South Korea, which was at the time a semi-presidential republic under its right-wing president Park Chung Hee, took a major active role in the Vietnam War. The Korean War just a decade prior was still fresh on the minds of the South Korean people, and the threat from North Korea was still very real. South Korea's decision to join resulted from various underlying causes. This included the climate of the Cold War, to further develop of South Korea–United States relations for economic and military support and political exigencies like anti-communism.Article title Under the wartime alliance, the South Korean economy flourished, receiving tens of billions of dollars in grants, loans, subsidies, technology transfers, and preferential economic treatment.
From September 1964 to March 1973, South Korea sent some 350,000 troops to South Vietnam. The South Korean Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force all participated as an ally of the United States. The number of troops from South Korea was much greater than those from Australia and New Zealand, and second only to the U.S. military force for foreign troops located in South Vietnam. The military commander was Lieutenant general Chae Myung-shin of the South Korean army. Participation of South Korean forces in the war included both non-combatant and combatant roles. Its role was also not without controversy, with South Korean forces having committed numerous war crimes in Vietnam, issues that still affect contemporary South Korea–Vietnam relations due to South Korea's indifferent stance.
Causes
Although the South Korean military was first dispatched to Vietnam during the Park Chung Hee administration, the discussions to send troops to Vietnam already started in the Syngman Rhee era, when France fought against Vietnamese forces in the First Indochina War. (The Japanese translation of 전쟁의 기억 기억의 전쟁 by 검현p의 originally published in 2002) Syngman Rhee originally offered to send troops to South Vietnam in 1954 because he was concerned about the redeployment of American troops from Korea to Vietnam, which reduced their defenses against the threat of North Korean aggression. With a South Korean military presence in Vietnam, Rhee surmised that he could demand a larger American military presence in South Korea in return. At that time, his proposal to dispatch the South Korean military was declined both by France and the US; however, the agenda was back on the table at the first meeting of Park and John F. Kennedy in Washington, D.C. during November of 1961.
When Park Chung Hee became the President of South Korea, he continued Rhee's policy, seeing the Vietnam War as an opportunity to further the alliance with the United States and receive economic aid, domestic help, modern military equipment, and other potential benefits. Out of all of the countries that agreed to send troops to Vietnam, South Korea was the poorest. Park saw South Korea's participation in the war as a way to receive American dollars — valuable currency that was used to kick-start the country's industrial development. South Korea also saw how American economic power helped Japan in its economic recovery during the destructive Korean War, and saw the same opportunity for South Korea's development during the Vietnamese war.
In 1965 Lyndon Johnson administration requested twenty five countries to participate in the Vietnam War, and seven countries accepted it. As far as South Korea was concerned President Lyndon Johnson made a formal request for noncombatant troops on May 1, 1964. President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected the previous offers because American public opinion would not support an American military presence in South Korea if the South Korean troops were fighting in Vietnam. President John F. Kennedy rejected the previous offers because he hoped that the situation in Vietnam would not deteriorate to the point that South Korean troops were needed. President Johnson, in comparison, was frustrated by the lack of international support for the war, and desperate for foreign forces. The Johnson administration requested for foreign mercenary troops, and South Korea responded and quickly sent the first deployment of South Korean troops, which were made from the groups of Taekwondo instructors and medical corps, in 1964.
Role Depended documents referred the time and the place the first South Korean units arrived at South Vietnam vary. The report by Stanley Larsen and James Collins Jr describes that the first units arrived in February 1965, in a brigade group known as Dove Force but there is also a book they were sent on January in the same year. These included engineers, a medical unit, military police, a navy LST, liaison staff, and other support personnel. Dove Force was deployed to the Biên Hòa region of South Vietnam, and helped build schools, roads and bridges. Medical teams are reported to have treated over 30,000 South Vietnamese civilians. The civilian operations in the early southern part of the campaign are reported to have had some success. At this time two thousand soldiers of the advance troops were dispatched and reached 50,000 finally within this year. In addition to combat and non-combat forces, South Korea had sent around 100,000 civilian workers to South Vietnam, employed in technical and civilian tasks. On the other hand, the Korean book by 金賢娥 writes that the first South Korean troops were sent in October 1965. According to it Blue Dragon Division and Fierce Tiger Division landed on Vũng Tàu after the South Korean national assembly approved the dispatch unanimously.
