The March 23 Movement (), often abbreviated as M23 and also known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army (), is a Rwandan-backed Congolese rebel paramilitary group. Based in the eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it operates mainly in the provinces of North and South Kivu, which border Uganda and Rwanda. M23 is the principal member of the Congo River Alliance, a coalition of rebel groups in eastern DRC.
M23 was established in 2012 by former members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a Rwandan-backed rebel group largely composed of Rwandan-Congolese fighters. These combatants had previously integrated into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) under the terms of a 2009 peace agreement, which also called for the transformation of the CNDP into a political party, reintegration of refugees, and incorporation of CNDP personnel into government roles. Local opposition to the CNDP's leadership, accused of past human rights violations, impeded the full implementation of the agreement. On 6 May 2012, a group of these ex-CNDP fighters mutinied, forming M23 and citing the government's failure to uphold the peace accord. The group launched strikes during its first rebellion against the Congolese government that led to the displacement of large numbers of people. On 20 November 2012, M23 took control of Goma, the capital of North Kivu with a population of a million people, but was persuaded to withdraw from the city by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) because the Congolese government had finally agreed to negotiate with the rebel group. In late 2012, Congolese troops, along with UN peacekeeping troops, retook Goma, and the M23 announced a ceasefire and said that it wanted to resume peace talks.
A United Nations report found that Rwanda created and commanded the M23 rebel group during the 2012 operations (in 2024, when M23 resurfaced again, another UN report found direct support from the Rwandan military). Rwanda ceased its support due to international pressure and the military defeat by the Congolese military and the UN peacekeeping forces in 2013. http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20150520/103498/HHRG-114-FA16-Transcript-20150520.pdf p. 74
In 2017, M23 remnants resumed their insurgency in the Congo, although it was largely a low-level insurgency. The M23 reorganized in 2022 and launched an offensive, which eventually resulted in the capture of the Congolese border town of Bunagana by the rebels. In November 2022, M23 rebels got close to the city of Goma and forced about 180,000 people to leave their homes after the Congolese Army had withdrawn from the region near the village of Kibumba. In June 2023, Human Rights Watch reported human rights abuses by M23 rebels in the Congo, including unlawful killings, rape and other war crimes. Allegations implicate Rwandan support for these actions, bringing concerns about war crimes and making the humanitarian situation worse in the region. The United Nations Security Council encouraged sanctions against the M23 leaders and implicated Rwandan officials. As of July 2025, the group occupies various major towns in eastern North Kivu and South Kivu including Bunagana, Kiwanja, Kitchanga, Rubaya, Rutshuru, and the cities of Goma and Bukavu.
Background
Since its formation, the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) has been widely recognized as having received substantial support from the Rwandan government. Initial backing dates to 2003, when Laurent Nkunda, a former Tutsi rebel affiliated with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), was reportedly pressured by Rwandan authorities not to integrate into the Congolese national army following his establishment of the political movement Synergie pour la paix et la concorde. Prior to that, Nkunda had served as brigade commander for the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Goma (RCD-Goma) in Kisangani during 2002, when the group was implicated in the May 2002 massacre of over 160 civilians.
By 2005, the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) was undergoing brassage, a national military integration program designed to unify former rebel groups into a restructured national army. This program mandated a 45-day training period and redeployment to regions outside prior areas of operation, while also offering the option of demobilization. Many ex-RCD-Goma combatants, reluctant to serve outside the Kivu provinces, defected to Nkunda's emerging armed faction.
By the end of 2005, a significant number of soldiers from the 82nd Brigade had joined Nkunda, along with elements from the 81st and 83rd Brigades. The Bwiza military camp became a strategic center for the training of senior officers aligned with Nkunda, including former brassage defectors. Training programs such as the Senior Officer Leadership Course (SOLEC) and the Officer Management Course were established, with the latter reportedly supported by materials provided by the Rwandan government.
In early 2006, Nkunda expanded his military and political base by incorporating General Bosco Ntaganda, the former chief of staff of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), who was soon appointed Chief of Staff of the CNDP. Nkunda subsequently merged his political platform, Synergie pour la paix et la concorde, with his military faction, the Conseil militaire pour la défense du peuple (CMDP). On 26 July 2006, the CNDP was officially formed, with Nkunda assuming the dual role of Chairman and Supreme Commander. Among the CNDP's principal financiers was Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa, a Rwandan presidential advisor and founder of the Rwandan Investment Group. In addition to providing funding, Rujugiro maintained substantial landholdings in CNDP-controlled territories, including cattle ranches in Kilolirwe, where Nkunda established his military base. The CNDP leveraged these commercial assets to sustain its military operations and regional influence.
