Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), is a Supreme Court of the United States case that ruled that police use of a trained detection dog to sniff for narcotics on the front porch of a private home is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and therefore, without consent, requires both probable cause and a search warrant..
In 2006, police in Miami, Florida received an anonymous tip that a home was being used as a marijuana grow house. They led a drug-sniffing police dog to the front door of the home, and the dog alerted at the front door to the scent of contraband. A search warrant was issued, which led to the arrest of the homeowner.
Twenty-seven U.S. states and the federal government, among other parties, had supported Florida's argument that the use of a police dog was an acceptable form of minimally invasive warrantless search. In a 5–4 decision, the Court disagreed, despite three previous cases in which the Court had held that a dog sniff was not a search when deployed against luggage at an airport, against vehicles in a drug interdiction checkpoint and against vehicles during routine traffic stops. The Court made clear by this ruling that it considered the deployment of a police dog at the front door of a private residence to be a separate type of situation.
Background On November 3, 2006, an anonymous, unverified tip was given to the Miami-Dade Police Department through its crime-reporting tip line indicating that the residence of Joelis Jardines was being used as a marijuana grow house. About a month later, on December 6, 2006, two detectives and a drug-detection dog approached the residence while other officers of the Miami-Dade Police Department established perimeter positions around the residence, with agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in standby positions as backup units.
As summarized by the written opinion of the Florida Third District Court of Appeal:
While the Miami-Dade narcotics detective was away from the scene in order to secure the search warrant, DEA agents remained behind to maintain surveillance of Jardines' home. The search warrant was secured about an hour later and was executed by officers from both agencies. The defendant was apprehended by a DEA agent as he attempted to flee through the rear door of the residence.
Lower courts Initially, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence that was obtained from his home, citing the authority of State of Florida v. Rabb. The state appealed that decision to suppress, and the Florida Third District Court of Appeal (DCA) reversed, while certifying a conflict with the earlier Rabb decision.Jardines, 9 So.3d, at 10–11. Summarizing their reasoning, the DCA stated:
The foundation for the principle that a canine sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search was derived from the Supreme Court's previous dog-sniff cases.
Jardines sought review in the Supreme Court of Florida based on the Rabb conflict.Jardines, 73 So.3d, at 39. In a 5–2 decision rendered on April 14, 2011, the court sided with Jardines, ruling:
The state filed a motion for rehearing, which the Supreme Court of Florida denied on July 7, 2011.
Previous dog-sniff cases In its written opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida referenced and analyzed the only three dog-sniff cases to have been heard by the Supreme Court of the United States. In the first, United States v. Place (1983),United States v. Place, . the Court answered the question of whether police, based on reasonable suspicion, could temporarily seize a piece of luggage at an airport and then subject the luggage to a sniff test by a drug-detection dog. After the defendant's behavior at an airport attracted suspicion, police seized his luggage and subjected it to a sniff test, discovering cocaine inside. The Supreme Court concluded that the seizure, which lasted 90 minutes, was an impermissibly long Terry stop, but with respect to the dog sniff, the Court said that:
Next, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000),City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, . the Supreme Court examined whether police could stop vehicles at a dragnet-style drug-interdiction checkpoint and subject each vehicle to a sniff test around the vehicle's exterior by a drug-detection dog. The Court ruled that the vehicle checkpoint itself was an impermissible seizure, but as to whether the dog sniff was a search, however, the Court again held that:
In the third case, Illinois v. Caballes (2005),Illinois v. Caballes, . the Supreme Court ruled that a minimally intrusive warrantless dog sniff of a vehicle was permissible at routine traffic stops, concluding:
This conclusion, which upheld the constitutionality of certain minimally intrusive warrantless searches, was based on the premise that the vehicle has already been legally seized, albeit only temporarily, during a traffic stop, that police never entered the car and that both the vehicle and the police were on public property.
Consistent with previous rulings, the Court again maintained that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy while on public property, and that a dog sniff reveals only information about contraband.
