The Islamic Emirate of Somalia, also known as the Islamic Wilayat of Somalia, is an unrecognized state under the control and governance of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab aims to control Somalia and govern the country by imposing Shari'ah law, although its government remains unrecognized. The de facto capital has been Jilib since 2014.

Etymology Al-Shabaab has used the term "Islamic Emirate of Somalia" to describe areas under its control since 2011. Rather than announcing the establishment of an emirate through a formal declaration, the group developed this characterization over time as it sought to portray its areas of territorial control as being governed according to its interpretation of Islamic law and principles. It has also been referred to as the "Islamic Wilayat of Somalia".https://somalilandsun.com/shabaab2/

History Al-Shabaab had its origins in the Islamic Courts Union, an umbrella group which governed much of Somalia until the Ethiopian invasion in December 2006.International Crisis Group. "Considering Political Engagement with Al-Shabaab in Somalia". Africa Report. 309. Archived from the original on September 12, 2022. Retrieved 2022-09-09."The Domestication of Al-Shabaab". The Journal of the Middle East and Africa. 10 (3): 279–305. . . S2CID 211466646. Bacon, Trisha. Muibu, Daisy. Archived from the original on January 5, 2024. Retrieved September 8, 2022. In 2007–08, Al-Shabaab was established as an independent group, gaining much support after branding itself the Somali resistance against the Ethiopian occupation.

Al-Shabaab fused Somali nationalism with jihadism. It was also pan-Islamist, linking the grievances of Somalia with those of the entire Muslim world."The Evolution of East African Salafi-jihadism". Barnett, James (2020-05-28). Report of the Hudson Institute. Archived from the original on September 11, 2022. Retrieved 2022-09-09.Vidino, Lorenzo; Pantucci, Raffaello; Kohlmann, Evan (2010). "Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict". African Security. 3 (4): 216–238. . . S2CID 144501155. Archived from the original on January 5, 2024. Retrieved September 8, 2022. The ideology of Al-Shabaab represented the fusion of the Salafi Jihadist trend in Somalia, which collaborated with the Takfir wal-Hijra group, with the hardline elements of Wahhabi groups in Somalia. Wahhabi group Jama'at al-I'tisam supported the setting up of early al-Shabab training camps, and its most hardcore faction merged into Al-Shabaab in late 2004.

However, some of the more nationalist factions of Al-Shabaab rejected pan-Islamism and only wanted Somalia under Islamic rule.Schaefer, Alan (2011). "Clan and Conflict in Somalia: Al-Shabaab and the Myth of 'Transcending Clan Politics'". Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor. 9 (40). Archived from the original on September 9, 2022. Retrieved September 9, 2022.Senate Hearing 111–678: Violent Islamic Extremism—2009 . Hearing of the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. U.S. Government Printing Office. 2009. Much of Al-Shabaab was staunchly nationalist, and aimed to expand across all of Greater Somalia.Solomon, Hussein (2014). "Somalia's Al-Shabaab: Clans vs Islamist nationalism". South African Journal of International Affairs. 21 (3): 351–366. . . S2CID 153592166. Archived from the original on January 5, 2024. Retrieved September 8, 2022.Petrich, Katharine (2022). "Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab's Criminal Activities in the Horn of Africa". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 45 (5–6): 479–500. . . S2CID 208835514. Archived from the original on September 10, 2022. Retrieved September 10, 2022. After the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union in 2007, Al-Shabaab launched its own insurgency. Although focused solely on Somalia, Al-Shabaab attracted some foreign jihadists. The vast majority of the foreign jihadists were Somali diaspora. The rest included volunteers from East Africa, the Middle East, and the West. High ranking foreign fighters included Fuad Qalaf Shongole, a Swedish Somali; Jehad Mostafa, a Kurdish American; Omar Shafik Hammami, a Syrian American; and Mujahid Miski, a Somali American.

During the Ethiopian military occupation, many Somalis saw Al-Shabaab as a genuine national resistance movement, while Al-Shabaab further capitalized on its nationalist ideology. On 13 November 2008, Al-Shabaab rapidly expanded and governed territory for the first time. The group also established networks and territorial bases concentrated in the rural south-central regions. The African Union reported Al-Shabaab was about 2,000 fighters strong during 2008.

In September 2008, Al-Shabaab announced its establishment of a government administration in Kismayo, and planned to declare the Islamic Emirate of Somalia. However, it was not declared. The group claimed that administrative positions would be divided between Al-Shabaab, surviving ICU members, and clan leaders. However, various clan elders and ICU commanders complained that they were left out of the negotiations. In January 2009, the ARS joined the TFG, with Sharif Sheikh Ahmed emerging as the new president of the TFG. Al-Shabaab began to attack the ARS for joining the TFG. The Somali government had lost almost all of the territory recovered by the TFG in 2007."Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Guerrilla Insurgency Or Strategic Terrorism?", John Maszka, 2017, pp. 76.

