The tributary system of China (), or Cefeng system () at its height was a network of loose international relations centered around China which facilitated trade and foreign relations by acknowledging China's hegemonic role within a Sinocentric world order. It involved multiple relationships of trade, military force, diplomacy and ritual. The other states had to send a tributary envoy to China on schedule, who would kowtow to the Chinese emperor as a form of tribute, and acknowledge his superiority and precedence. The other countries followed China's formal ritual in order to keep the peace with the more powerful neighbor and be eligible for diplomatic or military help under certain conditions. Political actors within the tributary system were largely autonomous and in almost all cases virtually independent.
Scholars differ on the nature of China's relations with its neighbors in traditional times. Many describe a system that embodied a collection of institutions, as well as social and diplomatic conventions, that dominated China's contacts with the non-Chinese world for two millennia, until the collapse of the system around the end of the 19th century. Other scholars like Odd Arne Westad see a variety of relationships that differed in character, not an overall "tributary system". They suggest a Sinocentric system, in which Chinese culture was central to the self-identification of many elite groups in the surrounding Asian countries. By the late 19th century, China had become part of a European-style community of sovereign states and established diplomatic relations with other countries in the world following international law. While some scholars have suggested that the tributary system is a model for understanding international relations in East Asia today, other scholars have argued that the concept is misleading about relations in both early modern times and today.
Definition
The term "tribute system" is a Western invention. There was no equivalent term in the Chinese lexicon to describe what would be considered the "tribute system" today, nor was it envisioned as an institution or system. John King Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yu created the "tribute system" theory in a series of articles in the early 1940s to describe "a set of ideas and practices developed and perpetuated by the rulers of China over many centuries." The concept was developed and became influential after 1968, when Fairbank edited and published a conference volume, The Chinese World Order, with fourteen essays on China's pre-modern relations with Vietnam, Korea, Inner Asia and Tibet, Southeast Asia and the Ryukyus, as well as an Introduction and essays describing Chinese views of the world order. The model presents the tribute system as an extension of the hierarchic and nonegalitarian Confucian social order.
"Tribute", points out Peter C. Perdue, the historian of Qing dynasty foreign relations, is "the inadequate translation for gong, a term with multiple meanings in classical Chinese," since its "root meaning of gift giving from inferiors to superiors applied to all personal relationships...." Fairbank's concept of tribute system "turned a flexible practice with multiple meanings into an overly formalized ritual system" in which gong always had the same meanings and gong ritual was exclusively and predominately a marker of foreign relations, whereas the Qing conducted "many diverse forms of tributary ritual".
In practice
Legitimacy The "tribute system" is often associated with a "Confucian world order", under which neighboring states complied and participated in the "tribute system" to secure guarantees of peace, investiture, and trading opportunities. One member acknowledged another's position as superior, and the superior would bestow investiture upon them in the form of a crown, official seal, and formal robes, to confirm them as king. The practice of investing non-Chinese neighbors had been practiced since ancient times as a concrete expression of the loose reign policy.
The early Ming dynasty actively sought out diplomatic relations with other states within the framework of a tributary relationship to bolster its claims to authority and superiority. In these diplomatic visits, Ming envoys would urge these states to send tributary missions to the Ming capital, asserting the Ming emperor's position as Son of Heaven above all other rulers.
The rulers of Joseon, in particular, sought to legitimize their rule through reference to Chinese symbolic authority. After the defeat of the Yuan dynasty in 1368, King Gongmin of Goryeo terminated tributary relations with the Yuan and sent tribute to the Ming. However, Goryeo also sent military forces to the Ming border region of Liaodong in 1370. After Gongmin was assassinated in 1374, his successor King U of Goryeo was dominated by a pro-Yuan court that re-established tributary relations with Northern Yuan while also sending tribute to the Ming in 1384. In 1388, Goryeo sent an army under deputy commander Yi Seong-gye to attack the Ming due to Ming demands to turn over their northeastern territory, but YI refused to carry out the invasion and instead turned back the army to remove King U from power. In 1392, Yi Seong-gye, also known as Taejo of Joseon, officially founded the state of Joseon, cut off relations with the Mongols and sent tributary envoys to the Ming founder Emperor Hongwu for recognition.
