The Royal Lao Police (; French: Police Royale Laotiènne – PRL), was the official national police force of the Kingdom of Laos from 1950 to 1975, operating closely with the Royal Lao Armed Forces (FAR) during the Laotian Civil War between 1960 and 1975.

History

The PRL traced back its origins to the immediate aftermath of World War II, when the Laotian Gendarmerie was established by the French Union authorities in May 1946 under the designation Lao National Guard (French: Garde Nationale Laotiènne – GNL), to replace the local sections of the mainly Vietnamese Indochinese Guard (French: Garde Indochinoise).Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (1995), p. 14. Initially answerable to the Laotian Ministry of Defense, the new GNL was closely modelled after the French National Gendarmerie (French: Gendarmerie Nationale) and although it was to be exclusively composed by Laotian nationals, it was kept under the close supervision of French gendarmes seconded from the Republican Guard units stationed in Indochina. In 1947, with a strength of 1,000 men, the GNL changed its designation to Laotian Gendarmerie Forces (French: Forces de Gendarmerie Laotiènne – FGL; Lao: Kong Kamlang Thahan Ladsa Vong Lao),Walton, A Survey of the Laos National Police (1965), p. 31. later altered to Laotian Gendarmerie (French: Gendarmerie Laotiènne; Lao: Kong Truat Lao), and despite being officially transferred to the Laotian Ministry of the Interior and placed that same year under the nominal command of King Sisavang Vong,Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army advice and support (1981), p. 14. the Gendarmerie remained in fact under French control.Creak, Embodied Nation: Sport, Masculinity, and the Making of Modern Laos (2015), pp. 91–93. The Laotian Gendarmerie was encharged of enforcing law and order in the country's rural areas, combat Viet Minh guerrilla activity and patrol the borders, and by late 1949, it had reached a strength of 2,500 officers and men, commanded exclusively by French Gendarmerie officers. The rank-and-file were made up of Laotians, with a few of them holding non-commissioned officer (NCO) rank.Walton, A Survey of the Laos National Police (1965), p. 31. Disbanded on March 1950 upon the formation of the Laotian National Army (French: Armée Nationale Laotiènne – ANL), it was re-established by official decree on February 13, 1951, as the Royal Lao Gendarmerie or Royal Gendarmerie for short.Walton, A Survey of the Laos National Police (1965), pp. 32–33. The new Lao Gendarmerie was charged with safeguarding internal security and public order, with a planned strength of 1,250 officers and enlisted men, though the actual number was lower. By the end of 1955, it had only 540 men – with some being rated as good soldiers, though very few possessed any police training or experience, and 20% of them were illiterate – organized into three companies based in Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Paksé, respectively.

Formation of the Laotian National Police 1955–1960 In September 1955, an American aid package, titled the Public Safety Program, provided for the merger of all the Laotian security forces into the Laotian National Police (French: Police Nationale Laotiènne – PNL; Lao: Tamrousat). Ordered by King Sisavang Vong on November 1955, the merger did not become effective until several months later when two royal ordinances dated January 17, 1957, retrospectively, declared that the process to have taken place earlier on January 1, 1956.

The PNL and the Laotian coups 1960–1965

In either late 1958 or early 1959, Major general Phoumi Nosavan, the defense minister and strongman of the Kingdom of Laos at the time, appointed his aide de camp Lieutenant colonel Siho Lamphouthacoul as Director General of the Department of National Coordination ().Steiglitz, In a Little Kingdom (1990), p. 96.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (1995), pp. 25; 27, note 45; 105–106. When Maj. Gen. Phoumi was deposed by Captain Kong Le's coup in August 1960, it seems not to have curtailed Lt. Col. Siho's power nor the growth of his Directorate of National Coordination. In September of that year, he raised and trained to paramilitary standards two special counter-insurgency battalions (French: Bataillons Speciales – BS) within the PNL, designated 11th and 33rd BS respectively, which were gathered into an incomplete regiment designated 1st Special Mobile Group (French: Groupement Mobile Speciale 1 – GMS 1).Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (1995), p. 105. The new PNL counter-insurgency unit was closely modelled after the Royal Thai Police (RTP) Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) Commandos and was similar in function to the later Republic of Vietnam National Police Field Force.

The GMS 1 soon became involved in Laos' domestic politics during the turbulent period of the early 1960s, with its commander Lt. Col. Siho actively conspiring in Maj. Gen. Phoumi's return to power. Between mid-November and late December 1960, GMS 1 paramilitary battalions participated in the retaking of Vientiane from Captain Kong Le's rebel Neutralist airborne units,Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (1995), p. 37.Stuart-Fox, Historical Dictionary of Laos (2008), pp. 25–26. including the successful capture of the Laotian Aviation (French: Aviation Laotiènne) military runway at Wattay Airfield.Conboy and McCouaig, South-East Asian Special Forces (1991), p. 17.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (1995), p. 41.