Escalation of support and regional strategic interests
Initially, Rwandan support to the CNDP was characterized by limited logistical and advisory assistance. However, this evolved significantly during the 2008 military escalations. Rwanda's direct involvement became increasingly evident, particularly during operations such as the CNDP's offensive against the Rumangabo military camp and the advance toward Goma. Despite reports of internal tensions, Nkunda himself reportedly grew uneasy with Rwanda's increasing influence, Rwandan troops were deployed in support of the CNDP's strategic objectives.
Although some analysts have emphasized the economic motivations behind Rwanda's involvement, a broader strategic calculus appears to underpin Rwandan engagement in eastern Congo. Rwanda has consistently viewed the provinces of North and South Kivu as within its sphere of influence, citing security concerns and geopolitical interests. A central factor in this engagement has been the threat posed by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), whose presence in eastern Congo provided a longstanding rationale for Rwandan intervention.
From 2004 to 2009, CNDP activities were justified, in part, by the need to neutralize the FDLR. Subsequent repatriation programs have seen more than 4,500 FDLR combatants returned to Rwanda, significantly diminishing the group's operational capabilities. Meanwhile, the Rwandan economy has benefited from regional trade, including mineral exports, some estimates suggest that 10 to 30 percent of Rwandan mineral trade may involve smuggled resources from the DRC. Rwandan commercial and military actors have also been active in the Kivu provinces, participating in sectors such as livestock, fuel distribution, and other forms of commerce.
Leadership transition and integration into the FARDC On 4 January 2009, Ntaganda announced the removal of Nkunda as CNDP leader, citing mismanagement. Nkunda, taken by surprise, was unable to prevent the leadership change. On 16 January 2009, Ntaganda declared the CNDP's integration into the Congolese army at a ceremony held at the Ihusi Hotel in Goma, attended by both Rwandan and Congolese government officials. Although the publicized aim of the Rwanda–DRC agreement was to initiate joint operations against the FDLR, a key objective was the consolidation and formal integration of the CNDP.
On 22 January 2009, Nkunda crossed into Rwandan territory at Kabuhanga, where he was arrested by Rwandan military officials. His associates, including Colonel Sultani Makenga, were instructed to proceed with the integration process. Soon thereafter, Rwandan and Congolese forces launched Operation Umoja Wetu ("Our Unity"), which involved the deployment of approximately 4,000 Rwandan troops into eastern DRC to combat the FDLR. Simultaneously, former CNDP officers were integrated into the FARDC and assigned key military positions, with assurances that they would remain stationed in the Kivus. On 23 March 2009, the Congolese government signed agreements with the CNDP and other armed factions, formalizing the integration of CNDP forces into the national army and marking the official dissolution of the CNDP. Key provisions of the accord included provisions for prisoner releases, the transformation of the CNDP into a political party, the reintegration of refugees, and the integration of CNDP members into government institutions and the Congolese army.
Operations
CNDP integration and the formation of the M23 rebellion Following the integration of the CNDP into FARDC, the Congolese government initially regarded this arrangement as a temporary solution to the ongoing instability in the eastern provinces. However, the integration process inadvertently consolidated the CNDP's influence within the national army. CNDP leaders, notably Ntaganda, utilized their positions to accumulate wealth through mineral smuggling, embezzlement, and unauthorized taxation systems. The CNDP leadership strategically co-opted officers from rival armed groups to broaden its base of power.
Efforts by the Congolese government to deploy former CNDP commanders beyond the Kivu provinces, initiated in September 2010, met with significant resistance. Former CNDP members justified their refusal by citing concerns over security, perceived anti-Tutsi discrimination, and unresolved hostilities with the FDLR. In response, Ntaganda sought alliances with ex-combatants from the Patriotes Résistants Congolais (PARECO), a group historically opposed to the CNDP. Talks held in Minova, South Kivu, in late 2010, aimed to forge a coalition of disaffected officers who accused the national military leadership of corruption.
In February 2011, the government launched a regimentation initiative to streamline the military structure and eliminate parallel command systems. This effort inadvertently strengthened Ntaganda's network, as he positioned loyal officers in key military posts. Exploiting the weak administrative oversight in Kinshasa, former CNDP officers retained substantial autonomy within the national army. Frictions within the CNDP ranks intensified, particularly between Ntaganda and Colonel Sultani Makenga. At the same time, Kinshasa attempted to promote Colonel Innocent Gahizi as a counterweight to Ntaganda. A United Nations report from December 2011 indicated that members of the CNDP, PARECO, and Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF) feared that the upcoming 2011–2012 electoral cycle would marginalize them within the FARDC.