Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775 is a book that examines the role of nonviolent struggle in the period before the American Revolution. Edited by Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, David J. Toscano and Gene Sharp, the book was published in the United States in 1986. It argues that the Stamp Act resistance and other campaigns from 1765 to 1775 were fundamental for shaping the outcome of the struggle for American independence, and were not merely a "prelude" to armed conflict.
Nonviolent resistance was at the heart of these campaigns, but key features of this nonviolence have been largely neglected by historians. To fill this perceived gap, the book provides a sustained narrative of the 1765–1775 resistance, followed by a set of interpretive essays aimed to provoke further discussion and inquiry. Six hypothetical explanations are offered for why the colonists shifted to military struggle, despite the considerable success of nonviolent struggle. Reviews have appeared in several historical and legal journals.
Origins Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence, 1765–1775 (RPASI), claims that most historians of colonial America have treated the events of 1765–1775 as merely a "prelude" (edited book) to the US Revolutionary War. Events such as the resistance to the Stamp Act and Townshend Acts are typically treated as "not significant in themselves." This book, however
In their preface, the editors state that their interest in the historical period covered in RPASI began in the 1970s, when they were studying nonviolent action as a pragmatic tool of civilian struggle. In their work, they
Indeed, "researchers often look throughout the length of a period for evidence of what they regard as its inevitable outcome... for example... for the roots of war.... In the process, they... may ignore the contributions of alternative means to the outcome." An example is that "Samuel Adams, whom many... associate with the tactics of violence, issued numerous statements prior to Lexington and Concord opposing the use of armed force" (see quote at left).
The book project was originally conceived due to recognition by co-editor Gene Sharp, a leading scholar of nonviolent struggle, that the American colonists had "employed the techniques of nonviolent resistance" in their struggle against Great Britain.The preface states that Sharp "has been unfailingly helpful in the other editors' attempt to understand the significance of these actions and has been centrally responsible for placing this work within the context of contemporary Anglo-American scholarship. Editors Conser, McCarthy, and Toscano wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge their great debt to Gene Sharp and his efforts to make the work as complete and rigorous as possible|RPASI, p. xi.
The book was sponsored by Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, and by the Albert Einstein Institution,"A book from the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and the Albert Einstein Institution" (RPASI, p. ii). both led by Sharp. The editors claim that the book "if read carefully, is likely to spark scholarly controversy and argument," and that they "believe that such debate can clarify the issues... and enhance the understanding of this critical decade in our history."
Topics covered "A history of military operations from April 19, 1775 to the 3d of September, 1783, is not a history of the American Revolution.... The revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people, and in the union of the colonies; both of which were substantially effected before hostilities commenced." —John Adams, 1815.Quoted on page 3 of RPASI. In a letter from John Adams to Dr. Jedediah Morse in 1815. List of RPASI ChaptersChapter TitleAuthor(s)Part 1: A Decade of Struggle, 1765–17751.The American Independence Movement, 1765–1775: A Decade of Nonviolent Struggles Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, & David J. Toscano2.The Stamp Act Resistance Walter H. Conser, Jr.3.The First Rockingham Ministry and the Repeal of the Stamp ActFull title: The First Rockingham Ministry and the Repeal of the Stamp Act: The Role of the Commercial Lobby and Economic Pressures Paul LangfordIntroduction to Chapter 4Full title: Introduction to Chapter 4: Circular Letters, Customs Officers, and the Issue of Violence: The Background to the Townshend Acts Resistance Conser & McCarthy4.Nonconsumption and Nonimportation... Against the Townshend ActsFull title: The Nonconsumption and Nonimportation Movement Against the Townshend Acts, 1767–1770 Leslie J. Thomas5.British Response to American ReactionsFull title: British Response to American Reactions to the Townshend Acts, 1768–1770 Ian R. ChristieIntroduction to Chapter 6Full title: Introduction to Chapter 6: Sullen Silence or Prelude to Resistance: Background to the Continental Association, 1771 to May 1774 David J. Toscano6.The Continental Association: Economic ResistanceFull title: The Continental Association: Economic Resistance and Government by Committee David L. Ammerman7.The British Business Community and... NonimportationFull title: The British Business Community and the Later Nonimportation Movements, 1768–1776 Paul Langford8.The British MinistersFull title: The British Ministers, Massachusetts, and the Continental Congress, 1774-1775 Ian R. ChristiePart II: The Impact of the Struggle9.The Impact of Commercial Resistance Conser & McCarthy10.Religion and... ResistanceFull title: Religion and the Development of Political Resistance in the Colonies Walter H. Conser, Jr.11.English Radicals and American ResistanceFull title: English Radicals and American Resistance to British Authority C. C. Bonwick12.A Shift in Strategy: The Organization of Military Struggle Toscano, McCarthy, & Conser13.British Attitudes to the American Revolution J. H. Plumb14.Parallel