Under the assembly's approval South Korean troops were sent totally four times after it. The second dispatch was in April 1966 and the third in September of the same year and at the times 26th regiment in Fierce Tiger Division and White Horse Division were sent. In 1966 the sent soldiers amounted to 45,000 besides 5,000 military engineering and medical corps were added.
In 1966 Korean combat forces were deployed to the Tuy Hòa valley and taking over security operations, where there was some positive evaluations of ROK's operational capability. They are alleged to have had a casualty ratio of 24 to 1 during one operation in 1966.
At the start of the Tet Offensive they were transferred to the Da Nang and Quảng Nam Province region.
State Department reports state that though they were seen as effective in combat in the initial years, they had later withdrawn to the coast and were reluctant to undertake offensive operations. A passive role was not limited to just the Koreans; other armies including ANZAC and US forces were also kept at minimal combat following the Tet Offensive. Part of the reason for this was the US announcement of withdrawal following political failures revealed by Tet, which caused the Korean military to lose motivational commitment, the Korean military's assessment received favourable reviews in the beginning and was passive in the second half. The withdrawal process had negatively impacted Korean-US relations, despite economic benefits gained, with Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird considering simultaneous withdrawal from both Korea and Vietnam.
In 1969 the South Korean army accounted for 9% of the foreign troops stationed in South Vietnam (US Army 475,200, ROK Army 49,755); by the end of 1972, they comprised 60.5% of foreign troops (US Army 24,200, ROK Army 37,438). US Marine Aviation assets that supported the 2nd Marine Brigade withdrew completely in May 1971 while the combat role of Korean troops continued. As Vietnamization progressed the U.S., had to consider keeping support units in South Vietnam to support the two ROK Divisions. Around the time of the Battle of An Khe Pass, ROK forces had more limited air-support, but remained until 1973 when all foreign troops withdrew due to the Paris Peace Accords. The U.S. considered convincing the South Korean government to keep one of the divisions in South Vietnam into 1974 given the slow progress of development of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units in the area.
Evaluation American war planners are alleged to have leaned on ROK forces, given their ability to carry out missions with considerable success, some claiming Koreans outperformed other allied forces in Vietnam in terms of lethality and organization. Other commanders whom interacted with them were more critical and stated "Koreans made excessive demands for choppers and artillery support and that they stood down for too long after an operation. He equated the total two Korean divisions to "what one can expect from one good US Brigade".
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird publicly and openly questioned their usefulness in the conflict and had notable conflict with Korean leaders during the US Withdrawal period, questioning their use in the conflict and threatening to withdraw funding for them. Some reports state that ARVN forces were instead effectively buffering Korean forces from the PAVN and providing actual security of most areas. Other reports indicate civilians often left the Korean occupied areas. and that areas Korean forces operated in experienced significant unrest and strengthening of Vietcong control. According to one Korean author, claims about alleged Korean success caused the Viet Cong to avoid engagements with South Korean forces.
As a component of the joint-service MACV, the South Korean marines had a great deal of interaction with American Marines. The Vietnam War constituted the first military action on foreign soil for the South Korean marines since their formation. All of the 2nd Marine Brigade's officers were trained in Quantico, Virginia or San Diego, California by the U.S. Marine Corps.
Overall, assessments of the ROK military vary greatly over time. The tactics of the ROK military changed to defensive and passive tactics including the establishment of siege-like bases, unlike aggressive tactics prior to the Tet Offensive. This passivity became even worse since the US 7th Division withdrew from South Korea. Since one of the reasons for participation was due to fears of US withdrawal from South Korea, when the United States was planning on reducing the number of US troops on the Korean Peninsula later on, public opinion and government opinion declined, and they became less willing to participate. Other U.S. data generally positively assess the military activities of the Korean military.
Non-combat and civilian support operation included medical, antimalarial and surgery aid which also benefitted South Korea's public health knowledge. During the Vietnam War, the South Korean military provided 3,353,364 public health services, 1,640 tons of food, 461,764 points of clothing, 6,406 farm tools, and 3,319 bridges This hearts and minds campaign received positive reporting.
South Koreans tried to support the cooperative civilians around the base, but the civilians in the town where Viet Cong was active were seen by Koreans as enemies, not civilians. This was particularly noticeable in the northern areas where the Vietcong was very active. In other cases the Korean military and in particular engineering, medical and construction units put a great deal of effort into helping the people.
Impact within South Korea