Mateo González Manrique (1745 ) was a Spanish Army officer and colonial administrator who served as the governor of West Florida from 1813 to 1815. During his tenure as governor, Spanish Florida was caught in the War of 1812 between the United States and Britain. Manrique attempted to remain neutral in the conflict despite the small garrison at his disposal. In an attempt to counterbalance US expansion, he invited British forces to garrison Pensacola in the hopes that this would dissuade an American attack. In 1814, American forces under Andrew Jackson attacked Pensacola, with the British forces in the city blowing up a fort before withdrawing. Following the battle, Jackson returned control of Pensacola to the Spanish. Manrique was succeeded as governor by José de Soto in 1815, and possibly died in the same year.
Career
Manrique was a commissioned officer of the Spanish army, starting his career in 1765 with the regimiento de infantería Saboya, rising to the Field ranks of teniente coronel capitán in 1799, and then Sargento mayor in August 1803. On May 5, 1813, Manrique was appointed governor of Spanish West Florida, reporting to Juan Ruiz de Apodaca the Captain General of Cuba and Florida. He held this post until March 31, 1815. Manrique was succeeded by José de Soto as governor of West Florida.
Escalation of the Creek War By 1812 the war against Napoleon and the revolts in South America had resulted in the Spanish position on the Gulf Coast deteriorating to a point of total weakness. Luis de Onís objected to any efforts to defend Florida, either by Spanish action or by alliances with the Indians, or even with British military help. He believed that Spain could only retain Florida through diplomacy, as opposed to of military force. In spring 1813, an attack on Pensacola by the Americans was anticipated by Zuniga, and Apodaca wanted it defended. Given their suspicions about the British, allying with the Indians was the only possibility left to the Spanish to defend Florida.
The Creek indians believed they would be supported by the British and the Spanish, and they would be given warlike stores at Pensacola. Manrique's predecessor Zuniga had invited the Creeks to Pensacola. It is likely the invitation was to discuss future plans. They were not in a position to provide aid for an immediate escalation. It was with these expectations that a party of 60 Creeks traveled to Pensacola in May 1813. This first party was dismissed, and went away empty handed.
After their departure, Manrique came to the same conclusion as his predecessor, the Americans would attack Pensacola in the very near future, and Indian support represented the only plausible Spanish defense. He sought Apodaca's approval, along with requesting supplies for his garrison and the Indians. Before a response was forthcoming from Havana, a second party of approximately 300 Indians arrived in Pensacola.
In July 1813, Peter McQueen, a Métis and Creek chief, prophet, trader and warrior from Talisi, decided to broaden the war against the Americans over their frequent incursions on Creek lands. McQueen demanded that Manrique supply him with ammunition, and warned that he would burn Pensacola to the ground if the governor did not cooperate. This was to lead to an ultimatum, to support the Red Sticks and to break relations with the Americans. McQueen's warriors were unruly, and at one point Manrique used his troops to face down some impatient Creeks.Manrique was able to provide gunpowder and food, but no weapons. Manrique informed his superiors of the intention of McQueen and the Red Sticks to broaden the war against the Americans, seeking approval to arm the Indians. The response was that Manrique should provide all the arms and supplies that he could spare, none of which were forthcoming from Havana or Cadiz. Neither the Spanish nor the British had been able or willing to supply the Creeks in 1813, notwithstanding American suspicions.
Upon leaving Florida, McQueen's party were ambushed, the engagement has since become known as the Battle of Burnt Corn. This was one of the first clashes between the Red Sticks and United States forces, as the intensity of the conflict escalated. After the Battle of Burnt Corn, U.S. Secretary of War John Armstrong notified General Thomas Pinckney, Commander of the 6th Military District, that the U.S. was prepared to take action against the Creek Confederacy. Furthermore, if Spain were found to be supporting the Creeks, an assault on Pensacola would ensue.
Although Jackson's mission in the fall of 1813 was to defeat the Creek, his larger objective was to move on Pensacola. Jackson's plan was to move south, build roads, destroy Upper Creek towns, and then later proceed to Mobile to stage an attack on Spanish-held Pensacola. He had two problems: logistics and short enlistments. When Jackson began his advance, the Tennessee River was low, making it difficult to move supplies, and there was little forage for his horses.
At this time there were only about 500 Spanish troops in West Florida. Substantial reinforcements would not be forthcoming from mainland Spain, engaged in combat against Napoleon. One way of countering the American threat could be to arm and provision the Indians, so as to bolster the weak Spanish defences.
Woodbine's military mission in May 1814 Captain Woodbine of the Royal Marines made contact with Indians. After a meeting of various elders held aboard HMS Orpheus (1809) on May 20, weapons and other gifts were provided by the British. Woodbine was appointed as British Agent to the Creek Nations. He was advised to respect the Spanish, and to communicate this to the Creeks. A declaration from the Chiefs of the Creek Nation to Cochrane alluded to this. The presence of the Orpheus in the Apalachicola was reported to Generals Flournoy and Jackson in June.