Other relevant cases The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed two additional Supreme Court cases related to the instant case. In United States v. Jacobsen (1984),United States v. Jacobsen . the Court answered the question of whether police could temporarily seize and inspect a package without probable cause, because it had been damaged in transit and had white powder spilling from within that was found to be cocaine. Again, it was considered not to be a search under the Fourth Amendment:
The other related case was Kyllo v. United States (2001),Kyllo v. United States, . in which police had used a thermal-imaging device from a public vantage point to monitor the radiation of heat from a person's home, enabling them to identify the telltale heat signature from the lights used in the process of growing marijuana. The Court held that this use of "advanced technology" to learn private details about the inside of a person's home without a warrant was unconstitutional. The Court's decision on Caballes a few years later called into question certain aspects of Kyllo, but Justice Stevens distinguished Caballes from Kyllo in this passage:
Dog sniff at a private residence In its analysis of these cases, the Supreme Court of Florida drew a clear distinction with respect to a dog-sniff test that was not conducted against a vehicle, but against a private residence:
In a separate concurrence, joined by two other justices, Judge Lewis went a step further:
Supreme Court of the United States
Questions presented On October 26, 2011, Florida petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on January 6, 2012. (Certiorari granted). The petition included the following questions of law: I. Is a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection dog a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause? II. Did the officers' conduct during the investigation of the grow house, including remaining outside awaiting a search warrant, constitute a Fourth Amendment search?
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but with the scope limited only to the first question as presented in the petition.
Amicus curiae Briefs of amicus curiae were filed in support of the petitioner by: United States of America The states of Texas, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin National Police Canine Association and Police K-9 magazine Wayne County, Michigan
Briefs in support of the respondent were filed by: Rutherford Institute Cato Institute Fourth Amendment Scholars (52 college law professors) National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al.
Arguments In each of the Supreme Court's prior dog-sniff cases, the Court's core belief that a dog sniff is sui generis and is only capable of detecting contraband substances has been the basis for concluding that a dog sniff did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This fundamental assumption has remained largely unchallenged in any of the cases. One amicus brief directly challenged this assumption:
In its petitioner's brief, the state of Florida argued that the lower court improperly relied on Kyllo and erred in equating the dog sniff with a search, in that: There was no physical intrusion or entry into the residence, and police have the right to approach a home's front door to "knock and talk" with the owner. "While a drug-detection dog may smell many different odors emanating from a source, it will convey only one thing: whether illegal drugs are present. ... and [it] reveals no private facts in the process." A dog is not a "device", nor is it the rapidly "advancing technology" that concerned the Kyllo court. "This Court has held repeatedly that a dog's sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search".
Oral arguments were heard on October 31, 2012, the same day as those of another "dog sniff" case, Florida v. Harris. That case focused on whether law enforcement's assertions that the dog is "trained" or "certified" is sufficient to establish probable cause for a search. The decision in Harris was delivered more than a month before that of Jardines.Florida v. Harris, .
Decision On March 26, 2013, by a 5-4 margin, the Supreme Court held that the government's use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thus affirming the Supreme Court of Florida.
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, joined by justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan. Justice Kagan also filed a concurring opinion, joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by chief justice Roberts and justices Kennedy and Breyer.
In this instance, the Court did not divide along typical liberal-conservative ideologies. The typically conservative justices were evenly split, with Scalia and Thomas joining three of the four typically liberal justices on the majority. Breyer and Justice Kennedy, often the "swing vote" on cases determined along strict ideological lines, joined the minority in dissent.
Majority opinion
Justice Scalia's majority opinion, joined by Kagan, Thomas, Ginsburg and Sotomayor, did not focus on the right to privacy, which is implicated by most modern-day Fourth Amendment cases. Rather, the decision hinged on the basis of a citizen's property rights. It followed the 2012 precedent from United States v. Jones that when police physically intrude on persons, houses, papers or effects for the purpose of obtaining information, "a 'search' within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment" has "undoubtedly occurred."United States v. Jones, , (slip op., at 3, n.3). This conclusion is consistent with the Court's early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which until the latter half of the 20th century was tied to trespass under common law. At the Fourth Amendment's "very core", the Court said, stands "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."Silverman v. United States, .
Scalia cited precedents as far back as 1765, from Entick v. Carrington, a case before England's Court of King's Bench, quoting, "[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave."Boyd v. United States, , quoting Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K. B. 275, 291; 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (K. B. 1765). He went on to say:Florida v. Jardines, , (slip op., at 6–7).