The occupation of the Jordan Valley by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) began in February 1918 during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of World War I. After the Capture of Jericho in February the Auckland Mounted Rifle Regiment began patrolling an area of the Jordan Valley near Jericho at the base of the road from Jerusalem. Towards the end of March the First Transjordan attack on Amman and the First Battle of Amman were launched from the Jordan Valley followed a few weeks later by the equally unsuccessful Second Transjordan attack on Shunet Nimrin and Es Salt at the end of April. During this time the occupation of the Jordan was fully established and continued through the summer of 1918. The occupation ended in September with the Battle of Megiddo which consisted of the Battle of Sharon and the Battle of Nablus. The Third Transjordan attack and Second Battle of Amman were fought as part of the Battle of Nablus.
Despite the difficult climate and the unhealthy environment of the Jordan Valley, General Edmund Allenby decided that, to ensure the strength of the EEF's front line it was necessary to extend the line which stretched from the Mediterranean, across the Judean Hills to the Dead Sea to protect his right flank. This line was held until September, providing a strong position from which to launch the attacks on Amman to the east and northwards to Damascus.
During the period from March to September the Ottoman Army held the hills of Moab on the eastern side of the valley and the northern section of valley. Their well placed artillery periodically shelled the occupying force and, particularly in May, German aircraft bombed and strafed bivouacs and horse lines. As a consequence of the major victory at Megiddo the occupied area was consolidated with other former Ottoman Empire territories won during the battle.
Background
After the capture of Jerusalem at the end of 1917 the Jordan River was crossed by infantry and mounted riflemen and bridgeheads established at the beginning of the unsuccessful first Transjordan attack on Amman in March. The defeat of the second Transjordan attack on Shunet Nimrin and Es Salt and the withdrawal to the Jordan Valley on 3 to 5 May, marked the end of major operations until September 1918.Bruce 2002 p. 203
The focus shifted to the German spring offensive launched by Ludendorff on the Western Front, which began the same day as the First Transjordan attack on Amman, completely eclipsing its failure. The British front in Picardy held by 300,000 soldiers collapsed when powerful assaults were launched on both sides of the Somme by a force of 750,000, forcing Gough's Fifth Army back almost to Amiens. On one day; 23 March German forces advanced and captured 600 guns; in total 1,000 guns and 160,000 suffered the worst defeat of the war. The British War Cabinet recognised at once that the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire must be at least postponed.Woodward 2006, p. 169Wavell 1968, p. 183Carver 2003 p. 228 The effect of this offensive on the Palestine Campaign was described by Allenby on 1 April 1918: "Here, I have raided the Hedjaz railway 40 miles East of Jordan & have done much damage but my little show dwindles now into a very insufficient [insignificant] affair in comparison with events in Europe." Overnight Palestine went from being the British government's first priority to a "side show."Woodward 2006, p. 176
Decision to occupy the valley Reasons for garrisoning the Jordan Valley include – The road from the Hedjaz railway station at Amman to Shunet Nimrin opposite the Ghoraniyeh crossing of the Jordan River, remained a serious strategic threat to the British right flank as a large German and Ottoman force could very quickly be moved from Amman to Shunet Nimrin and a major attack mounted into the valley.Powles 1922 pp. 222–3The Ghoraniyeh bridgehead was just from Jerusalem direct. [Maunsell 1926 p. 194] The plan for the advance in September required holding the Jordan bridgeheads and maintaining a continuous threat of another offensive across the Transjordan.Keogh 1955 p. 228 The mobility of the mounted force kept alive the possibility of a third Transjordan attack on this flank and their endurance of the terrible heat, may have confirmed the enemy's assumption, that the next advance would come in this sector of the front line.Wavell 1968 pp. 188–9 The implied threat of a large mounted force which was constantly active in whatever part of the front line Desert Mounted Corps was based raised enemy expectations of a fresh attack being mounted in that area. A withdrawal of Lieutenant General Harry Chauvel's force from the valley to the heights may have been contemplated but the lost territory would have to be re–taken before the proposed September operations. Despite the huge numbers of sick projected to be suffered during the occupation of the Jordan Valley, the re-taking of the valley may have been more costly than holding it. If a retreat out of the Jordan Valley took place, the alternative position in the wilderness overlooking the Jordan Valley was insufficient in either space or water to accommodate the Desert Mounted Corps.Woodward 2006 p. 183 A retreat out of the valley would enhance the already increased morale of the German and Ottoman forces and their standing in the region, following their Transjordan victories. Normally mounted troops would be held in reserve, but Allenby did not think there were enough available infantry divisions to hold his front line while the radical reorganisation of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was being carried out.
It therefore was decided to defend the eastern flank from the Jordan valley with a strong garrison until September and to occupy a place many considered to be an unpleasant and unhealthy place and virtually uninhabitable during the hot summer months due to the heat, high humidity and malaria.
