The first Battle of Lechfeld (the first Battle of Augsburg in Hungarian historiography), fought on 12 June 910, was an important victory by a Hungarian army over the combined forces of East Francia and Swabia (Alamannia) under the nominal command of Louis the Child.Charles R. Bowlus, The Battle of Lechfeld and Its Aftermath, August 955: The End of the Age of Migrations in the Latin West, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006, p. 166 Located approximately south of Augsburg, the Lechfeld is the floodplain that lies along the river Lech. At this time the Grand Prince of the Hungarians was Zoltán, but there is no record of him taking part in the battle. After the battle, the victorious Hungarians broke into Franconia for the first time. On 22 June in Franconia, the same Hungarian army defeated a united army of the duchies of Franconia, Lotharingia and Bavaria in the Battle of Rednitz. The Bavarian, Frankish, Swabian and Saxonian duchies became taxpayers of the Hungarians. As consequence of this victory, in the next year, Hungarian attacks launched from the Carpathian Basin crossed the Rhine for the first time in 911.

The battle is an example of successful use of the feigned retreat and Parthian shot tactics, usually carried out by nomadic warriors, and highlighting the effective use of psychological warfare.

Sources Sources include Antapodosis, seu rerum per Europam gestarum, written by Liutprand of Cremona,Györffy György: A magyarok elődeiről és a honfoglalásról; Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002 pp. 213–214 From Antapodosis of Liutprand of Cremona. Hungarian translation from the original Latin of those parts, which are about the Hungarians. Continuator Reginonis, Annales Alamannici,Werra, Joseph, Über den Continuator Reginonis and the necrologies of the Swabian counts Gozbert and Managolt, who were killed in this battle. The chronicle Annalium Boiorum VII, written in the 16th century by the Bavarian humanist Johannes Aventinus, gives a detailed narration of the battle, relying on older documents which today are lost. However, he errs in dating this battle to 907, soon after the Battle of Pressburg, mistakenly locates it at Ennsburg in Bavaria, and instead of Swabians, names the Bavarians as participants.Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 481. Original Latin text: "Quidam similitudine nominum, quae una duntaxat literula distant, decepti, hanc cladem Boios accepisse tradunt ad Augustam Rhetiae, quae Teutonum sermone Auspurg, ut Anasiburgium Ansburg nuncupatur." English translation from the Latin: "Some people, fooled by the similarity of the names which are differentiated only by a single letter, say that the Bavarians were massacred at Augusta Rhetia, named by them in the language of the Teutons Augsburg, as well as it is named in the tongue of the Anasiburgians as Ansburg"

Location and date The majority of historians accept the date and place of the battle given by Liutprand as 910 and Augsburg, respectively. Although the Antapodosis was written in the 950s, only a few decades after the battle, the Hungarian historian Torma Béla believes that Aventinus, who wrote in the 16th century, was correct when he placed the battle in 907 and at Ennsburg, not Augsburg.Torma Béla Megjegyzések a 907. és 910. Évi magyar kalandozások időrendjéhez , Hadtörténelmi közlemények, 125. évf., 2012/2, pp. 463–482. However, this represents a dissenting opinion from other historians, who believe that the near-contemporary Liutprand's information is more accurate.

Background

This battle was part of the war in the Carpathian Basin between the newly-settled Hungarians and the kingdom of East Francia, which lasted from the Hungarian conquest of Transdanubia from the Bavarians in 900, until the Battle of Rednitz in 910. After the Battle of Pressburg in 907, the Hungarians continued their campaigns against East Francia. In 908 a Hungarian army invaded Thuringia and were victorious at Eisenach, killing the co-dukes Burchard and Egino, as well as Rudolf I, Bishop of Würzburg. In 909 a Hungarian army invaded Bavaria, but it was defeated by Arnulf, Duke of Bavaria in a minor battle near Pocking.

Prelude Possibly desirous of repeating the victorious campaigns of his ancestor Charles the Great against the Avars which ended with the subjugation of the latter (though unmindful of the fate of Luitpold in the Battle of Pressburg three years earlier), King Louis decided that forces from all the German duchies should come together to fight the Hungarians. He even threatened with execution those who would not gather under his flag.Györffy György: A magyarok elődeiről és a honfoglalásról; Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002 p. 213 From Antapodosis of Liutprand of Cremona. Hungarian translation from the original Latin: "Lajos király tehát látva népének pusztulását és a magyarok kegyetlenkedését, övéinek lelkét feltüzeli ama fenyegetésével, hogyha valaki történetesen kivonná magát ebből a hadjáratból, amelyet a magyarokkal szemben szándékozik viselni, az ilyen kétségen kívül akasztófán fogja végezni." English translation from the Hungarian: King Louis, seeing the destruction suffered by his people, and the atrocities committed by the Magyars, instigated them [the Germans] with the threat, that if anyone would hang back from this campaign, which he wanted to lead against the Hungarians, without doubt that person would be hanged" So we can presume that Louis gathered a "huge army," as Liutprand terms it in his Antapodosis.Györffy György: A magyarok elődeiről és a honfoglalásról; Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002 p. 213 The exact size of the Frankish army is not known, but it can be assumed that it was far more numerous than the Hungarian army. This explains why the Magyars were so cautious during the battle, and waited an unusually long time (more than twelve hours), sapping the strength of the enemy little by little with hit-and-run tactics as well as using psychological methods to confuse them, before taking the decisive tactical step.

