The Battle of Delville Wood was a series of engagements in the 1916 Battle of the Somme in the First World War, between the armies of the German Empire and the British Empire. Delville Wood , was a thick tangle of trees, chiefly beech and hornbeam (the wood has been replanted with oak and birch by the South African government), with dense hazel thickets, intersected by grassy rides, to the east of Longueval. As part of a general offensive starting on 14 July, which became known as the Battle of Bazentin Ridge General Douglas Haig, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force, intended to capture the German second position between Delville Wood and Bazentin le Petit.
The attack achieved this objective and was a considerable though costly success. British attacks and German counter-attacks on the wood continued for the next seven weeks, until just before the Battle of Flers–Courcelette the third British general attack in the Battle of the Somme. The 1st South African Infantry Brigade made its Western Front début as part of the 9th (Scottish) Division and captured Delville Wood on 15 July. The South Africans held the wood until 19 July, at a cost in casualties similar to those of many British brigades on 1 July.
The village and wood formed a salient, which could be fired on by German artillery from three sides. The ground was a rise from Bernafay and Trônes woods, to the middle of the village; the village or the wood could be held without possession of the other. After the Battle of Bazentin Ridge, the British tried to advance on both flanks to straighten the salient at Delville Wood, to reach good jumping off positions for a general attack. The Germans tried to eliminate the salient and to retain the ground, which shielded German positions from view and overlooked British positions. For the rest of July and August, both sides fought for control of the wood and village but struggled to maintain the tempo of operations.
Wet weather reduced visibility and made the movement of troops and supplies much more difficult; ammunition shortages and high casualties reduced both sides to piecemeal attacks and piecemeal defence on narrow fronts, except for a small number of bigger and wider-front attacks. Most attacks were defeated by defensive firepower and the effects of inclement weather, which frequently turned the battlefield into a mud slough. Delville Wood is well preserved with the remains of trenches, a museum and a monument to the South African Brigade at the Delville Wood South African National Memorial.
Background Strategic developments
In 1916, the French had absorbed the lessons of the failed breakthrough offensives of 1915 and abandoned attempts to break the German front in a sudden attack, as the increased depth of German defences had made this impossible. Attacks were to be limited, conducted over a wide front, preceded by artillery "preparation" and made by fresh troops. (nibbling) was expected to lead to the "crumbling" of German defences. The offensive was split between British and Dominion forces in the north (from Gommecourt to Maricourt) and the French in the south (from the River Somme to the village of Frey). After two weeks of battle, the German defenders were holding firm in the north and centre of the British sector, where the advance had stopped except at Ovillers and Contalmaison. There had been substantial Entente gains from the Albert–Bapaume road southwards.
The British attacks after 1 July and the rapid French advance on the south bank, led Falkenhayn on 2 July, to order that
On the next day, General Fritz von Below issued an order of the day forbidding voluntary withdrawals,
after his chief of staff, General Paul Grünert and the corps commander General Günther von Pannewitz, were sacked for ordering the XVII Corps to withdraw to the third position. Falkenhayn ordered a "strict defensive" at Verdun on 12 July and the transfer of more troops and artillery to the Somme front, which was the first strategic success of the Anglo-French offensive. By the end of July, finding reserves for the German defence of the Somme caused serious difficulties for Falkenhayn, who ordered an attack at Verdun intended to pin down French troops. The Brusilov Offensive continued and the German eastern armies had to take over more of the front from the Austro-Hungarians when Brody fell on 28 July, to cover Lemberg. Russian attacks were imminent along the Stochod river and the Austro-Hungarian armies were in a state of disarray. Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, was reluctant to take troops from the Italian front, when the Italian army was preparing the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo, which began on 6 August.
Tactical developments
On 19 July, the German 2nd Army was split and a new 1st Army was established, to command the German divisions north of the Somme. The 2nd Army kept the south bank, under General Max von Gallwitz, transferred from Verdun, who was also made commander of with authority over Below and the 1st Army. Lossberg remained as the 1st Army Chief of Staff and Bronsart von Schellendorff took over for the 2nd Army. Schellendorff advocated a counter-offensive on the south bank but Falkenhayn turned this down, because forces released from the Verdun front were insufficient, five divisions having been sent to the Russian Front in July.
