Dockworkers in New Orleans at the turn of the 20th century often coordinated their unionization efforts across racial lines. The nature of that coordination has led some scholars to conclude that the seeming interracial union activity was in fact biracial: a well-organized plan of parallel concerted activity with coordination and support between the groups, but with a clear divide along racial lines.

Under this framework, cooperation was seen less a matter of ideological interracial solidarity among the working class and more a matter of pragmatism so that the working conditions of each distinct group would improve.Eric Arnesen, "Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers, ed. Calvin Winslow, University of Illinois Press, Chicago (1998) (p. 23).

As discussed below, several factors may have allowed biracial union efforts to succeed at the port of New Orleans, including (a) the independent strength of the blackFor the sake of consistency throughout, this Article uses the racial descriptors "black" and "white." Other possible descriptors for those groups include Black, African-American, White, and Caucasian. No implication or inference should be drawn as a result of the terms chosen in this Article. unions that compelled whites to enter into collaborative agreements with them; (b) the prior history of racial division or segmentation of labor; (c) the relative power of employers to control jobs; and (d) overall employment relations."Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 47).

Because dock work was generally unskilled (with the notable exception of screwmen) and of a short-term contractual nature, an employer could readily replace workers who refused to bend to the employer's terms. Black laborers were both numerous and available for work. In this type of competitive market, blacks and whites were pitted against each other by ship owners in an effort to keep wages down: if whites would not work for a lower wage, owners would look to blacks who would."Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 26). Following this reasoning, "[o]nly control of the labor supply and solidarity across trade and racial lines could reduce this possibility. That meant that alliances between unions and, most importantly, between black and white unions, were essential to reducing competition between different groups for jobs.""Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 26). Alliances between the groups allowed both to exercise more control over the terms and conditions of their work, including wage rates and production expectations. Union leaders of both races recognized the difference that an alliance made in those terms and conditions, prompting a pragmatic continuation of the biracial system.

50-50 or half-and-half New Orleans dockworkers maintained a long-standing tradition known as "50-50" or "half-and-half." Under this arrangement, both black and white workers insisted that any work crew hired by ship owners be 50% black and 50% white. Workers would labor side by side, performing the same work for the same pay. This was generally seen as a way to prevent employers from undermining one group by playing to the other: both black and white union leaders recognizes that when blacks and whites were hired in alternating groups as they were in the mid-1890s, unions weakened and race riots or other tensions could – and did – flare up.Rosenberg, Daniel, New Orleans Dockworkers: Race, Labor, and Unionism 1892-1923 SUNY Press, Albany (1988) (pp. 69, 71); Arnesen, Eric, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans: Race, Class, and Politics Oxford University Press, New York (1991) (pp. 143-44).

In October 1901 the separate black and white unions created a Dock and Cotton Council that overarched unions of black and white screwmen, longshoremen, teamsters, loaders, and other work classifications at the waterfront. Leadership positions on the council were generally divided according to the 50-50 system, with the presidency and financial secretary position held by white workers and the vice-presidency and corresponding secretary position held by black workers. Committee positions were similarly assigned.New Orleans Dockworkers: Race, Labor, and Unionism 1892-1923 (p.73). By 1903, the council oversaw eight separate unions of black and white dockworkers with a total of approximately 10,000 members and helped ensure that all unions adhered to the 50-50 rule.New Orleans Dockworkers: Race, Labor, and Unionism 1892-1923 (p. 74). Over time, it also assisted the member unions in negotiations with employers and were kept informed of the unions' organizational and racial relationships. As the overarching union body, the council was also empowered to call for a general port strike.New Orleans Dockworkers: Race, Labor, and Unionism 1892-1923 (p. 74).

Limits on racial cooperation Both black and white unions insisted that they had no interracial equality or ideological leanings."Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 23). Black workers announced that they wanted a stable waterfront, not social equality with white men, and did not want to be used by employers to drive a wedge between the races."Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 30). The structure and operation of the Dock and Cotton Council has also been seen as racially stratified by some scholars. Although black and whites were elected equally to officer positions and conference committees, and work operated under the 50-50 system, white workers consistently held the presidency and were the only ones allowed to hold foreman positions. Black workers vehemently protested their exclusion from foreman jobs, but faced resistance from white waterfront laborers who did not want to take orders from a black man. In order to preserve the overall alliance, black unions retreated from the foreman controversy."Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 31).