The historian Igaz Levente states that the Hungarian campaign of 910 was started in order to prevent another German campaign against the Hungarian territories like the one from 907, which ended in disaster for the Western army in the battle of Pressburg. Although it was a crushing Hungarian victory, the Magyars thought that it is safer to conduct military operations in Germany rather than in their own lands.Igaz Levente, "... A király maga is csodálkozik azon, hogy ő, a győztes, legyőzötté vált...", Belvedere Meridionale, 2012/2, p. 6 This Hungarian campaign is often cited as a brilliant example of the preventive war strategy.Igaz Levente 2010, p. 6

The king and his troops arrived near the city of Augsburg, on the plains of Gunzenle, near the Lech river, and waited for the Frankish army led by Gebhard, Duke of Lorraine to appear and join them against the Hungarians. The king's army was led by Count Gozbert,Reuter, Timothy. Germany in the Early Middle Ages 800–1056. New York: Longman, 1991, p. 129 because Louis was only 16 years old at the time. We do not know who led the Hungarians, inasmuch as the Grand Prince of the Hungarians in the ninth and tenth centuries never took part in a battle outside of the Hungarian territories, the campaigns being led by more minor military leaders—possibly the gyula,Szabados György: Magyar államalapítások a IX–XI. században; Szegedi Középkori Könyvtár, Szeged, 2011, p. 201 the horka or one of the princes.

The Hungarians learned about the plans of Louis, and quickly sent an army to prevent the joining of the Swabian and Frankish-Lotharingian-Bavarian forces. From the work of Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum volume VII, we can reconstruct their route: After they had crossed Bavaria via the River Enns, they reached Augsburg through Tegernsee, then Sandau near to Landsberg am Lech.Kristó Gyula: Levedi törzsszövetségétől Szent István Államáig; Magvető Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1980, p. 239 They reached Augsburg through forced march very quickly, totally unexpected by his army.Werra, Joseph: Über den Continuator Reginonis; Gressner & Schramm, Leipzig, 1883, p. 69 Annales Alamannici for the year 910, Latin text: "Ungari in Alamanniam; bello insperato. ". English translation: Hungarians in Alamannia; an unexpected war". This is further proof of the incredible efficiency of espionage due to its emphasis by the Principality of Hungary and other states of the nomadic warriors.Göckenjan, Hansgerd: Felderítők és kémek. Tanulmány a nomád hadviselés stratégiájáról és taktikájáról (Scouts and spies. A study of the strategy and tactics of the nomadic warfare). In: Nomád népvándorlások, magyar honfoglalás; Balassi Kiadó, Budapest, 2001, pp. 57–66 (about the Hungarian intelligence: pp. 61–63) The unexpected appearance of the Hungarians before the battle of Augsburg makes it hard to believe that it was only a coincidence. This shows that Hungarian intelligence worked very effectively not only within Hungary, but also in enemy territory, making possible the rapid movement of military operations onto the opponent's land. As Liutprand of Cremona mentions, the king did not expect that the Hungarians would appear in his territory so quickly.Györffy György 2002 p. 214 From Antapodosis of Liutprand of Cremona. Hungarian translation from the original Latin: "Lajos király már megérkezett összetoborzott sokaságával Augsburgba, amikor jelentik azt a nem remélt, vagy inkább nem óhajtott hírt, hogy e nép ott van a szomszédságukban." English translation from the Hungarian: King Louis with his recruited crowd [huge army] arrived to Augsburg, when he was informed of the unhoped, better to say unwished news that this people [the Hungarians] is in his neighborhood" So his plans of uniting all of his forces: his mostly Swabian troops and the Frankish-Lotharingian-Bavarian army, before the battle, failed because of the remarkable espionage of the nomadic Hungarian state and the superior mobility of the Magyar army, which made possible for them to defeat these two armies separately. In conclusion we can say that the Hungarian spies learned of the preparations of the Frankish armies and informed the Magyar commanders so quickly, that these had the time to gather an army and move into the German territory so quickly that the Eastern Franks had no time not only to reach Hungary, but even to finish the concentration of their troops, and start to move towards it. Still, from the account of Liutprand of Cremona it can be understood that, even without the Frankish help, the king's army had many more soldiers than the Hungarians.

One historian supposes that a small Hungarian unit kept the Frankish army busy until the Battle of Augsburg ended. Hungarian nomadic warriors used similar tactics elsewhere. They distracted enemies with simple maneuvers to hide the real tactical movement and intent. An example is the Battle of the Brenta.Lipp Tamás: Árpád és Kurszán; Kozmosz Könyvek, Budapest, 1988, pp. 97–99

Battle