McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), is a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that an Ohio statute prohibiting anonymous campaign literature is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which protects the freedom of speech. In a 7–2 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the First Amendment protects the decision of an author to remain anonymous.
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre stood outside of a middle school in Westerville, Ohio, and passed out anonymous leaflets that opposed a proposed school district tax levy. The Ohio Elections Commission fined McIntyre $100 for violating a state law that prohibited the distribution of any kind of political or campaign literature that does not have the name and address of the person responsible for its contents. With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, McIntyre appealed the fine in court. The county court reversed the fine, holding that because McIntyre did not attempt to mislead the public, the Ohio statute was unconstitutional as it applied to her actions. However, the state court of appeals reinstated the fine, referring to a 1922 decision by the Ohio Supreme Court as precedent, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court on April 19, 1995. As precedent, the Court referred to its decision in Talley v. California (1960), in which the Court found a similar law prohibiting anonymous leafletting unconstitutional, as well as the role of anonymous political literature throughout history, one example being The Federalist Papers. The Court's majority opinion emphasized the importance of anonymous speech, describing it as "not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent".McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 357. The effect of the Court's opinion on anonymous speech has been analyzed in the contexts of television and radio advertisements, campaign finance, and the Internet.
Background
Ohio statute and prior case law The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the federal government from abridging the freedom of speech, and the Fourteenth Amendment extends this prohibition to state governments under the incorporation doctrine.McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 336, n.1. Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Revised Code forbade the creation and distribution of any kind of publication "... designed to promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in any election ..." unless the publication contains the name and address of the person responsible for the content of the publication."McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 338, n.3. Previously, in a case called State v. Babst (1922), the Supreme Court of Ohio, the state's highest court, upheld the constitutionality of the "statutory predecessor" of section 3599.09(A).McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 339.State v. Babst, 104 Ohio St. 167, 135 N.E. 525 (1922). However, in Talley v. California (1960), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a similar Los Angeles city ordinance prohibiting all anonymous leafletting was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment.Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
The U.S. Supreme Court has also discussed whether disclosure of an anonymous individual's identity is permissible in certain situations. In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Court upheld, among other things, a part of the Federal Election Campaign Act that required the public disclosure of political campaign contributions above a certain dollar amount. Applying a standard of exacting scrutiny, the Court determined that the government's interest in providing the electorate with information about campaign contributions outweighed the First Amendment concerns in the case of Buckley. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law that made it a crime to use corporate funds to influence the voters of an election. As part of its analysis, the Court commented that "identification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected".McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 354, n.18 (quoting Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 at 792, n.32).
Facts of the case
On the evening of April 27, 1988, the superintendent of Westerville City School District held a public meeting at Blendon Middle School in Westerville, Ohio, to discuss a new school district tax levy. On the same day, an Ohioan named Margaret McIntyre stood outside the school and distributed leaflets to meeting attendants, asking them to vote no on the tax levy issue. Some of the leaflets did not identify her as the author, instead identifying the message as coming from "concerned parents and tax payers".McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 337.
While she was distributing the leaflets, a school official who supported the tax proposal warned McIntyre that her anonymous leaflets were unlawful. Despite the warning, McIntyre continued to distribute the leaflets at a meeting the next day.McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 338. The tax levy issue failed to pass on its first try. In November 1988, in the third election on which the issue was presented, the tax levy was finally approved. Five months after the levy passed, the same school official who warned McIntyre about her anonymous leaflets filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, accusing McIntyre of violating section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Revised Code. The commission found her guilty and fined her $100.
Lower court proceedings McIntyre appealed the fine to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which reversed the fine, holding that because McIntyre "did not 'mislead the public nor act in a surreptitious manner'", section 3599.09(A) was unconstitutional as it applied to her actions. McIntyre was represented by David Goldberger, an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed that court, putting back the fine. In a divided vote, the majority of the judges felt bound by the precedent set in State v. Babst (1922) by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which upheld the "statutory predecessor" of section 3599.09(A). The judge who dissented from the opinion argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening decision in Talley v. California (1960) "compelled the Ohio court to adopt a narrowing construction of the statute to save its constitutionality".McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 339. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, also by a divided vote. The majority of the state supreme court justices felt that the Ohio statute was different from the city ordinance in Talley, finding that section 3599.09(A) "has as its purpose the identification of persons who distribute materials containing false statements". In a dissenting opinion, Justice J. Craig Wright wrote that section 3599.09(A) "'is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and is, therefore, unconstitutional as applied to McIntyre.'"McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 340.
Supreme Court
Margaret McIntyre died while the case was still being litigated in the state courts. On behalf of Joseph McIntyre, the executor of McIntyre's estate, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, which the Court granted on February 22, 1994.McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 340–41.McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 67 Ohio St.3d 391, 618 N.E. 2d 152, cert. granted, 510 U.S. 1108 (U.S. February 22, 1994). Justice Stevens later wrote, "Even though the amount in controversy is only $100", the Court's grant of certiorari "reflects our agreement with [the executor's] appraisal of the importance of the question presented".
Opinion of the Court
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court on April 19, 1995, reversing the Ohio Supreme Court in a 7–2 decision.McIntyre, 514, U.S. 334 at 335. Stevens emphasized that the First Amendment protects a right to anonymity, referring to Talley as precedent,McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 342. and stated that Ohio's interests in preventing fraud and informing the electorate were insufficient to justify the sweeping scope of its statute.McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 348–53. Stevens also rejected the argument that the Court's prior decisions in Bellotti and Buckley compel the Court to uphold the Ohio statute.McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 353–56.
Freedom to publish anonymously
Stevens began his First Amendment analysis by quoting Talley v. California, where the Court wrote: "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind."McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 341 (quoting Talley v. California, 362 U.S. at 64). Stevens noted various well-known authors throughout literary history who had opted to publish either anonymously or under a pseudonym, including Mark Twain, O. Henry, Benjamin Franklin, and Voltaire.McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 341, n.4. He then stated that the "freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond the literary realm", referring to the decision in Talley, as well as The Federalist Papers, a collection of anonymous essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to promote the ratification of what is now the U.S. Constitution.McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 342.
In justifying a First Amendment right to anonymity, Stevens wrote that while curiosity might cause a reader to inquire about an author's identity, an author's "decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible".McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 341–42. Stevens added that anonymity "provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not like its proponent".McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 342. Stevens concluded that Talleys reasoning "embraced a respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes", stating that "this tradition is perhaps best exemplified by the secret ballot, the hard-won right to vote one's conscience without fear of retaliation".McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 343.
Exacting scrutiny standard
Because Ohio's law was "a regulation of pure speech" as opposed to a regulation of merely "the mechanics of the electoral process", Stevens applied a standard of "exacting scrutiny", a more rigorous standard of scrutiny than the Ohio Supreme Court had applied.McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 345. Under this standard, the Court may uphold Ohio's law "only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest".McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 347. Specifically, Ohio must demonstrate that its stated interests "in preventing fraudulent and libelous statements" and "in providing the electorate with relevant information" are sufficient to justify its law against anonymous campaign literature.McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 at 348.