The Battle of Thiepval Ridge was the first big offensive of the Reserve Army (Lieutenant General Hubert Gough), during the Battle of the Somme on the Western Front during the First World War. The attack was intended to benefit from the Fourth Army attack in the Battle of Morval by starting afterwards. The battle was fought on a front from Courcelette in the east, near the Albert–Bapaume road, to Thiepval and the Schwaben Redoubt () in the west, which overlooked the German defences further north in the Ancre valley, the rising ground towards Beaumont-Hamel and Serre beyond.
Thiepval Ridge was elaborately fortified and the German defenders fought with great determination, while the British co-ordination of infantry and artillery declined after the first day, due to the confused nature of the fighting in the maze of trenches, dugouts and shell-craters. The final British objectives were not reached until a reorganisation of the Reserve Army and the Battle of the Ancre Heights (1 October – 11 November). Organisational difficulties and deteriorating weather frustrated General Joseph Joffre's intention to proceed with vigorous co-ordinated attacks by the Anglo-French armies.
Anglo-French attacks became disjointed and declined in effectiveness during late September, at the same time as a revival occurred in the German defence. The British experimented with new techniques in gas warfare, machine-gun bombardment and tank–infantry co-operation. The German defenders on the Somme front struggled to withstand the preponderance of men and material fielded by their opponents, despite reorganisation and substantial reinforcement of troops, artillery and aircraft from Verdun. September became the month most costly in casualties for the German armies on the Somme.
Background Tactical developments Some debate had occurred among the Reserve Army staffs on tactics. The II Corps commander, Lieutenant-General Claud Jacob, advocated attacks by one line, to avoid supporting lines being caught in German counter-bombardments on the British front-line and no man's land, which usually fell after the beginning of an attack. Jacob considered that the supporting lines played little part in the success of the attack and merely added to casualties. Jacob also advocated afternoon attacks, since the six made by his corps had succeeded and the two dawn attacks had failed. The Reserve Army commander, Lieutenant-General Hubert Gough, was less certain but did lay stress on the supports crossing the danger zone swiftly. Gough also used the evidence of a film of an attack on 18 September, to decide against infantry advancing in groups, because of their vulnerability to artillery and because German defences in the gaps between groups were unsuppressed, allowing them to cut off the forward infantry and stop the advance of supporting groups and troops on the flanks.
Prelude
British preparations
The 18th (Eastern) Division (Major-General Ivor Maxse), moved south after three weeks' battle training in the Third Army area, joining II Corps on 8 September. All company, battalion and brigade commanders reconnoitred the ground and a lecture was given by Brigadier-General Philip Howell, the II Corps Chief of Staff. Howell briefed the division on the local situation and recent experience which the unit commanders found helpful, having only been in Flanders since August. Two divisional field artilleries were attached to the division and II Corps put a battery of howitzers and four tanks at the disposal of the divisional commander. On 21 September, the trenches south of Thiepval were taken over from the 49th (West Riding) Division and work begun to prepare them for the attack. Royal Engineer field companies, pioneers and two battalions of infantry dug about of assembly and communication trenches and existing positions were also improved; supply dumps were prepared over four nights of digging. The road from Authuille to Thiepval was repaired and hidden behind a brushwood screen, which enabled supplies to be moved up and wounded to be brought down with little German shelling. The division arranged a stratagem, whereby the assembly and Hindenburg trenches were to be left empty after the first waves had advanced and the reserve battalion held back, to avoid the German counter-barrage. As soon as the counter-barrage stopped the troops were to advance rapidly in small columns.
British plan
General Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the Western Front, directed the Reserve Army to attack towards Achiet le Grand and the Third Army to stand ready to attack at Gommecourt as a flank guard. Gough, ordered the attack for 26 September at to push the Germans off the high ground of the Thiepval Ridge, from Courcelette west to Schwaben Redoubt, by the Canadian Corps (Lieutenant-General Julian Byng) and II Corps, each with two divisions in the attack. Three stages were set for the advance, with halts of ten minutes and one hour before the final advance.
The Canadian Corps was to provide a flank guard on the right, by taking the German trenches on the spur north-west of Courcelette, the right of II Corps was to take Redoubt in the second stage of the advance and Stuff Redoubt at the final objective on the crest of the ridge. On the left the corps was to take Thiepval in the second stage and then reach Redoubt, which overlooked the slope down to St Pierre Divion. It was emphasised that the Germans were to be driven off the crest, to deny the Germans observation towards Albert and gain observation over the Ancre valley. The German front line west of Thiepval was to be captured during the advance.
