The () is the ongoing energy transition by Germany. The new system intends to rely heavily on renewable energy (particularly wind, photovoltaics, and hydroelectricity), energy efficiency, and energy demand management.
Legislative support for the was passed in late 2010 and included greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions of 80–95% by 2050 (relative to 1990) and a renewable energy target of 60% by 2050. Germany had made progress on its GHG emissions reduction target before the introduction of the program, achieving a 27% decrease between 1990 and 2014. The country would need to maintain an average GHG emissions abatement rate of 3.5% per year to reach its goal, equal to the maximum historical value. Germany's energy mix has a high intensity due a significant coal and fossil gas usage.
Germany phased out nuclear power in 2023 as part of the , and plans to retire existing coal power plants possibly by 2030, and latest by 2038. By 2023 the early retirement of the country's nuclear power plants was no longer supported by the general public and the plan was controversial among energy experts, fearing that it could have a negative impact on Germany's goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Etymology The term is regularly used in English language publications without being translated (a loanword).
The term was first contained in the title of a 1980 publication by Öko-Institut, calling for the complete abandonment of nuclear and petroleum energy. In support of the claim that Krause et al. (1980) was the first use of the term Energiewende. The most groundbreaking claim was that economic growth was possible without increased energy consumption. On 16February 1980, the German Federal Ministry of the Environment hosted a symposium in Berlin called (Energy Transition: Nuclear Phase-Out and Climate Protection). The Öko-Institut was funded by environmental and religious organizations, and the importance of religious and conservative figures like and Peter Ahmels were crucial. In the following decades, the term expanded in scope; in its present form, it dates back to 2002.
designated a significant change in energy policy. The term encompassed a reorientation of policy from demand to supply and a shift from centralized to distributed generation (for example, producing heat and power in small co-generation units), which replace overproduction and avoidable energy consumption with energy-saving measures and increased efficiency.
In a broader sense, the transition also entailed a democratization of energy. In the traditional energy industry, a few companies with large centralized power stations were perceived as dominating the market as an oligopoly and consequently amassing a worrisome level of both economic and political power. Renewable energies can be established in a decentralized manner. Public wind farms and solar parks can involve many citizens directly in energy production. Photovoltaic systems can be set up by individuals. Municipal utilities can also benefit citizens financially, while the conventional energy industry profits from a relatively small number of shareholders. The decentralized structure of renewable energies, enables the creation of value locally and minimizes capital outflows from a region. Renewable energy sources, play an important role in municipal energy policy, and local governments promote the sources.
Status
The policy document outlining the was published by the German government in September 2010, six months before the Fukushima nuclear accident. Legislative support was passed in September 2010. On 6 June 2011, following Fukushima, the government removed the use of nuclear power as a bridging technology as part of their policy. The program was later described as "Germany's vendetta against nuclear" and attributed to the influence of ideologically anti-nuclear green movements in politics. In 2014, then-Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy Sigmar Gabriel lobbied Swedish company Vattenfall to continue investments in brown coal mines in Germany, explaining that "we cannot simultaneously quit nuclear energy and coal-based power generation." James Hansen reports that Gabriel argued in June 2008 that "coal use was essential because Germany was going to phase out nuclear power. Period. It was a political decision, and it was non-negotiable"., describing a June 2008 private meeting of Sigmar Gabriel, James Hansen, and Stefan Rahmstorf at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.
In 2011, the Ethical Committee on Secure Energy Supply was tasked with assessing the feasibility of the nuclear phase-out and transition to renewable energy, and it concluded:
In 2019, Germany's Federal Court of Auditors determined the program had cost €160 billion over the last 5 years and criticized the expenses for being "in extreme disproportion to the results." Despite widespread initial support, the program is perceived as "expensive, chaotic, and unfair", and a "massive failure" as of 2019.
Russian fossil gas was perceived as a "safe, cheap, and temporary" fuel to replace nuclear power in the initial phase of Energiewende as part of the German policy of integrating Russia with the European Union through mutually beneficial trade relations. German dependency on Russian gas imports was presented as "mutual dependency."
Initial phase 2013–2016
After the 2013 federal elections, the new Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) /Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) coalition government continued the , with minor modification of its goals in the coalition agreement. The coalition government introduced an intermediate target of a 55–60% share of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption in 2035. The targets were described as "ambitious". The Berlin-based policy institute Agora Energiewende noted that "while the German approach is not unique worldwide, the speed and scope of the are exceptional". A characteristic of the compared to other planned energy transitions was the expectation that the transition is driven by citizens and not large energy utilities. Germany's switch to renewable energy was described as "democratization of the energy supply". The also sought a greater transparency in relation to national energy policy formation.
