The Nuneaton rail crash occurred on 6 June 1975, on the West Coast Main Line just south of Nuneaton railway station in Warwickshire, England, United Kingdom.
The crash happened when the 23:30 sleeper from London Euston to Glasgow derailed after entering a temporary speed restriction at 4 times the speed limit. Six people (four passengers and two staff) died and 38 were injured. In the subsequent inquiry, the crash was deemed to have been caused by driver error, partially due to the failure of gas lit lamps that illuminated the lineside signage warning of the speed restriction, which resulted to the addition of AWS magnets at every temporary speed restriction site on the British railway network ever since.
Background The station Nuneaton railway station is situated on the Trent Valley section of the West Coast Main Line running from to destinations such as , and ; in addition to this it is served by other lines going towards , and , operated by British Rail.
In January 1975, a track remodelling scheme commenced at Nuneaton, which would last during most of the year; by 24 May 1975, the ninth stage of the remodelling scheme went into effect, affecting the fast lines at the Eastern end of the station. The work carried out at the time involved removing the old set of points and crossovers and replacing them with a plain track with authorised speeds of , down from the standard line speed of ; the intention was that later on, a new set of points and crossovers would be installed there, on a new alignment. The temporary stretch of track included some sharp curves. According to the permanent way engineer who supervised the track alterations at Nuneaton, some trains would overspeed and travel through the temporary track section at , and believed that the track was built to handle speeds as high as , with trains only being at real risk at ; additionally, it would take roughly four months until the speed restrictions would be fully lifted.
The speed restriction warning boards were installed on 23 May 1975, two days before the restrictions came into effect and a mile and a quarter away from the speed restriction commencement boards, at the "standard service braking distance". These were gas lit lamps powered with the help of two canisters, which would have provided a week and ten days' worth of lighting, day and night. However, as the canisters were set up incorrectly, the automatic changeover valve that would have changed the supply from one canister to another (after the first one would have emptied) had not been put in use, meaning that at some point, the lights would go out. There were also no other types of warnings installed in regards to the speed restriction, meaning that if the lights would go out, train crews would have no way of telling if the speed restriction had been lifted or if it was still in place.
Ten days before the crash, a daytime InterCity train running from London Euston to Glasgow Central had entered the speed restricted area at instead of because its driver had misread the Weekly Engineering Notice and assumed that the speed restrictions applied to the Down Slow line and not to the Down Fast line he was on, as a result of this, a passenger was scalded by drinks but the train did not derail. In this case the speed restriction boards were illuminated and the driver applied heavy braking in order to avoid a derailment.
The train
The train involved in the crash carried the headcode 1S26 and was the 23:30 London Euston to Glasgow Central InterCity Sleeper train, a precursor to the present-day Caledonian Sleeper. Its composition was at follows:
Locomotive 86006 Locomotive 86242 Brake Van Gangwayed (M81389) Sleeping Car Second Twin-Berth and Pantry (M2637) Sleeping Car First (M2008) Sleeping Car Composite (M2454) Sleeping Car First (M2027) Sleeping Car Second Twin-Berth and Pantry (M2632) Restaurant Car Miniature Buffet (M1846) Sleeping Car First (M2011) Sleeping Car Second Twin-Berth and Pantry (M2663) Sleeping Car First (M2024) Sleeping Car Second Twin-Berth and Pantry (M2629) Sleeping Car First (M2032) Sleeping Car Second Twin-Berth and Pantry (M2662) Sleeping Car Second Twin-Berth and Pantry (M2616) Brake Van Gangwayed (M81530)
The train had 15 Mark 1 carriages and a length of overall and had a total weight of , the braking force was of , which was around 74.9% of the total train weight and was vacuum braked.
Sequence of events
Before the crash
On the night of 5 June 1975, Driver John McKay, alongside secondman L. W. Norman signed on duty at London Euston and, after meeting with the train guard, prepared the train for departure and left as scheduled at 23:30, with secondman Norman at the controls of locomotive 86242. However, near , the train was left stranded due to the locomotive's failure, it was stopped for over an hour until another Class 86 locomotive from Willesden TMD was brought over and coupled to the front of the train. The train was able to proceed and after having nearly crawled to a halt at in order to allow the crew members of the relief locomotive to get off at the platform, Driver McKay, who was now at the controls of 86006 and the train behind it, was now driving at a constant speed of in order to minimise the 75 minute delay that they had gained while at a standstill. Between and , there were no scheduled stops and the train had made good progress up to the approach to Nuneaton.