Government in AmericaFull title: Resistance Politics and the Growth of Parallel Government in America, 1765-1775 Ronald M. McCarthyHypothethcal Reasons for Shift to Military StrategyHypotheses are discussed in Toscano, McCarthy and Conser's Chapter 12 of RPASI, pages 448-453.H1Changes within the movement and "the last resource"H1. "One might argue that the shift to military struggle was caused by changes in organization and goals which occurred within the American resistance movement during the years 1774-76...Supporters of this view might suggest that the weakening and breaking of the imperial bond caused by ten years of resistance allowed, even encouraged, the colonists to take action that their previous allegiance to the king had forestalled...." (RPASI, p. 448).H2Inadequacy of the nonviolent techniqueH2. "It might be argued that while the provincial leaders had successfully relied on the methods of noncooperation and nonimportation in the past to induce changes in British policy, these were unable to effect change under the conditions existing in 1774 and after" (RPASI, p. 449).H3A violent partyH3. "The war might have occurred because of the efforts of a small faction of colonial radicals—possibly including Samuel Adams, John Lamb, and Patrick Henry—who believed that the only way in which British control could ultimately be defeated was through violence" (RPASI, p. 451).H4A fait accompliH4. "The decision to use military means may not have been a decision at all but resulted from a fait accompli presented to the Second Continental Congress by the battles at Lexington and Concord, Bunker Hill, and the seizure of Ticonderoga" (RPASI, p. 451).H5The military as a symbol of sovereigntyH5. "One might argue that members of the new provincial governmental bodies wanted to develop the external trappings that would illustrate their authority to the world and that the use of military force would further this goal" (RPASI, p. 452).H6Misunderstanding of the nonviolent techniqueH6. "From the evidence in this and previous chapters, a case might be made that the colonists' limited awareness of the strength of their means of struggle, how it would best be used, and how to distinguish success from failure led them to abandon prematurely the nonviolent strategy" (RPASI, p. 452). Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence, 1765-1775 contains 14 chapters that are intended to "relate integrally to one another and provide a complete narrative of the period [of 1765-1775]." These chapters are listed in the table at right.
After the first introductory chapter, the next 7 chapters contain the book's "narrative section," which focuses on describing the struggles from 1765 to 1775 chronologically, using the "terminology of the day," and only "rarely [making] use of the term 'nonviolent action.'" The book's final 6 chapters are analytical, offering interpretations of the decade's events. These chapters address questions raised in the narrative section, and also suggest areas for future research.
Basic concepts are introduced in Chapter 1, which gives an overview of the three main resistance campaigns of 1765 to 1775 opposing the Stamp Act of 1765, the Townsend Acts of 1767, and the Coercive Acts of 1774. Nonviolent action is described as a technique that operates to bring about change through serving to "manipulate the shared social, cultural, economic and political system in which the opposing parties engage in conflict." Citing Sharp's Politics of Nonviolent Action, they divide methods of nonviolent action into the three categories of nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention. Nonviolent action succeeds by "rendering the opponent's sources of power unusable, unworkable, and uncontrollable," through mechanisms that may include conversion, accommodation, or "nonviolent coercion [that] occurs when an opponent is forced against his or her will to grant the actionists' demands."
The editors argue (Ch. 1) that previous scholarship has overlooked "the degree to which the colonists used a kind of 'weapons system' that operated without force of arms or violence in trying to compel the British government to change its policies." Viewed from this angle, commercial resistance (nonimportation) is analyzed closely (Ch. 9). It is apparent that the colonists' skill in applying the methods of nonviolent struggle "improved greatly over the decade," as did the "intellectual underpinnings" of their resistance (Chs. 10, 11).
Still, at the close of the decade, the nonviolent movement was abandoned in favor of military resistance, and the editors discuss six alternative hypothetical explanations for why this shift occurred (Ch. 12; see table at right). The hypothetical explanations are not meant as mutually exclusive, but as "avenues for fruitful inquiry." Indeed,
John Adams (quoted above right), who lived through and helped lead the independence struggle, claimed that "The revolution was... substantially effected before hostilities commenced." McCarthy (Ch. 14) argues that "independence in many of the colonies had essentially been achieved prior to the commencement of military hostilities at Lexington and Concord."
Appendices: Historical DocumentsA.Examination of Benjamin Franklin on the Stamp Act, 12-–13 February 1766B.Letter Three of John Dickinson's Letters from a Farmer in PennsylvaniaC.Excerpt from the Boston Newsletter, 6 July 1769D.Virginia Association, August 1774E.Suffolk Resolves, 14 September 1774F.Continental Association, October 1774G.Letters and Diary Extracts of Josiah Quincy, Jr., 1774–1775 The book concludes with 7 appendices that reproduce key historical materials (see table below right), as well as a 23-page index.
Reviews and influence Reviews have appeared in the Journal of Southern History the Journal of American History, ISSN 1936-0967 and the Law and History Review.