As of 2013, Germany was spending €1.5 billion per year on energy research to solve the technical and social issues raised by the transition, which are provided by the individual federal states, universities, and the government, which provided €400 million per year. The Government's contribution was increased to €800 million in 2017.
Important aspects included ():
+ policy targets and status as of 2016 Target 2016 2020 2030 2040 2050 Greenhouse gas emissions Greenhouse gas emissions (the base year 1990) −27.3% −40% −55% −70% −80 to −95% Renewable energy Share of gross final energy consumption 14.8% 18% 30% 45% 60% Share of gross electricity consumption 31.6% 35% 50% 65% 80% Share of heat consumption 13.2% 14% Share in the transport sector 6.9% 10% 14% Efficiency and consumption Primary energy consumption (the base year 2008) −6.5% −20% −50% Final energy productivity (2008–2050) 1.1% per year(2008–2016) 2.1% per year(2008–2050) Gross electricity consumption (the base year 2008) −3.6% −10% −25% Primary energy consumption in buildings (the base year 2008) −18.3% −80% Heat consumption in buildings (base year 2008) −6.3% −20% Final energy consumption in transport (base year 2005) 4.2% −10% −40%
In addition, there was an associated research and development drive. A chart showing German energy legislation in 2016 is available.
The targets went beyond European Union legislation and the national policies of other European states. The policy objectives have been embraced by the German Federal Government and has resulted in an expansion of renewable energy, particularly wind power. Germany's share of renewables has increased from around 5% in 1999 to 22.9% in 2012, surpassing the OECD average of 18% usage of renewables. Producers have been guaranteed a fixed feed-in tariff for 20 years, guaranteeing a fixed income. Energy co-operatives have been created, and efforts were made to decentralize control and profits. Poor investment designs have caused bankruptcies and low returns, and unrealistic promises have been shown to be far from reality.
Nuclear power plants were closed, and the existing nine plants were scheduled to close earlier than planned, in 2022.
A factor that inhibited efficient employment of new renewable energy has been the lack of an accompanying investment in power infrastructure to bring the power to market. It is believed of power lines must be built or upgraded. In 2010 legislation has been passed seeking construction and upgrade of of new grid lines, have been built by 2019—and in 2017, has been built.
The German States have varying attitudes to the construction of new power lines. Industry has had their rates frozen and the increased costs of the had been passed on to consumers, who have had rising electricity bills. Germans in 2013 had the highest electricity prices (including taxes) in Europe. In comparison, its neighbours (Poland, Sweden, Denmark and nuclear-reliant France) have some of the lowest costs (excluding taxes) in the EU.
On 1 August 2014, a revised Renewable Energy Sources Act entered into force. Deployment corridors stipulated the extent to renewable energy to be expanded in the future and the funding rates (feed-in tariffs) will no longer be fixed by the government, but will be determined by auction.
Market redesign was perceived as a key part of the . The German electricity market needed to be reworked to suit. Wind and solar power cannot be principally refinanced under the current marginal cost based market. Carbon pricing is also central to the , and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) needs to be reformed to create a genuine scarcity of certificates. The German Federal Government is calling for a reform. Most of the computer scenarios used to analyse the rely on a substantial carbon price to drive the transition to low-carbon technologies.
Coal-fired generation needs to be retired as part of the . Some argue for an explicit negotiated phase-out of coal plants, along the lines of the well-publicized nuclear phase-out, but as German minister of economy noted, "we cannot shut down both our nuclear and coal-fired power plants". Coal comprised 42% of electricity generation in 2015. A phase-out of fossil fuels together with a shift to 100% renewable energy is required by about 2040.
The is made up of various building blocks and assumptions. Electricity storage was hoped to become a useful technology in the future. As of 2019, a number of potential storage projects (power-to-gas, hydrogen storage and others) are still in prototype phase with losses up to 40% of the stored energy in the existing small scale installations.
Energy efficiency plays a key but under-recognised role. Energy efficiency is one of Germany's targets. Integration with national electricity networks can offer benefits. Systems with high shares of renewables can use geographical diversity to offset intermittency.
Germany invested €1.5billion in energy research in 2013. The German Federal Government spent €820million supporting projects ranging from basic research to applications. The federal government also foresees an export role for German expertise in the area.
The social and political dimensions of the have been subject to study. Sebastian Strunz argues that the underlying technological, political and economic structures will need to change radically—a process He calls "regime shift". Eva Schmid, Brigitte Knopf, and Anna Pechan analyze the actors and institutions that will be decisive in the and how latency in the national electricity infrastructure may restrict progress.