Operation Goodwood was a series of British carrier air raids conducted against the German battleship Tirpitz at her anchorage in Kaafjord in occupied Norway during late August 1944. It was the last of several attacks made by the Home Fleet during 1944 which sought to damage or sink Tirpitz and thereby eliminate the threat it posed to Allied shipping. Previous raids on Kaafjord conducted by Fleet Air Arm aircraft had involved only one air attack; in Operation Goodwood several attacks were made in a single week. The Royal Navy hoped that these raids would wear down the formidable German defences.
The British fleet departed its base on 18 August and launched the first raid against Kaafjord on the morning of 22 August. The attack failed, and a small raid that evening inflicted little damage. Attacks were conducted on 24 and 29 August and were also failures. Tirpitz had been hit by two bombs during the raid on 24 August, but neither caused significant damage. British losses during Operation Goodwood were 17 aircraft to all causes, a frigate sunk by a submarine, and an escort carrier badly damaged. German forces suffered the loss of 12 aircraft and damage to 7 ships.
In late August 1944, responsibility for attacking Tirpitz was transferred to the Royal Air Force. In three heavy bomber raids conducted during September and October 1944, the battleship was first crippled and then sunk. Historians regard Operation Goodwood as a significant failure for the Fleet Air Arm and attribute its results to the shortcomings of the force's aircraft and their armament.
Background From early 1942, Tirpitz posed a significant threat to the Allied convoys transporting supplies through the Norwegian Sea to the Soviet Union. Stationed in fjords on the Norwegian coast, the battleship was capable of overwhelming the close-escort forces assigned to the Arctic convoys or breaking out into the North Atlantic.Ellis (1999), pp. 294–295 To counter this threat, the Allies needed to keep a powerful force of warships with the British Home Fleet, and capital ships accompanied most convoys part of the way to the Soviet Union.Bennett (2012), p. 9Faulkner and Wilkinson (2012), p. 109
Several air and naval attacks were launched against Tirpitz in 1942 and 1943. On 6 March 1942, torpedo bombers flying from the aircraft carrier attacked the battleship while she was attempting to intercept Convoy PQ 12 but did not achieve any hits.Bennett (2012), p. 11Bishop (2012), pp. 78–83 Bombers from the Royal Air Force and Soviet Air Forces also attempted to strike Tirpitz in her anchorages several times in 1942 and 1943 but failed to inflict any damage. On 23 September 1943, two British X-class midget submarines penetrated the defences around the battleship's main anchorage at Kaafjord in northern Norway during Operation Source, and placed explosive charges in the water beneath her. This attack caused extensive damage to Tirpitz, putting her out of service for six months.Woodman (2004), p. 340
Following Operation Source, the task of attacking Tirpitz was assigned to the Home Fleet's aircraft carriers. Following months of preparations, a successful attack (Operation Tungsten) involving two strike forces of 20 Fairey Barracuda dive bombers escorted by 40 fighters was conducted on 3 April 1944. While Tirpitzs crew suffered heavy casualties during this operation, the battleship was not badly damaged.Bennett (2012), pp. 14–17 Nevertheless, she was placed out of action for several additional months while repairs were completed.Garzke and Dulin (1985), p. 267
The Home Fleet initiated a further four raids against Tirpitz between April and July 1944, though the battleship was only attacked during the last of these operations. These attacks were hindered by the transfer of many of the Home Fleet's airmen to other units following Operation Tungsten, as the replacement aircrew were less experienced.Zetterling and Tamelander (2009), p. 283 The first raid (Operation Planet) began on 21 April, but it was cancelled three days later when agents stationed near Kaafjord reported bad weather over the target area. The Home Fleet put to sea to attack Tirpitz again in mid-May in what was designated Operation Brawn.Zetterling and Tamelander (2009), p. 280Bishop (2012), p. 310 A strike force of 27 Barracudas escorted by Vought F4U Corsair and Supermarine Seafire fighters took off from the carriers and Victorious on 15 May, but returned to the ships without attacking after they encountered heavy clouds over Kaafjord.Brown (1977), p. 36 The next raid, Operation Tiger Claw, was initiated in late May but cancelled due to bad weather on the 28th of the month. The subsequent attack (Operation Mascot) was timed for mid-July, before the resumption of the Arctic convoys, which had been suspended since April 1944 in order to free ships for the Normandy landings.Tarrant (1994), p. 129 The strike force of 44 Barracudas and 40 fighters dispatched on 17 July reached the target area, but found Tirpitz cloaked in a protective smokescreen and the attack failed to inflict any damage on the battleship.