About guns, howitzers and mortars with guns and howitzers were available, the guns of V Corps north of the Ancre, being used to fire on the German river crossings and trenches on the south bank from behind. II Corps artillery was to pay special attention the demoralisation of the German garrisons of the redoubts and Thiepval village, while certain German trenches intended for the British infantry to occupy were not bombarded sufficiently for destruction. Two changes were introduced into the artillery plan, gas shell was to be fired by mortars and the machine guns of both attacking corps, were arranged to fire overhead barrages into the gaps between the artillery barrage lines. The creeping barrage was to move at in three minutes, then at in two minutes, when no man's land and the German front position had been crossed.
Six of the eight tanks available were allotted to II Corps. Divisional reliefs were to be delayed to keep the attacking troops fresh, beginning on the night of on the right and on the left. Zero hour was set for the afternoon instead of dawn, because Maxse wanted only three hours of daylight for the consolidation on the final objective, so that most of the work would be done after dark, to avoid exposure to observed artillery fire. The Thiepval attack was to be followed by an attack astride the Ancre River. Orders for the capture of more objectives and to gain ground at every opportunity, were issued on 28 September and were intended to combine with the Fourth Army attacks planned for early October, which became known as the Battle of Le Transloy; Stuff and redoubts were to be captured by 29 September and Stuff Trench by 1 October.
German preparations
The German front position was held by the 7th Division, 8th Division and the 26th Reserve Division, from Courcelette westwards to Thiepval. The village was garrisoned by two regiments, one attached from the 2nd Guard Reserve Division; the ground from Thiepval to St Pierre Divion was held by a regiment detached from the 52nd Division. The German front position on the south face of Thiepval was about in front of the village; about back was the second line, ("Stuff Trench" to the British and "Regina Trench" to the Canadians) about and another further back was the third line, (Grandcourt Trench). The cellars under Thiepval Château had been extended into a complex of tunnels used as storehouses and shelters. A sunken road running up the middle of the village to the cemetery had been lined with dug-outs and in the original front-line to the west were dug-outs.
Thiepval had been held by Württemberg Infantry Regiment 180 (WIR 180) since 1914, which still contained many pre-war trained soldiers. The regiment had not been moved and was allowed to make its own arrangements, using Bapaume as a base. Redoubt guarded the first line between Courcelette and Thiepval, (Stuff) and redoubts anchored the west end of the first and second lines. Mouquet Farm, to the east of Thiepval, had become dangerously isolated, beyond any support trenches, connected only by a half-demolished trench. The losses incurred in its defence weakened the garrison in the area, for little corresponding gain. Beyond the south-west of Thiepval, the original German front position ran northwards to St Pierre Divion and the Ancre. The German garrisons were alerted that an attack was imminent on 22 September and German artillery began harassing fire on British trenches and supply dumps. The British assembly for the attack early on 26 September went undisturbed.
Battle Reserve Army
23–26 September +Somme weather23–30 September 1916 Datemmrain °F 23066°–43°fine 24072°–45°mistsun 25073°–50°fine 260.175°–54°fine 270.172°–52°rain 28173°–54°rain 291761°–54°rain 30063°–41°dull The preliminary bombardment began on 23 September in poor visibility and mist rose morning and evening for the next few days. II Corps fired artillery and artillery rounds. On the afternoon of 24 September a detachment of the Special Brigade fired (gas) shells into Thiepval, which silenced German trench mortars by A preliminary operation to capture Mouquet Farm began on the evening of 24 September, when a company from the 11th Division reached the farm, before a German bombardment and a bombing attack covered by accurate machine-gun fire, forced the British back. The creeping barrage began prompt at on 26 September and the infantry began their advance.
On the right flank, the Canadian Corps attacked with the 6th Canadian Brigade of the 2nd Canadian Division on the right, as flank guard and the 1st Canadian Division on the left. At the 6th Canadian Brigade advanced behind a creeping barrage with three battalions and two attached tanks, though a German counter-barrage kept the right-hand battalion in its trenches. Both tanks were lost early but the 29th Canadian Battalion in the centre reached the German front line in ten minutes, while the left battalion was stopped by machine-gun fire from ahead and the left flank, except for a few troops on the right. At the objective was captured from Twenty Road, westwards to the east end of Miraumont Road and held against two counter-attacks during the night.
The 1st Canadian Division attacked with two brigades. The right brigade with two battalions advanced to Sudbury Trench and resumed the advance at reaching Kenora Trench on the right which ran north-west back to Regina/Stuff Trench by The battalion on the left had been delayed; German bombers counter-attacked the flank and were repulsed. The left battalion had formed up in no man's land to escape the German counter-barrage but had a harder fight to reach their objectives, taking until mid-afternoon to reach the second objective, which was just short of the ridge crest, linking with the left brigade later.