lakes in Egypt.Threlfall (2014), pp. 160–162
The Royal Navy also made preparations in late 1942 for the movement of the 9th Division back to Australia. Four large troop ships were allocated to the task, and the British Chiefs of Staff Committee initially proposed to Churchill that they sail across the Indian Ocean without a protective escort. However, as the eastern Indian Ocean was within range of Japanese warships based at Singapore and Japanese submarines had occasionally attacked ships near Aden, this was judged to be unacceptably risky, especially as it was not likely that the movement of so many soldiers could be kept secret.Day (1993), p. 91 Moreover, transporting the division without an escort would have violated the long-standing policy of assigning at least one capital ship to protect troop convoys in this region, and would not have been accepted by the Australian government. In November, the Chiefs of Staff Committee decided to allocate an escort to the convoy, but did not specify what it should comprise.Day (1993), p. 92
The ships assigned to carry the 9th Division to Australia were the converted ocean liners Aquitania, Île de France, Nieuw Amsterdam and Queen Mary; these four large vessels had previously carried Australian soldiers to the Middle East and other locations.Plowman (2003), p. 366 The liners were heavily tasked transporting Allied military personnel across long distances, and arrived at Suez individually. Aquitania put in from Australia on 5 January, Queen Mary was reassigned from transporting American personnel across the Atlantic and arrived from the United Kingdom on 18 January, Nieuw Amsterdam completed one of her frequent voyages along the coast of East Africa on 31 January and Île de France arrived in late January.Plowman (2003), pp. 367–372 In addition to the four converted liners, the armed merchant cruiser HMS Queen of Bermuda was transferred from transport duties in the Indian Ocean to both augment the convoy's escort and embark Australian personnel.Plowman (2003), pp. 370–371 The four liners were armed with anti-aircraft guns operated by dedicated personnel, as well as two 6-inch guns each. The operation to sail these vessels from Egypt to Australia together was designated Operation Pamphlet.