Preparations
In the weeks after Operation Mascot, Tirpitz continued to prepare for potential combat operations. Following trials in the sheltered waters of Altafjord, she put to sea on 31 July and 1 August to train with her protective destroyers. Additional smoke generators were also installed around Kaafjord to improve the area's already strong defences.Bishop (2012), p. 311 These activities were reported by spies, and the British Admiralty interpreted them to mean that Tirpitz was being readied for a raid against Allied shipping. To defend against this threat, it was decided to conduct further attacks against the battleship at her anchorage in Kaafjord at the time of the next series of Arctic convoys.Sweetman (2000), p. 78 In reality, the German Navy was not planning to use Tirpitz offensively as she would be very vulnerable to the superior Allied naval and air forces if she put to sea. Instead, the battleship was being maintained in active service to tie down Allied warships and aircraft.Bishop (2012), pp. 316–317
The failure of Operation Mascot convinced the commander of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Henry Moore, that the Fleet Air Arm's main strike aircraft, the Fairey Barracuda dive bomber, was not suited to operations against Kaafjord. As the dive bombers' slow speed gave the defenders of Kaafjord enough time to cover Tirpitz in a smoke screen between the time incoming raids were detected and their arrival over the target area, Moore concluded that further attacks using these aircraft would be futile. However, the Admiralty judged that repeatedly striking Kaafjord with Barracudas over a 48-hour period might wear down the German defences and exhaust the supply of fuel for Tirpitzs protective smoke generators. Consideration was also given to flying fast and long-ranged de Havilland Mosquito bombers off the carriers in an attempt to achieve surprise, but none of these land-based aircraft could be spared from supporting the Allied bombing of Germany. Despite his misgivings, Moore agreed to make another attempt to strike Tirpitz.Roskill (1961), p. 156
As proposed by the Admiralty, Moore's plans for the new attack on Kaafjord involved the Home Fleet's aircraft attacking the region over several days. While the fighter aircraft involved in the previous raids had used only their machine guns to strafe German defences in order to reduce the threat they posed to the Barracudas, it was decided to use some of these aircraft as dive bombers during Operation Goodwood. In preparation, the two squadrons of Corsairs and a single squadron of Grumman F6F Hellcats selected to participate in the attack received training in dive-bombing tactics during the period between Operations Mascot and Goodwood. Another new element of the plans was a decision to use Fleet Air Arm aircraft to drop mines near Tirpitz and the entrance to Kaafjord. The mines dropped near the battleship were to be fitted with time-delay fuses, and it was hoped that the explosions of these devices would cause Tirpitzs captain to try to move the warship into safer waters and pass through the minefield at the fjord's entrance.Zetterling and Tamelander (2009), pp. 282–283Brown (1977), p. 37 During the period before Operation Goodwood, the Home Fleet's flying squadrons conducted training exercises using a target range at Loch Eriboll in northern Scotland; the terrain in this area is comparable to that around Kaafjord, and the loch had also been used for this purpose as part of the preparations for Operation Tungsten.Sweetman (2000), p. 79Bishop (2012), p. 297
Opposing forces The Operation Goodwood attack fleet was divided into three groups. Admiral Moore embarked on board the battleship , which sailed with the fleet aircraft carriers (the flagship of Rear Admiral Rhoderick McGrigor, commander of the 1st Cruiser Squadron), and Furious, as well as two cruisers and fourteen destroyers. The second force comprised the escort carriers and , cruiser and a group of frigates. A pair of fleet oilers escorted by four corvettes sailed separately to support the two attack groups.Roskill (1961), p. 159
The aircraft carriers embarked the largest group of Fleet Air Arm aircraft assembled up to that point in the war. Their main striking element was the 35 Barracudas assigned to 820, 826, 827, and 828 Naval Air Squadrons which operated from the three fleet carriers. The two units of 6 Naval Fighter Wing, 1841 and 1842 Squadrons, flew 30 Corsairs from Formidable. A total of 48 Seafires were assigned to 801, 880, 887 and 894 Squadrons on board Indefatigable and Furious. In addition, 1770 and 1840 Squadrons operated 12 Fairey Firefly and 12 Hellcat fighters respectively from Indefatigable. The two escort carriers embarked a total of 20 Grumman TBF Avengers (which had responsibility for the mine-dropping element of Operation Goodwood) and 8 Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters; these aircraft were split between 846 Squadron on board Trumpeter and 852 Squadron on Nabob.Brown (2009), p. 24
Tirpitzs anchorage at Kaafjord was heavily defended. Prior to Operation Tungsten, eleven batteries of anti-aircraft guns, several anti-aircraft warships and a system of smoke generators capable of hiding Tirpitz from aircraft were located around the fjord.Tactical, Torpedo and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section) (2012), pp. 135, 151 After the attack, additional radar stations, and observation posts were established and the number of smoke generators was increased. Tirpitzs air defences were strengthened by fitting her with additional cannons, modifying the guns so they could be used to attack aircraft, and supplying anti-aircraft shells for her main guns. The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) had few fighters stationed at airfields near Kaafjord, and their operations were constrained by a lack of fuel.Bennett (2012), p. 14Tactical, Torpedo and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section) (2012), p. 135
Attacks
22 August
The Operation Goodwood attack force sailed on 18 August. The timing of the operation was set to allow the Home Fleet to also protect Convoy JW 59, which had departed from Scotland on 15 August bound for the Soviet Union. After an uneventful journey north, the attack forces arrived off Norway on 20 August. While the first attack against Kaafjord had been planned to take place on 21 August, weather conditions that day were unsuitable for flying operations, and Moore decided upon a 24-hour postponement. The Germans were first alerted to the presence of the British fleet on 21 August when radio messages from the carriers were detected.Hinsley et al. (1988), p. 277