At Nuneaton, the gas in the first canister was running low, and as a result of the incorrect setup of the automatic valve, the lights on the speed restriction warning board for the Down Fast line became dimmer and dimmer until they were fully extinguished between 1:10 and 1:40 AM. During this time, three other trains passed the speed restriction and complied with it, but they had failed to stop in order to inform the signalman at the first convenient opportunity, as required by Rule T25.5 of the British Railways' Board's "Rules for Observance by Employees". These three trains were:
1P54; the 23:45 London Euston to InterCity Sleeper train (which had overtaken the stranded 1S26 at Kings Langley). The train was approaching Nuneaton at about 1:12 AM and according to its driver, Ireson, he had seen the Down Fast warning board but only its horizontal lights were illuminated, the 20 on the board was not, and slowed down and passed through the speed restriction, he failed to inform the staff at Crewe that the lights were out on the speed restriction warning board, despite being aware of Rule T25.5. 1S15; the 23:30 to Motorail. According to its driver, Sharpes, the train had left on time but was delayed by the fact that it was pulled by a Class 50 locomotive which was underpowered. The train passed the speed restriction board at around 1:40 AM, during which he did not see the warning board, being only able to gain a glimpse of it and notifying his secondman that the lights were out and slowed down for the speed restriction, knowing that it would be there for a long time. The train did not stop at Nuneaton as it should have according to Rule T25.5 and continued towards Crewe, where the driver and secondman saw the breakdown train come out, only then realizing what had happened. 6F72; the 22:20 Willesden to Runcorn freight train, made up of 29 oil tanker wagons limited to . According to its driver, Turner, the train passed the warning board at 1:45 AM, and in the initial inquiry claimed that the lights had been illuminated; however, he retracted his testimony in January 1976 and instead claimed to have been looking for his hand lamp, therefore having had no clear view of the track ahead of him.
Following these three trains was the delayed 1S26 which was fast approaching Nuneaton at .
The crash
Near the site of the former Bulkington railway station, the train began its descent towards Nuneaton, and as such McKay began powering down the locomotive and lightly applying the brakes in order to not go over the train's assigned speed, by the time he had reached the long left-hand curve where the Down Fast warning board was located, the train was travelling at . As he was looking out for the warning board on the Down Fast line, he saw Signal NN82 (displaying a green aspect) and the warning board for the Down Slow line, but not the one for the Down Fast line. Despite having driven the previous night through Nuneaton and having noticed the nature of the construction in the area and believing it would be long before the restrictions would be lifted, McKay assumed in the heat of the moment that the speed restriction had been lifted and released the train's brake, having been convinced that the warning board had been removed, claiming he had not seen its outline either. The decision was rooted in the fact that the Weekly Engineers Notice that began on 24 May had expired on 6 June at 0:01 AM, and thought that the engineers had completed their work and lifted the restriction; additionally he had not received the notice covering the period between 7 June and 13 June and he was preoccupied with minimising the train's delay that had been the result of the (now) trailing locomotive's breakdown at Kings Langley.
Just before entering the station from the East, McKay and Norman both saw the speed restriction commencement board and the emergency brakes were applied, but with little effect, as the train had entered the restriction area at , four times over the speed limit that was in place, at around 1:54 AM. Seconds after this, the leading locomotive (86006) left the rails and burst the track, tripping all circuits in the Nuneaton signal box (and showing all tracks as occupied), before eventually grinding to a halt halfway though the station between the platforms receiving little damage. However, the trailing locomotive (86242) became separated as the chain couplers broke; the locomotive then mounted the platform and became jammed in the station's roof, causing severe damage to the front cab; it was also struck from behind by the first brake van, also causing damage to the rear cab.
The first three carriages then travelled over what was left of the temporary track and zig-zagged as they kept moving, the first two carriages remained upright but were significantly damaged as they derailed, with the first car being jammed against the platform's end. The third carriage then fell over to its sides, as did the fourth and fifth carriage, which were badly crushed during the derailment. The sixth carriage also fell to its sides but it wasn't uncoupled from the carriages behind it, which more or less stayed upright and in line with the leading locomotive; the last carriage, the second brake van on the train was sitting on the rails and was at the spot where the leading locomotive had burst the tracks. The accident had been witnessed by the signalmen on duty during the night at the Nuneaton signal box, who saw the train approaching faster than usual on their line diagram, before seeing it come barrelling down towards the restriction area in front of them, deralining and causing flashing from electric arcs between the overhead line and the pantograph. The time of derailment showing 1:54 AM was further corroborated by the Electrical Control Room recording a traction current isolation at that time, the power outage occurring due to the damage to the OHLE equipment. The driver of a nearby goods train, Ram Patel, also witnessed the accident and described how "the sky suddenly lit up and there was a tremendous noise", with debris and cables shattering against the locomotive (25286)'s windscreen, before heading for the engine room; his train was only doing and was coming from the Coventry Colliery.