Despite Yi's willingness to become a tributary of the Ming, the Hongwu Emperor did not trust Joseon and forbade Joseon envoys from entering Ming territory by 1397. The militarist faction in Joseon planned to attack the Ming in 1398 with support from the king but their leader, Chŏng Tojŏn, was killed by one of the king's sons, Yi Pangwŏn, who later succeeded his father and became king of Joseon. He then used Neo-Confucian doctrines to solidify his rule over Joseon. Yi Seong-gye was the only king of Joseon who requested but did not receive investiture from the Ming emperor. There is no evidence that Koreans during the Ming era ever questioned the practice of sending tribute to and requesting investiture from the Ming emperor upon the enthronement of a new king. Receiving investiture from the Ming emperor was taken for granted as a source of political legitimacy for the Joseon king who was vulnerable to attacks from their subjects should he not receive recognition. Due to the Confucian outlook of contemporary Korean elites, the Ming emperor was identified as the "Son of Heaven" who embodied Confucian moral authority.
In the aftermath of the Imjin War, Seonjo of Joseon in particular sought symbolic authority from the Ming emperor due to the lack of his own political authority at home. Generals and irregular armies had formed outside of government control during the war and many had personally witnessed Seonjo fleeing from the capital upon the outbreak of the war. He downplayed the accomplishments of his own generals while attributing victory to Ming intervention. Out of fear of rebellion against his own rule, Seonjo doubled down on seeking authority from the Ming through a narrative in which he was central to the Ming's decision to send military aid against the Japanese. However most Koreans at the time understood that the Ming intervention came about from geopolitical concerns that the Japanese would have posed a threat to Ming territory if Joseon had lost the war.
On the opposite side of the tributary relationship spectrum was Japan, whose leaders could hurt their own legitimacy by identifying with Chinese authority. With the exception of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu from 1401-1408, no other modern Japanese ruler accepted official tributary status with China. As the first ruler of unified Japan during the Muromachi period, he may have sought to enhance his own status within Japan by accepting a title from the Ming to solidify his ascendance over the Japanese emperor. None of his successors adopted the same tributary relationship with China. In these politically tricky situations, sometimes a false king was set up to receive investiture for the purposes of tribute trade.
Autonomy In practice, the tribute system only became formalized during the early years of the Ming dynasty. Actors within the "tribute system" were virtually autonomous and carried out their own agendas despite sending tribute; as was the case with Japan, Korea, Ryukyu, and Vietnam. Chinese influence on tributary states was almost always non-interventionist in nature and tributary states "normally could expect no military assistance from Chinese armies should they be invaded".
Tribute The "tribute" entailed a foreign court sending envoys and exotic products to the Chinese emperor. Once foreign envoys reached the Chinese capital, they participated in a series of Confucian ceremonies including the kowtow. Before meeting the emperor, Chinese officials and foreign envoys gathered to practice a rehearsal ceremony. On the day of the assembly, Chinese officials and foreign envoys moved to their rehearsed positions before the emperor. An official from the Ministry of Rites led the foreign envoys to perform five bows and three sets of kneeling and bows. Afterwards, the foreign envoys would kneel before the emperor while the emperor instructed the Ministry of Rites official to provide them with drinks and meals. The emperor then gave the envoys gifts in return and permitted them to trade in China. Before departing, the envoys would perform another three sets of kneeling and bows. Presenting tribute involved theatrical subordination but usually not political subordination. The political sacrifice of participating actors was simply "symbolic obeisance". Nor were states that sent tribute forced to mimic Chinese institutions, for example in cases such as the Inner Asians, who basically ignored the trappings of Chinese government. Instead they manipulated Chinese tribute practices for their own financial benefit.
The gifts doled out by the Ming emperor and the trade permits granted were of greater value than the tribute itself, so tribute states sent as many tribute missions as they could. In 1372, the Hongwu Emperor restricted tribute missions from Joseon and six other countries to just one every three years. The Ryukyu Kingdom was not included in this list, and sent 57 tribute missions from 1372 to 1398, an average of two tribute missions per year. Since geographical density and proximity was not an issue, regions with multiple kings such as the Sultanate of Sulu benefited immensely from this exchange.
After 1435, the Ming dynasty urged foreign delegations to leave and stopped offering transport assistance for visiting missions. The size of delegations was restricted from hundreds of people to less than a dozen and the frequency of tributary missions was also reduced.
The practice of giving gifts of greater value than the tribute itself was not practiced by the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty court with Goryeo. Gifts conferred by the Yuan were worth a fraction of the tribute offered by Goryeo. Joseon paid the Qing dynasty multiple times per year and were coerced to receive hundreds of diplomatic missions, in turn granting the Qing great influence in their internal affairs, in comparison to Siam who would only send gold and silver to the Qing when requested by the court as a gift rather than a forced payment, often once every decade.
Culture