The Portuguese Air Force (PoAF) operated 50 LTV A-7 Corsair II aircraft in the anti-ship, air interdiction and air defense roles between 1981 and 1999. The Portuguese government acquired the Corsair II to replace the PoAF's North American F-86 Sabre fighters, with two orders being placed for a total of 50 A-7Ps and TA-7Ps. As part of the program one TA-7C belonging to the United States Navy was also loaned to the PoAF.
During its 18 years of service in the PoAF the A-7 fleet suffered 14 accidents and suffered from numerous maintenance and logistic problems in its last years of service due to the lack of spare parts and financial problems. Nevertheless, the program was seen as a success due to the evolution that it allowed the Air Force in aircraft maintenance, with focus in modern computer and electronic systems, and in the qualification of technicians and the modernization of the Portuguese military aviation industry.
Acquisition
The acquisition of the A-7P Corsair II was the result of many attempts by Portugal to replace its F-86F Sabre in the air defense role and, to some extent, the Fiat G.91 in the ground attack role. The first attempts started in 1968, during the Ultramar War, due to the performance of the Portuguese fighters in Africa. After the end of the war, the Portuguese Air Force (PoAF) renewed its attempts in procuring new air combat aircraft because of the F-86 and G.91 being outdated compared to the aircraft fielded by its NATO allies and the countries of the Warsaw Pact.
During this process the PoAF evaluated the Dassault Mirage III, Dassault Mirage 5, Northrop F-5, McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II, and the SAAB J-35 Draken before selecting the Corsair II in 1980.
Wartime attempts During the Ultramar War the Portuguese Air Force operated the F-84 Thunderjet, F-86 Sabre, and Fiat G.91 without much resistance from the guerrilla forces until the appearance of the Strela 2, in Guinea, in the early 1970s threatened the Portuguese air superiority. However, it had also become clear in the late-1960s that Portugal lacked a modern fighter capable of carrying out strikes with heavy payloads deep inside enemy territory. The fighters in service also lacked a self-defense capability when operating without escorts and were not able to counter the Soviet-made fighter aircraft that could potentially be supplied by communist states to the rebels and operated from the neighboring countries of Portugal's oversea territories.
In 1968, a rearmament study by the Air Force perceived the need for a new fighter capable of reaching Mach 2 in horizontal flight and a rate of climb that allowed it to reach 40,000 ft in less than five minutes. The study also gave preference to twin-engine aircraft and specified the armament capacity and the capability to operate in hot environments, in addition to being capable of flying directly from mainland Portugal to Sal, Cape Verde. The preferred contenders at the time were the Dassault Mirage III, Dassault Mirage 5, Northrop F-5A, and McDonnell-Douglas F-4C Phantom II.
Nonetheless, it was only in 1971 that the Portuguese government gave priority to the procurement of new fighters and approved a new rearmament plan for the purchase of 64 fighters, 28 of which would be for the defense of mainland Portugal and 36 to be deployed overseas. This plan called for an initial order of 30 aircraft (27 single-seat and three twin-seat). At the time Portugal was under a United Nations arms embargo and the United States was against the Portuguese colonial war and Portugal's presence in Africa, having even previously put limitations on the use of Portuguese F-86F Sabre fighters in Africa. Meanwhile, France saw a Portuguese presence in Africa as coinciding with its own interests and had become, between 1964 and 1971, in the largest supplier of weapons to Portugal. As such, the Dassault Mirage was seen as the best option.
In 1969 the French government's foreign relations underwent a change with Charles de Gaulle leaving office and Georges Pompidou taking over as president. This change in policy included improving French relations with French speaking African countries, which resulted in defense accords with Senegal. Talks about the purchase of French fighters started in December 1971, but the French government was then worried that Portuguese Mirage fighters stationed in Africa would be in range of Guinea-Conakry and Senegal, and would result in protests against France by these countries. In 1972 France gave permission for the start of negotiations as long as conditions for the basing of the aircraft were agreed on before any acquisition took place. However, by then the Portuguese government was facing financial problems and the difference between Portugal's and France's strategy for Africa had also further slowed any talks.
In March 1973 the Portuguese minister of Defense, Horácio José de Sá Viana Rebelo, contacted the French government regarding the procurement of 50 to 100 Dassault Mirage F1 fighters, which were more expensive than either the Mirage III or Mirage 5. Later in November Viana Rebelo was replaced as minister of Defense by Silva Cunha, who was able to obtain additional funding for the rearmament of the armed forces. Following new funding, a new plan was made in February 1974 to acquire new aircraft for the Air Force, which included 32 Dassault Mirage 5 fighters along with 239 other airplanes and helicopters.Secretaria de Estado da Aeronáutica [State Secretary of Aeronautics] Memorandum, Subject: "Programa de Forças – Aquisições Previstas (1a revisão)" [Forces Program – Predicted Acquisitions (1st revision)], February 4, 1974. Arquivo Histórico da Força Aérea. This plan dismissed the option of acquiring the Mirage F1 because of its cost and the fact that it would take four years for the aircraft to be delivered.