On 21 July Falkenhayn ruled that no more divisions could be removed from quiet fronts for the Somme until exhausted divisions relieved them. He needed seven "fought out" divisions to replace those already sent to the Somme. Gallwitz began to reorganise the artillery and curtailed harassing and retaliatory fire to conserve ammunition for defensive fire during Anglo-French attacks. From gun and howitzer batteries arrived on the Somme, along with five reconnaissance flights, three artillery flights, three bombing flights and two fighter squadrons. Since 1 July, thirteen fresh divisions had arrived on the north bank of the Somme and three more were ready to join the defence.
The strain on the Germans on the Somme worsened in August; unit histories make frequent reference to high losses and companies being reduced to eighty men before relief. Many German divisions came out of a period on the Somme front having suffered at least and some German commanders suggested a change to the policy of unyielding defence. The front line was lightly held, with reserves further back in a defensive zone but this had little effect on the losses caused by the Anglo-French artillery. Movement behind the German front was so dangerous that regiments carried rations and water for a four- to five-day tour with them. Work on new rear lines was constant, despite shortages of materials and rail lines being overloaded with troop trains. Supply trains were delayed and stations near the front were under bombardment by artillery and aircraft. Light railways were insufficient and lorries and carts were pressed into use, using roads which, while paved, needed constant maintenance, which was difficult to ensure with the troops available.
The German artillery suffered many losses and the number of damaged guns exceeded the repair capacity of workshops behind the front. Inferior ammunition exploded prematurely, bursting gun barrels. Destruction, wear and tear from 26 June to 28 August, led to the guns and the guns in the being lost. The Anglo-French maintained air superiority but German air reinforcements began to arrive by mid-July. More artillery was sent to the Somme but until the reorganisation and centralisation of artillery control had been completed, counter-battery fire, barrage-fire and co-operation with aircraft remained inadequate. Gallwitz considered plans for the relief attack but lack of troops and ammunition made it impractical, particularly after 15 July, when Falkenhayn withheld more fresh divisions and the 1st Army had to rely on the 2nd Army for reinforcements. In early August, an attempt was made to use men over 38 years old, who proved a danger to themselves and were withdrawn.
Prelude British preparations
British attacks south of the road between Albert and Bapaume began on 2 July, despite congested supply routes to the French XX Corps and the British XIII, XV and III Corps. La Boisselle near the road was captured on 4 July, Bernafay and Caterpillar woods were occupied from and then fighting to capture Trônes Wood, Mametz Wood and Contalmaison took place until early on 14 July. As German reinforcements reached the Somme front, they were thrown into battle piecemeal and had many casualties. Both sides were reduced to improvised operations; troops unfamiliar with the ground had little time for reconnaissance, whose artillery was poorly co-ordinated with the infantry and sometimes fired on ground occupied by friendly troops. British attacks in this period have been criticised as uncoordinated, tactically crude and wasteful of manpower, which gave the Germans an opportunity to concentrate their inferior resources on narrow fronts.
The Battle of Bazentin Ridge (14–17 July) was planned as a joint attack by XV and XIII Corps, whose troops would assemble in no man's land in darkness and attack at dawn after a five-minute hurricane bombardment. Haig was sceptical of the plan but eventually accepted the views of Rawlinson and the corps commanders, Lieutenant-General Henry Horne and Lieutenant-General Walter Congreve. Preparatory artillery bombardments began on 11 July and on the night of British troops advanced stealthily across no man's land, which in parts was wide, to within of the German front line and then crept forward. At the hurricane bombardment began and the British began to run forward. On the right flank, the 18th (Eastern) Division (Major-General Ivor Maxse), captured Trônes Wood in a subsidiary operation and the 9th (Scottish) Division (Major-General William Furse) was repulsed from Waterlot Farm but on the left got into Delville Wood. The 21st, 7th and 3rd Division on the left (northern) flank, took most of their objectives. By mid-morning of the German second position had been captured, cavalry had been sent forward and the German defenders thrown into chaos.
Longueval and Delville Wood
The village of Longueval enclosed a cross-roads which ran south-west to Montauban, west to the two Bazentins, north to Flers and east to Ginchy. South African forces used the English place names in Longueval and Delville Wood, as they were more meaningful than French terms. Pall Mall led north from Montauban and Bernafay Wood, to the cross-roads on the southern fringe of the village, where Sloan Street branched to the west, to a junction with Clarges Street and Pont Street. Dover Street led to the south-east and met a track running north from Trônes Wood. Two roads converged on Pall Mall at the main square; North Road ran between Flers and High Wood, with a path to the west meeting Pont Street, which ran into High Wood and the second road ran south-east to Guillemont. Clarges Street ran west from the village square to Bazentin le Grand and Prince's Street ran east through the middle of Delville Wood.