The Syrian Civil War is an intensely sectarian war. After the early years of cross-sectarian opposition to the rule of Bashar al-Assad, the civil war has largely transformed into a conflict between ruling minority Alawite government and the allied Shia government of Iran; pitted against the country's Sunni Muslim majority who are aligned with the Syrian opposition and its Turkish and Persian Gulf state backers. Sunni Muslims made up the majority of the former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and many held high administrative positions, while Alawites and members of almost every minority had also been active on the rebel side.
Despite this, Sunni recruits faced systematic discrimination in the armed forces and ninety percentage of the officer corps were dominated by Alawite members vetted by the regime; based on their sectarian loyalty to Assad dynasty. SAA also pursued a truculent anti-religious policy within its ranks; marked by animosity towards Sunni religious expressions such as regular observance of salah (prayers), Hijab (headcoverings), abstinence from alcoholic drinks, etc. The conflict has drawn in various ethno-religious minorities, including Armenians, Assyrians, Druze, Palestinians, Kurds, Yazidi, Mhallami, Arab Christians, Mandaeans, Turkmens and Greeks.
In 2011, all the religious and ethnic communities, Muslim and non-Muslim, Arab, Turkmen or Kurd were united in their uprising against Assadist rule; disenchanted with the regime's corruption, authoritarian repression, nepotism, increasing poverty, unemployment, etc. Bashar al-Assad's strategy of importing Iran-backed Shia fundamentalists engaged in regional conflict with Sunni-majority countries and his portrayal as being the sole defender of Alawite interests from the Syrian Sunni majority; led to the transformation of the conflict into a sectarian war by late 2013. Khomeinist militants have used its influence in regime-held areas to attempt Shi'ification through forced conversions, establishment of shrines, ethnic cleansing and demographic shifts by bringing in foreign Twelver Shia settlers from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. Iranian government has been focusing its missionary efforts on converting Syria's Alawite minority to Twelver Shi'ism, by recruiting them in Iranian cultural and religious centres.
Background After early hopes that an era of political liberalization might follow Bashar al-Assad's succession of his father, these hopes flickered as Assad tightened his grip. He reined in Sunni Islamist opponents and sought to broaden his power base beyond minority sects. He promoted Sunnis to power and restored ties to Aleppo - a Sunni stronghold with which relations had been tense since the 1982 Hama massacre and the subsequent repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s.Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle east, p.476-477
Assad adopted a more religious persona than his father, e.g. leaking videos of one of his sons reciting the Qur'an. While continuing to look to Iran for military supplies, he improved ties with Turkey. Yet Assad's policy of criticising jihadism in Iraq and Palestine carried risks and "enabled previously latent ethnic and sectarian tensions to surface, Sunni groups to organize, and unsettled other sects and power clusters who had prospered under his father" Hafez al-Assad. Furthermore, the power and influence of Alawite elites in various sectors across the country; ranging from military, businesses, bureaucracy, etc. increased manifold times during the reign of Bashar al-Assad. Additionally, Assad regularly stressed his Alawite roots in public appearances in order to suppress the rising number of dissidents from the traditionally loyalist Alawite base, who had begun playing prominent roles for the Syrian opposition.
General issues Both the opposition and government have accused each other of employing sectarian agitation. The opposition accused the government of agitating sectarianism. Invoking minority sentiments and fears had long been a key policy of the Assads to ensure the regime's support amongst disenchanted Alawites.The regime dispatched the most loyal of the Alawite army units to fiercely crush the biggest protests. Time Magazine reported that in Homs government workers were offered extra stipends of up to $500 per month to fan sectarian fears while posing as opposition supporters. This included placing graffiti with messages such as "The Christians to Beirut, the Alawites to the grave," and shouting such sectarian slogans at anti-government protests.
In 2012, United Nations human rights investigators concluded that Syrian civil war is rapidly devolving into an "overtly sectarian" and ethnic conflict, raising the specter of reprisal killings and prolonged violence that could last for years after the government falls. "In recent months, there has been a clear shift" in the nature of the conflict, with more fighters and civilians on both sides describing the civil war in ethnic or religious terms, "Feeling threatened and under attack, ethnic and religious minority groups have increasingly aligned themselves with parties to the conflict, deepening sectarian divides", said the report.