So important was the support of Prince Feisal's Sherifial Hedjaz Arab force to the defence of the EEF's right flank, that they were substantially subsidised by the War Office. After a delay in receipt of a payment, the High Commissioner in Egypt Reginald Wingate wrote to Allenby on 5 July 1918, "I think we shall manage the subsidy required as well as the extra £50,000 you require for Northern Operations." At the time £400,000 was on its way from Australia, while Wingate was asking the War Office for an additional £500,000, emphasising the importance of the regular "payment of our Arab subsidy."Hughes 2004 pp. 167–8
The Ottoman defenders maintained an observation post on El Haud hill which dominates the whole Jordan Valley.Maunsell 1926 p. 199
+Ottoman Force June 1918Hughes 2004 p. 160 Rifles Sabres Machineguns Art.Rifles [sic] East of Jordan 8050 2375 221 30 VII Army 12850 750 289 28 VIII Army 15870 1000 314 1309 North Palestine Line of Communications 950 – 6 –
At this time the strength was estimated at 68,000 rifles and sabres and morale of the Ottoman defenders very strong, the harvest coming in and food abundant. While the EEF was defending its line with every available unit. As Allenby wrote in a letter to the War Office on 15 June 1918, "all my goods are in the shop window." The EEF line stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River was strong, supported by roads and communications behind. However the line was wide in comparison with the size of the EEF it. Allenby saying, "It is the best line I can hold. Any retirement would weaken it. My right flank is covered by the Jordan; my left by the Mediterranean Sea. The Jordan Valley must be held by me; it is vital. If the Turks regained control of the Jordan, I should lose control of the Dead Sea. This would cut me off from the Arabs on the Hedjaz railway; with the result that, shortly, the Turks would regain their power in the Hedjaz. The Arabs would make terms with them, and our prestige would be gone. My right flank would be turned, and my position in Palestine would be untenable. I might hold Rafa or El Arish; but you can imagine what effect such a withdrawal would have on the population of Egypt, and on the watching tribes of the Western Desert. You see, therefore, that I cannot modify my present dispositions. I must give up nothing of what I now hold. Anyhow, I must hold the Jordan Valley."Hughes 2004 p. 163
Garrison Chauvel was given the task of defending the Jordan Valley, but his Desert Mounted Corps had lost the 5th Mounted Brigade and the Yeomanry Mounted Division, both of which, along with most of the British infantry were sent to the Western Front to be replaced by Indian Army infantry and cavalry. This resultant reorganisation required time to work through.Blenkinsop 1925 p.228
The Jordan Valley was garrisoned in 1918 by the 20th Indian Brigade, the Anzac Mounted Division and the Australian Mounted Division, until 17 May when the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions arrived. They took over the outposts in the sector outside the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead while the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade held the bridgehead.The two Imperial Service brigades (one infantry and one cavalry fielded by Indian Princely States) had seen service in the theatre since 1914; from the defence of the Suez Canal onwards. [Falls 1930 Vol. 2 Part II p. 424] In August these troops were joined at the beginning of the month by the newly formed 1st and 2nd Battalions British West Indies Regiment, in the middle of the month by the 38th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers (the 39th would follow later), both part of the Jewish Legion and towards the end of August by British Indian Army cavalry units.Falls 1930 Vol. 2 Part II pp. 423–4 This force included a section of the Light Armoured Motor Brigade commanded by Captain McIntyre; the armoured cars had two machine guns mounted on the rear of each car and were camouflaged with bushes while making sorties to attack Ottoman patrols.Scrymgeour 1961 p. 53 Allenby had decided to hold the valley with this mainly mounted force because the mobility of mounted troops would enable them to keep the greater proportion of their strength in reserve on the higher ground.
Chauvel's headquarters were at Talaat ed Dumm from 25 April until 16 September and he divided the Jordan Valley into two sectors, each patrolled by three brigades while a reserve of three brigades was maintained.Powles 1922 pp. 223–4Hill 1978 p. 157
In the garrisoned area of the valley there were two villages; Jericho and Rujm El Bahr on the edge of the Dead Sea; other human habitations included the Bedouin shelters and several monasteries.Moore 1920 pp. 116–7 Arabs chose to evacuate Jericho during the summer months, leaving only the heterogeneous local tribes. In the vicinity of the Dead Sea, the Taamara, a 7,000 strong semi-settled Arab tribe cultivated selected areas of the slopes of the Dead Sea about Wady Muallak and Wady Nur. They husbanded 3,000 sheep, 2,000 donkeys and a few large cattle or camels and travelled to the Madeba district to work as hired carriers.Secret 9/4/18
Conditions in the valley At below sea level and below the mountains on either side of the scorching Jordan Valley, here for weeks at a time, the shade temperature rarely dropped below and occasionally reached ; at the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead was recorded. Coupled with the heat, the tremendous evaporation of the Dead Sea which keeps the still, heavy atmosphere moist, adds to the discomfort and produces a feeling of lassitude which is most depressing and difficult to overcome. In addition to these unpleasant conditions the valley swarms with snakes, scorpions, mosquitoes, great black spiders, and men and animals were tormented by day and night by swarms of every sort of fly.Powles 1922 pp. 260–1Blenkinsop 1925 pp. 227–8 Trooper R. W. Gregson 2663, described the Jordan Valley to his family, "...it's a terrible place. I will never tell anyone to go to hell again; I will tell him to go to Jericho, and I think that will be bad enough!"Holloway 1990 pp. 212–3