Abdul Rahman Hassan Azzam, the secretary-general of the Arab League from 1945 to 1952, declared in 1947 that, were a war to take place with the proposed establishment of a Jewish state, it would lead to "a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacre and the Crusades."
The quote was universally cited for decades as having been uttered on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the Arab states several months later.For example: Sachar, Howard (1981) "Egypt and Israel". Richard Marek Publishers. pg 51. "So confused were the Egyptians in their purpose even at this last moment, however, that Azzam Pasha, the Arab League secretary-general, could boast to a press conference on May 15; “This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades.” The source of the quote was traced by the computer scientist Brendan McKay to an October 11, 1947, article in the Egyptian newspaper Akhbar al-Yom, titled "Arab countries prepare for war" (Arabic: البلاد العربية تستعد للحرب) in a section titled "War of extermination..." (Arabic: ...حرب إبادة), which included the quote, with the added words "Personally, I hope the Jews do not force us into this war, because it would be a war of extermination and momentous massacre ". The article was written following a meeting organized by the journalist Jon Kimche at the Savoy Hotel in London between Azzam and three Zionist leaders in London: David Horowitz, David Ben-Gruion and Aba Eban, following the passing of UN Resolution 181, which recommended a partition plan for Palestine that established a Jewish state. All of the members of the meeting would later give different accounts of what was said.
The historian Efraim Karsh considers this quote a "genocidal threat". The Israeli historian Tom Segev has disputed Karsh's interpretation, saying that "Azzam used to talk a lot" and pointing to another statement from May 21, 1948, in which Azzam Pasha declared his desire for "equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine".
Historical context Azzam was selected to be the first Secretary-General of the Arab League in March 1945. The first proposal for a joint Arab military intervention in Palestine was proposed by the king of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud, in September of that year. Azzam rejected this idea, warning in a report to Egyptian prime minister Mahmoud Nuqrashi that the "destruction of the Jews by force is not a solution to the Palestine problem"as well as arguing that since the Arab armies were dependent foreign countries for their supplies, the league did not have to adopt "such [an] extreme measure", since those foreign powers would not consent to an Arab war against the Jews. Weeks later, Azzam shelved another proposal, this time from Iraq, for Arab military action. On October 1 1945 Azzam wrote to the Egyptian foreign minister:British officials with whom I spoke about Palestine are ready to support us as long as our demands are not extreme. Our position is much worse than it appeared when I was in Cairo. There is a very serious problem which necessitates a solution. There are hundreds of thousands of Jews who are in concentration-camp-like conditions. They are in a terrible condition. An extreme response against them will not be good. We must not take an extreme attitude against the Jews.In an interview with Le Progrès Egyptien on October5 1945, Azzam declared:If you could assure me that the handing of Palestine to the Jews would mean peace everywhere, I should give all of it. However, such a solution would involve constant conflicts like those that developed in Ireland. But if a partition of the country is likely to effect a solution and put an end to the present disturbed situation, let us study such a possibility most carefully.Haaretz, 24 October 1945 "Day by Day" page 2At the Bloudan conference in June on that year, Nuqrashi announced his opposition to Arab intervention while Azzam argued that the time was not right for military preparations; the Arab League rejected Amin al-Husseini's plea for an Arab volunteer army under his command, while secretly deciding to assist Husseini and to boycott the US and the UK if the situation came to armed struggle. The head of the Bloudan conference, Mohammed Hussein Heikal, would later deny in his memoirs responsibility for the secret protocols, which he was either unaware of or opposed, except for the agreement to raise the Palestine issue in the UN Assembly. Again, in December 1946, the Arab League rejected another Iraqi proposal which called for an Arab police force to be sent to Palestine with British approval. In September 1947, yet another Iraqi proposal at Sofar calling for the implementation of the secret protocols of Bloudan was rejected. It was not until April 1948, two weeks before the Mandate of Palestine was set to expire, that the Arab chiefs of staff met to plan an intervention.