The sharpest split arose between the ruling minority Alawite sect, a heterodox offshoot of Shi'ism constituting about 12% of total Syrian population, from which President Assad's most senior political elites, military officers, generals and associates are drawn; and the country's Sunni Muslim majority, mostly aligned with the opposition, the panel noted. But it said conflict had drawn in other minorities, including Armenian Christians, Assyrian Christians, Druze, Palestinians, Kurds, Yezidi and Turkmens. Taking advantage of the existing social tensions; state media began trumpeting the sectarian card to discredit the protestors, in order to legitimise Assad's continuation and to gain critical support from those Alawites disillusioned with the regime.
Nevertheless, there were some trends at this point that were not in line with a developing sectarian war. While Syrian opposition supporters were predominantly Sunni, it also included many Christian and Alawite figures in its ranks.A Tour Inside Syria's Insurgency Paul Wood. 29 December 2011 On 12 February 2013, a CNN report from inside Talkalakh revealed that the town itself was under rebel control, though government forces were only a matter of yards away, surrounding the town. Nevertheless, there was no fighting in or around the town thanks to a tenuous ceasefire between the warring sides brokered by a local sheikh and an Alawite member of parliament. Though isolated clashes have occurred, killing three rebels, and though government forces have been accused of harassing civilians since its implementation, the ceasefire has largely held. The town has returned to a degree of normal function, and some shops have started to re-open. Even the governor of Homs Province has been able to meet with rebels in the town, and has called the ceasefire an "experiment". Both sides reject sectarianism, stressing the need to keep foreign jihadist fighters out of the country. Nevertheless, the mainly Sunni rebels in the town stated that they remained committed to overthrowing Assad.
International positions In 2011, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the primarily Sunni protesters "have a lot of work to do internally" in order to gain the broad public support needed to form a genuinely national movement. She added, "It is not yet accepted by many groups within Syria that their life will be better without Assad than with Assad. There are a lot of minority groups that are very concerned." Clinton urged all opposition factions to extend further towards the minorities and to sustain their "moral high ground". In December 2012, US president Barack Obama praised the Syrian opposition as a pluralistic, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural popular movement, stating: "the Syrian opposition coalition is now inclusive enough, is reflective and representative enough of the Syrian population that we consider them the legitimate representative of the Syrian people in opposition to the Assad regime" In 2012, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said he had been trying to "cultivate a favorable relationship with whatever government would take the place of Assad" regardless of the group.
History
In 2012 the first Christian Free Syrian Army unit formed, yet it was reported that the Syrian government still had the support of the majority of the country's Christians of various ethnicities and denominations.Syria's Christians continue to stand by Assad regime Global Post 6 February 2012.Christians in Syria live in uneasy alliance with Assad, Alawites USA Today 10 May 2012. By 2013 an increasing number of Christians favored the opposition. In 2014, the predominantly Christian Syriac Military Council formed an alliance with the FSA, and other Syrian Christian militias such as the Sutoro had joined the Syrian opposition against the government.
The Alawite sect of Islam has the second highest religious following in the Syrian Arab Republic and remains at the heart of the Syrian Government grassroot support; however, in April 2016 Alawite leaders released a document seeking to distance themselves from Shia Islam. The manifest titled "Declaration of an Alawite Identity Reform" stated that Alawism was a separate current "of and within Islam" and that the current political power (i.e. president Bashar al-Assad) did not represent the Alawite community. Incidents of sectarianism amongst the Sunni population have been said to be rooted in that both Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad are Alawites, a minority fundamentalist Sunnis see as heretics. Additionally, the Syrian government maintains a network known as the shabiha, a shadow militia that anti-government activists allege are prepared to use force, violence, weapons and racketeering, whose members primarily consist of Alawites.
Iran provides training and equipping of Shia militants from Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan to fight with various sectarian Sunni militias in Syria. Minorities such as the Druze and Ismailis have refused to join these militias or be associated with the government, with even some Alawites and Christians who are openly pro-government also refusing to join these militias or serve their conscription terms.
Arab Sunnis