Upon receiving reports that the British to land on Spanish soil to arm natives at war with the United States, and Manrique had not intervened, Jackson's letter to Manrique dated July 12 warned of "disagreeable consequences" if this intelligence was true. Manrique's response dated July 26 referred to the site of the landing as being in the territory of the Indians, not the Spanish. Regarding the extradition of the two chiefs - McQueen and Francis the Prophet - to the Americans, whose presence in Florida was denied, he deplored the hypocrisy with which Spanish fugitives had been allowed to roam free by the Americans. He was critical that Baratarian pirates led by Jean Lafitte were undertaking their operations from American soil, and had not been apprehended by the authorities, resulting in losses to Spanish citizens.
Manrique was in a precarious situation. Whilst too weak to confront the Americans, he did not want to antagonise the Americans, and to maintain the remaining goodwill. Yet, at the same time, did not want to weaken his position by cutting connections with his Creek allies. He appealed for assistance to his superior in Havana, but none was forthcoming. He reported to Apodaca that he would not be able to prevent the British from landing. He took the initiative, and in August 1814 approached the British, inviting them to Pensacola. This was a radical change from the existing policy of holding small populated enclaves with the meager garrison, and avoiding confrontation with either the Americans or the British.
It has been theorized that Manrique was anticipating a substantial British force would be deployed to the Gulf Coast, to which Woodbine and Nicolls were a prelude. The evidence indicates this was promised to him by Nicolls. Rumors were circulating in Pensacola that this would be taking place. The newspapers in Havana were reporting that 25,000 soldiers of Wellington's peninsular army had allegedly arrived in Bermuda in August.
It became apparent that the Americans would be prepared to attack Pensacola. Jackson would force the issue, being well aware of Manrique's position of weakness. In his letter dated August 24, Jackson criticized Manrique for allowing British agents to operate in Pensacola and warned him that he would consider him personally responsible for any depredations suffered by American citizens.
Nicolls's military mission in August 1814 At Bermuda, on July 4, 1814, Carron and embarked a company-strength force of Royal Marines, commanded by Edward Nicolls, for deployment on the Gulf Coast. When the British stopped at Havana on August 4, prior to sailing to the Florida coast, they made contact with Apodaca, the Captain General of Cuba and Florida. An anonymous letter sent from Havana, authored by American merchant and vice-consul Vincent Gray, which found its way into the hands of the Governor of Louisiana William C. C. Claiborne, mentioned that permission to land in Pensacola had been denied to the British. On August 5 Hermes, with accompanying, departed from Havana. They arrived at the mouth of the Apalachicola River eight days later, on August 13, 1814. From August 13 through August 21, Hermes was in the river. A vessel arrived from Pensacola, having been hired by Captain Woodbine, to transfer warlike stores from Prospect Bluff to Pensacola, with the tacit approval of Manrique. When Nicolls arrived at Prospect Bluff in August with 300 British uniforms and 1000 muskets, Manrique, fully aware of the threat the Americans posed to Florida, requested the redeployment of British forces to Pensacola. During this time, HMS Sophie arrived at Prospect Bluff, her commander, Lockyer, was met by Major Nicolls Woodbine decided to remain at Pensacola, but dispatched Lockyer to Apalachicola with orders to return with all the remaining arms and a request for all British forces arriving there to join him at Pensacola.
Correspondence from Nicolls to Cochrane advised that upon Woodbine's arrival at Pensacola, 'he was received by the Spanish Governor in the greatest terms of friendship, and solicited by the Governor for his assistance in protecting the town of Pensacola from the immediate attack of the Americans'. Notwithstanding the rosy picture presented by Nicolls, relations between Nicolls and Manrique became strained in the following months.
The British were observed docking the 25th and unloading the 26th. At Pensacola on August 26, 1814, Nicolls issued an order of the day for the 'First Colonial battalion of the Royal Corps of Marines', and at the same time issued a widely disseminated proclamation to the people of Louisiana, urging them to join forces with the British and Indian allies against the American government. Both proclamations were reproduced in Niles' Register of Baltimore. These were a ruse as to the real strength of the British. The "numerous British and Spanish squadron of ships and vessels of war" he described comprised two sixth-rates and two sloops of the Royal Navy (Hermes, Carron, Sophie, Childers),, vol. VI, p. 518 the "good train of artillery" comprised three cannon and twelve gunners, whilst the "battalion" was a company-strength group of 100 Royal Marines infantry, detached from Major George Lewis's battalion.
Nicolls trained and equipped Creek refugees. The British had armed and recruited 500 Indians and 100 blacks as of September 10.