When Kong Le and his rebel paratroopers withdrew from Vientiane after Phoumi's coup succeeded, one of the prisoners they took with them was the head of the National Police.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (1995), p. 46, note 39. For his actions in support of his patron Maj. Gen. Phoumi's December 1960 countercoup, Lt. Col. Siho was rewarded with a promotion to Brigadier general and given command of a new paramilitary security organization comprising the police forces of Laos, civil and military, together with the security and information services responsible for propaganda and political action.Conboy and McCouaig, The War in Laos 1960-75 (1989), p. 39.Stuart-Fox, Historical Dictionary of Laos (2008), p. 226. In March 1961 Siho combined his GMS 1 with Laotian National Army or ANL (military intelligence, psychological warfare, and military police units) and PNL (the civil police force and the immigration service) units to form the Directorate of National Coordination or DNC (French: Direction de Coordination Nationale – DCN) paramilitary Security Agency, which was quickly assigned to the Ministry of Defense.Anthony and Sexton, The War in Northern Laos (1993), p. 98, note 54. Answering only to Maj. Gen. Phoumi, Brig. Gen. Siho and its new security agency quickly took over police duties in Vientiane, exercising near absolute authority in the capital city and began screening the civilian population for Pathet Lao elements and stragglers, which often led to abuses.Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army advice and support (1981), pp. 72–73. Brig. Gen. Siho's actions cost funding from the U.S. for police training; however, his GMS 1 was considered the most effective paramilitary unit in the Royal Lao Armed Forces (French: Forces Armées du Royaume – FAR).Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (1995), pp. 105–106.

Although originally intended to be used in intelligence-gathering and Commando operations, the GMS was primarily kept in Vientiane to support Siho's illicit activities.Conboy and McCouaig, South-East Asian Special Forces (1991), p. 18. In reality, the GMS served principally as Siho's private army, gaining a reputation among the civilian populace for both corruption in police duties and military ability as para-commandos.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (1995), p. 113, note 1. One source refers to them as "gangsters" involved in prostitution, gambling, extortion, sabotage, kidnapping, torture, assassination and political repression.Kuzmarov, Modernizing Repression (2012), pp. 130–131. Siho staffed the DNC with his own non-professional personnel, transferred from the Laotian Army. Many of the senior professional Police officials were transferred or found places in the Army and other government slots. A number of illiterate and otherwise unqualified personnel were allowed to join the PNL over the next four years operation under the DNC; these included 1,600 supporters (the majority illiterate) of Maj. Gen. Phoumi that were added to the force in Savannakhet.Walton, A Survey of the Laos National Police (1965), p. 1.

In 1962 a 30-man contingent was sent to Thailand to attend Airborne and Commando courses manned by Royal Thai Police (RTP) instructors from the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) at their Camp Narusuan training facilities located near Hua Hin in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province. Upon their return to Laos, they formed the cadre of a new special battalion, 99 BS, which enabled GMS 1 to attain full regimental strength. A DNC training depot and an airborne course were established at Phone Kheng in Vientiane, where 11, 33, and 99 BS were all given parachute training.Conboy and McCouaig, South-East Asian Special Forces (1991), pp. 17–18. In 1963 Brig. Gen. Siho appointed Lieutenant colonel Thao Ty as his replacement at the head of the GMS 1 para-commando regiment, while retaining the command of the DNC.Conboy and McCouaig, The War in Laos 1960-75 (1989), p. 46, Plate G1.

On 18 April 1964, Brig. Gen. Siho staged a coup d'état, during which his DNC police units seized the capital's public infrastructure and took control of the country.Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam (1993), p. 64. However, the coup was short-lived, as Brig. Gen. Siho received international criticism and was quickly outranked by Major general Kouprasith Abhay, who succeeded in being nominated Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Lao Army (RLA), whilst his ally Major general Ouane Rattikone became the RLA Commander-in-Chief. In response, Siho changed the GMS 1 designation to "Border Police" or "Frontier Police" (French: Police de Frontiers), and kept a low profile.Anthony and Sexton, The War in Northern Laos (1993), p. 119.Conboy and Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (1995), p. 123.

On 1–3 February 1965, the DNC which had held de facto control over Vientiane during the previous year, was defeated and disbanded by the RLA in the wake of another coup d'état led by Maj. Gen. Kouprasith Abhay held that same month. Brig. Gen. Siho was forced to exile in ThailandConboy and Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (1995), pp. 124–125. and his DNC "empire" was quickly divided, with its units being disbanded: the military intelligence, psychological warfare, and military police personnel were returned to the RLA structure whilst some of the policemen were kept in service and renamed the National Police Corps, which was re-assigned to the Ministry of the Interior of the Royal Lao Government. After two days of negotiations, the DNC's three airborne-qualified Border Police Special Battalions – BS 33, BS 11, and BS 99 – and their commander, Lieutenant colonel Thao Ty agreed to lay down their arms with the option of transferring to the RLA's airborne forces command. By mid-year they had been moved to Seno, near Savannakhet and consolidated into a new parachute regiment, Airborne Mobile Group 21 (French: Groupement Mobile 21 Aeroportée – GM 21) under Thao Ty's command.

Structure