Screwmen New Orleans screwmen were responsible for tightly compressing and packing cotton bales into the holds of ships. This critical task put them at the top of the labor force on the docks and allowed them to insist on the highest wages; their work was highly skilled, required immense strength, and was indispensable to the smooth operation of the waterfront. However, in contrast to other waterfront laborers, white screwmen had resisted cooperation with their black counterparts. In the 1880s, the white screwmen refused the 50-50 arrangements and voted for a quota system that allowed only 20 black screwmen crews per day."Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 27). Another account put the limit at 100 black screwmen at any one time.New Orleans Dockworkers: Race, Labor, and Unionism 1892-1923 (p. 82). The locals had separate contracts with different terms, and there was no way to support workers in labor disputes. In addition, rumors began to spread that shipping agents were trying to find ways to remove the 75-bale per day limit instituted by white screwmen by using black screwmen who would work for lower wages with no limit on bales stowed.Waterfront Workers of New Orleans (p. 125-26). A black shipping company also emerged.Waterfront Workers of New Orleans (p. 125). Such types of racial divisions led to riots in the mid-1890s as black screwmen attacked their white counterparts, whites responded with equal violence, and numerous deaths resulted."Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 27); Waterfront Workers of New Orleans (pp. 127-29).

By the turn of the twentieth century, however, screwmen of both races faced new pressures and demands from employers with the advent of new shipping technologies, larger ship size, and the shippers' search for non-union labor.Waterfront Workers of New Orleans (p. 122). Now, "speed, not skill, was central to profitability.""Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 28). In part as a response to the high wages that screwmen commanded (regardless of how many bales were stowed) and the results of cooperation between black and white workers overall on the waterfront, employers introduced a new system of loading known as 'shoot-the-chute.' This system required crews of 4 to 5 men to throw down between 400 and 700 bales or more of cotton per day into the holds of the ships where other workers waited to pack them.Waterfront Workers of New Orleans (p. 163). Moreover, in contrast to earlier years, no limit was placed on the number of bales required to constitute a day's work – men would work until told to stop, not until they reached a set number of bales. There was also concern that the faster pace would mean that there would be less work left for subsequent days, leaving workers idle (and unpaid).New Orleans Dockworkers: Race, Labor, and Unionism 1892-1923 (p. 83).

The definition of a fair day's work was central to the dispute, and in April 1902 the employers' Steamship Conference declared that (1) the employer had the right to direct where employees work; (2) that the employer's orders must be obeyed, even if the employer's agent was not a union member; (3) only Conference members could determine the "character of the stowage of the cotton"; and (4) the employer had the right to expect as much work as could reasonably be done.Waterfront Workers of New Orleans (p. 166).

Both black and white screwmen fiercely resisted shoot-the-chute and the lower working conditions it represented for them, as well as the Conference's view of a day's work. In order to effectively stand against their employers, the two screwmen unions agreed to a uniform wage scale in April 1902."Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 28). This contract also provided for equal work distribution among black and white screwmen, but forbade them from engaging in sympathy strikes or striking for higher wages.New Orleans Dockworkers: Race, Labor, and Unionism 1892-1923 (p. 82-83). As scholar Eric Arnesen analyzed the situation, "white workers reasoned accurately that success lay in reducing all possible divisions between black and white workers and preventing a revival of a split labor market on the docks.""Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 28). Black screwmen found a somewhat different reason for joining with their white counterparts, namely, a sense that they were being unfairly used by owners as a way to attack the white workers and starve them out of work – and being paid lower wages in the process."Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 28).

In the fall of 1902, the black and white screwmen unions agreed that they would present all demands to employers jointly, renew the 50-50 work-sharing agreement from the spring, and maintain mixed-race work crews. Embracing 50-50 even further, they insisted that they would not recognize a foreman who was not a member of either the black or white screwmen's union."Biracial Waterfront Unionism" in Waterfront Workers (p. 29). Moreover, 100 to 120 bales of cotton would be a day's work – not the 400 and 700 demanded under shoot-the-chute.New Orleans Dockworkers: Race, Labor, and Unionism 1892-1923 (p. 83); Waterfront Workers of New Orleans (p. 164).