Despite having publicly rejected Zionism, Egyptian officials privately met with Zionist leaders as early as October 1945. In December 1945, the head of the Arab department of the Jewish Agency, Eliyahu Sasson, met in Cairo with former Egyptian prime minister Ali Mahir. Mahir expressed his support for Jewish-Arab relations, even going as far to suggest that the Jews might eventually join the Arab League. In August 1946, Sasson met Mahir in Cairo again, who offered to mediate between British, Jewish, and Arab officials. Then-Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi promised to endorse either a partition or a bi-national solution in exchange for Jewish assistance in Egypt's disputes with the UK. Sasson proposed a deal whereby Egypt would convince the Arab states to accept partition, and in return, the Jewish Agency would lobby on behalf of the Egyptians to persuade the British to transfer their troops on the Suez Canal bases to the new Jewish state. Surprisingly, the Egyptians were receptive to this offer. Sasson reported back to the Jewish Agency:In his [Azzam's] view there is only one solution and that is: partition. But collective debates and discussions are required in order to arrive at this solution. As the Secretary of the Arab League, he cannot appear before the Arabs as the initiator of this suggestion. His position is very delicate. He is married to seven wives (that is, he is the Secretary of seven Arab states), each one fearing her fellow wife, competing with her and trying to undermine her. He can see fit to support partition on two conditions: If one of the Arab states will find the strength and the courage to take the initiative and to propose the matter at a meeting of the League, and if the British will request that he follow this line.The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was set up in May 1947 to develop proposals for the partition of Palestine. Recommendations to this effect were made in September of that year. The majority plan proposed a distinct two-state solution; the minority plan foresaw a federal state. Though the Jews had accepted the majority plan, the Arab countries were unanimous in their negative reactions to both plans, and openly spoke of taking up arms were either of these proposals enacted.Ronald J. Berger,The Holocaust, Religion, and the Politics of Collective Memory: Beyond Sociology, Transaction Publishers, 2012 p. 176.Henry Laurens, La Question de Palestine, Fayard, Paris 2002, vol.2 p.593. For Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, the majority plan would only lead to an outbreak of generalized violence, as clearly unjust to the Arabs, whilst the minority plan was inapplicable since it assumed a prior accord between Jews and Arabs.Henry Laurens, La Question de Palestine, p.594 On September15,Howard Morley Sachar, Europe leaves the Middle East, 1936–1954, Knopf, 1972 p.494, gives October the 14th. This date however is not that given by Abba Eban himself. See A. S. Eban, 'Note of Conversation with Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha,' London, Sept. 15, 1947,' in Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, Frank Cass, 1986, Vol. 2, pp. 274–76; Laurens, Question de Palestine, vol. 2 p. 680 n. 103 for additional bibliography. Azzam Pasha, who was held in high esteem by David Ben-Gurion, met a Zionist delegation in London, consisting of Abba Eban and David Horowitz, both liaison officers with the Jewish Agency, and the journalist Jon Kimche. The emissaries stated that there was no doubt that a Jewish state would be established and requested that the Arab states accept the consequences and cooperate. They were willing to give guarantees against any form of Jewish expansionism.Howard Morley Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, Knopf, May 15, 2007, pp. 285, 333. Azzam Pasha, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Arab League, suggested that the Zionist project be abandoned, and that the Jews could integrate themselves into Arab society on the basis of autonomous entities. He argued that it was pointless to appeal to political realism when the whole Zionist project demonstrated the efficacy of will-power. Azzam argued that the existence of the Palestinian Jewry as a historic fact - something he accepted - was not accepted by the Arabs as a whole, citing the example of the Crusaders, who had been defeated after centuries of presence in Palestine due to the Arabs not accepting them as a historical fact. According to Aba Eban's memorandum notes on September 19, Azzam stated:For me you may be a fact, but for them you are not a fact at all- you are a temporary phenomenon. Centuries ago, the Crusaders established themselves in our midst against our will, and in 200 years we ejected them. This was because we never made the mistake of accepting them as a fact.
You may easily convince me that the Arabs now have an interest in allowing you to develop your State, and to live at peace with them [sic], but having convinced me of this, you will have achieved nothing, for you have nothing at all to offer which I can take back to my people tomorrow. Up to the very last moment, and beyond, they will fight to prevent you from establishing your State. In no circumstances will they agree to it
Politics were not a matter for sentimental agreements; they were resultants of contending forces. The question is whether you can bring more force for the creation of a Jewish State than we can muster to prevent it. If you want your State, however, you must come and get it. It is useless asking me for the Negev on the grounds that it is empty. You can only get your Negev by taking it. If you are yourselves strong enough to do this, or if you enlist strong partners - Britain, America, Russia, the United Nations- you may well succeed. If you cannot, then you will fail. But, in no circumstances, will you obtain Arab consent in the process.
On the other hand, we once had Spain, and then we lost Spain, and we have become accustomed to not having Spain. We once had Persia, and then lost Persia, and now we have become accustomed to not having Persia. Whether at any point we shall become accustomed to not having a part of Palestine, I cannot say. The chances are against it, since 400,000 of our brethren will be unwilling citizens of your State. They will never recognise it, and they will never make peace.