Ahmed Godane was announced the emir of Al-Shabaab in 2008. He pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and took a pan-Islamist approach, unlike the Somali nationalists in Al-Shabaab. After the Ethiopian withdrawal in January 2009, the public support that Al-Shabaab had previously enjoyed as a resistance faction had significantly diminished. After Al-Shabaab allied with al-Qaeda, Anwar al-Awlaki encouraged jihadists to migrate to Somalia in support of Al-Shabaab. Osama bin Laden also released a statement in support of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Al-Shabaab significantly grew in power and size.After Bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the Next Generation, Abdel Bari Atwan, 2013, pp. 115-116,

By 2009–10, Al-Shabaab controlled most of central and southern Somalia, and it had formed administrative structures to govern territories under its control.Bacon, Tricia; Muibu, Daisy (2019b). "The Domestication of Al-Shabaab". The Journal of the Middle East and Africa. 10 (3): 279–305. . . S2CID 211466646. Archived from the original on January 5, 2024. Retrieved September 8, 2022.Anzalone, Christopher (2013). "Al-Shabab's Tactical and Media Strategies in the Wake of its Battlefield Setbacks". CTC Sentinel. 6 (3). Archived from the original on September 9, 2022. Retrieved September 9, 2022.Bryden, Matt (2014). "The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?"(PDF). Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Archived (PDF) from the original on September 8, 2022. Retrieved September 8, 2022.

During the Battle of Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab suffered heavy losses. By August 2011, Al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu, although it continues to influence the city and launch attacks from nearby cities. In October and November 2011, local groups with the support of Kenya and Ethiopia launched offensives against Al-Shabaab, with Kenya approaching from the south and Ethiopia approaching from the west. Al-Shabaab lost territory to both armies, notably losing Baidoa to Ethiopia in February 2012 and losing Kismayo to Kenya in October 2012.

Under Godane, Al-Shabaab's stated goals expanded to include controlling Somalia for itself and governing the country by enforcing a strict interpretation of the Wahhabi ideology. The authoritarian style of Al-Shabaab's governance and its use of indiscriminate violence during Godane's tenure caused the group to lose support among the vast majority of Somalis. In 2013, the internal disagreements led to internecine violence as Godane purged his critics. The Pan-Islamist, pro-al-Qaeda faction of Godane clashed with more nationalist factions.

Al-Shabaab took significant damage in 2013. Following its territorial losses, Al-Shabaab reverted to asymmetric warfare and guerrilla attacks. While the group no longer had governmental and military authority over substantial territory, it retained a sporadic presence, and therefore significant influence, in many places.Doboš, Bohumil (2016). "Shapeshifter of Somalia: Evolution of the Political Territoriality of Al-Shabaab". Small Wars & Insurgencies. 27 (5): 937–957. . . S2CID 147834973. Archived from the original on January 5, 2024. Retrieved September 9, 2022.

In 2016, Al-Shabaab remained weakened by the military campaign against it.Jones, Seth G.; Liepman, Andrew; Chandler, Nathan (2016-09-13). "Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al-Shabaab". Report of the Rand Corporation. Archived from the original on September 9, 2022. Retrieved September 9,2022. An American drone strike killed Godane on September 1, 2014, and he was succeeded by Ahmed Diriye. The group reverted to its Somali nationalism.Petrich, Katharine (2022). "Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab's Criminal Activities in the Horn of Africa". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 45 (5–6): 479–500. . . S2CID 208835514. Archived from the original on September 10, 2022. Retrieved September 10, 2022. Al-Shabaab won more military operations against the government. It had also expanded its operations in Puntland.Horton, Michael (2017-03-10). "Al-Shabaab: Why Somalia's al-Qaeda Affiliate Wants Puntland". Jamestown. Jamestown Foundation Briefing. Archived from the original on September 10, 2022. Retrieved 2022-09-10.Felbab-Brown, Vanda (2017-06-19). "Puntland's problems". Brookings Institution. Archivedfrom the original on September 10, 2022. Retrieved 2022-09-10. The Salafi jihadist organization Islamic State – Somalia Province (IS–SP) challenged Al-Shabaab.Global Interagency Security Forum (2016-03-23). "The Resurgence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Implications for the Humanitarian Sector". Global Interagency Security Forum Briefing. Archived from the original on October 28, 2018. Retrieved 2022-09-09. On 20 July 2022, Al-Shabaab launched an invasion into Ethiopia with the motives of setting up a base in the Somali Region.

Governance The group is led by an executive Tanfid Council of 7-14 members. It operates several internal departments known as makhtab, including Jabhat (military), Sanaaca (explosives), Da'wa (preaching), Zakat (taxation), Islamic Wilayah (local administration), Garsoor (Islamic courts), Amniyat (intelligence agency) and Jaysh al-Hisbah (police force). The organization appoints governors (waali), of whom there are ten, who oversee all civil services in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, including welfare and roads.