The conflict in Guinea escalated in March 1973 and the PAIGC was able to shoot down five aircraft with newly acquired Strela 2 surface-to-air missile launchers. The commander of the PoAF's Cape Verde and Guinea Air Zone (, ZACVG) requested 12 of the planned Mirage 5 to replace the North American T-6G and Fiat G.91 then operated.
Later in August 1973 it was reported that the rebels were receiving pilot training in the Soviet Union with the objective of operating MiG fighters from Guinea-Conakry. (Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, SGDN 3500) Further reports mentioned the possible involvement of the Guinea Air Force, which had started receiving help from Cuban pilots and technicians to maintain its MiG-17F fleet that were mostly inoperable.
On February 20, 1974, the French minister of Defense, Robert Galley, wrote to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Michel Jobert, about Portugal's purchase of 26 to 28 Mirage III or Mirage 5 fighters, under the condition that the fighters were not to be based in Guinea or in Cape Verde. Nevertheless, Galley didn't see a problem with these fighters being stationed in Angola and Mozambique, especially since France had already sold Mirage fighters to South Africa.
The African and Malagasy Affairs Directorate (, DAM) of the ministry of Foreign Affairs went further and was against allowing any future Portuguese Mirage aircraft being based in Angola and Mozambique since Congo, Tanzania, Zaire, or Zambia could be against it.Note no. 23/DAM-2, Direction des Affaires Africaines et Malgaches, Subject: Possible sale of Mirage to Portugal, February 27, 1974. Archive du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (AMAE), Europe 1971–1976 - Portugal - Box 3501 Upon the stalemate between the two ministries, France's then-prime minister Pierre Messmer agreed with the minister of Defense to only impose basing restrictions to Cape Verde and Guinea.Note no. 75133. From the Minister of Defense to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Subject: Combat aircraft for Portugal, April 11, 1974. Archive du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (AMAE), Europe 1971–1976 - Portugal - Box 3501
On April 3, 1974, the International Affairs assistant director of the French Ministry of Defense, Philippe Esper, met in Lisbon with the Portuguese government to start negotiations and discuss the imposition of restrictions, delivery schedule, and pilot and ground crew training. The Portuguese government then decided on the purchase of a variant of the Mirage IIIE, to be designated Mirage IIIEPL, instead of the Mirage 5.
Later on April 24, 1974, the Portuguese minister of Foreign Affairs, Rui Patrício, met with the French ambassador Bernard Durand in Lisbon to further discuss the restrictions regarding the basing of any fighters supplied by France in Guinea, given the need to dissuade attacks by rebel aircraft operating from Guinea-Conakry. At this time the French prime minister had already given permission for the sale of 32 Mirage IIIE aircraft valued at 750 million francs while maintaining the restrictions that the Portuguese had not agreed with.Direction des Affaires économiques et financières note, Subject: Sale of armament to Portugal, May 31, 1974. Archive du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (AMAE), Europe 1971–1976 - Portugal - Box 3501
After the Carnation Revolution, on April 25, 1974, Portugal started its decolonization process and withdrew its military forces from its oversea territories. With this change in policy and strategy the acquisition of the Mirage III stopped being a priority and the new political regime did not continue the negotiation process.
Post-war aircraft acquisition With the end of the conflict in Africa the Portuguese Armed Forces went through a reorganization and shifted their focus back from counter-insurgency to honoring Portugal's commitments to NATO and preparing for a possible conflict in Europe against the Warsaw Pact. The Portuguese Air Force's F-86F Sabre and G.91 fighters were considered to be outdated in both the air defense and ground attack roles to face Soviet forces in the European operations theater and only a few Sabre fighters were in service due to problems with the engines and lack of spare parts.
After the revolution Portugal faced financial problems and the new government didn't see the modernization of the armed forces as a priority, as such the Air Force counted on the support from the United States through the military assistance programs and the offsets and compensations for the use of the Lajes Air Base. In June 1974 the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Manuel Diogo Neto, informed the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Lisbon of the interest in acquiring one F-5E Tiger II squadron and one F-4E Phantom II squadron, as well as the T-38A Talon to replace the T-33 Shooting Star, and the T-41 Mescalero to replace the DHC-1 Chipmunk.
During a meeting on July 30, 1974, at the Foreign Affairs Ministry regarding an agreement for the use of the Lajes Air Base, a revised request was presented, which only listed 16 F-5E Tiger IIs, 16 T-38As, 20 T-41As and 12 AH-1Q Cobras for Portuguese service at an estimated value of 165 million dollars.
In addition to the offsets from the use of Lajes, Portugal relied on the offsets of an agreement with the German Air Force for the use of Beja Air Base to acquire former German Fiat G.91R aircraft.